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The objectives of this paper are three-fold.  The first is to rebut Charles Kindleberger’s famous
dictum that usury ‘belongs less to economic history than to the history of ideas’; and in particular to
demonstrate that the resuscitation of the anti-usury campaign from the early 13
th century led to a veritable
financial revolution in late-medieval French and Flemish towns: one that became the ‘norm’ in modern
European states from the 16
th century (in England, from 1693): a  shift in public borrowing from interest-
bearing loans to the sale of annuities, usually called rentes or renten.  That anti-usury campaign had two
major features: (1) the decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, which provided harsh punishments –
excommunication -- for both unrepentant usurers and princes who failed to suppress them; and (2) the
establishment of the two mendicant preaching orders: the Franciscans (1210) and the Dominicans (1216),
whose monks preached hellfire and eternal damnation against all presumed usurers – including, of course,
anyone who received any interest on government loans.  There is much evidence that from the 1220s, many
financiers in many French and Flemish towns, fearing for their immortal souls, preferred to accept far lower
returns on buying rentes than the interest they would have earned on loans.  These rentes, based on 8
th-
century Carolingian census contracts, had two basic forms: (1) life-annuities, by which a citizen purchased
from the government, with a lump sum of capital, an annual income stream lasting a lifetime, or the lifetime
of his wife as well; (2) perpetual annuities, by which the annual income stream was indeed perpetual, or until
such time as the government chose to redeem the rentes, at par.  Initially, some theologians opposed sales of
rentes as subterfuges to cloak evasion of the usury doctrine.  But in 1250-1, Pope Innocent IV declared them
to be non-usurious contracts, essentially because they were not loans.  Subsequent popes in the 15
th century
confirmed his views and the non-usurious character of rentes, on two conditions: (1) that the buyer of the
rente could never  demand redemption or repayment, and (2) that the annual annuity payments (and any
ultimate redemptions) be in accordance with actual rent contracts: i.e., that the funds be derived from the
products of the land.  Ecclesiastical authorities soon agreed that taxes on the consumption of the products of
the land (and sea) met this test: i.e., taxes on beer and wine (which always accounted for the largest share),
bread, textiles, fish, meat, dairy products, etc.
The second objective of this paper is to measure the importance of renten in the civic finances of
Flemish towns, in terms of both revenues and expenditures: from the annual town accounts Ghent (14
th
century only), and Aalst (1395-1550), where they had far greater importance.  The related third objective is
to measure  the burden of the excise taxes for master building craftsmen in Aalst, in tables that measure the
values of the excise tax revenues expressed in real terms: first, in the equivalent number of ‘baskets of
consumables’ (which form of the base of the Consumer Price Index), and second their value in terms of the
annual money-wage incomes of master masons (for 210 days).  This provides an entirely new look at the late-
medieval ‘standard of living’ controversy – with indications that this consumption-tax burden sometimes rose
from about 13,200 to almost 30,000 days’ wage income, for a town of perhaps 3600 inhabitants (but
obviously less dramatic on a per capita basis).  That tax burden rose the most strongly when, by other
indications, real wages (RWI = NWI/CPI) were also finally rising; and thus possibly these real wage gains
were largely eliminated. That per capita tax burden would have been all the greater if, in the course of the 15
th
century, Aalst had experienced the same decline as did small towns of Brabant, to the east, on the order of
25%, and some other Flemish towns, in which the population decline varied from 9% to 28 %. 
In earlier publications I had challenged the widespread view that the era following the Black Death,
with a radical change in the land:labour ratio, came to be a  ‘Golden Age’ of the artisan and labourer. I
contended instead that frequent inflations eroded or eliminated wage gains, and thus that periodic rises in real
wages were due essentially to steep deflations combined with pronounced wage-stickiness.  As I also
calculated, English artisans in the 1340s had earned real wages that were about 50% of the Flemish; but by
the 1480s, they had narrowed that  gap (with much less inflation) to about 80%.  That gap was probably even
smaller, until the 1640s, when England’s Parliament finally imposed similar excise taxes on consumption.
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The medieval origins of the ‘financial revolution’ in government borrowing: usury and rentes 
The establishment of permanent funded national debts in many European states from the sixteenth
to eighteenth centuries, often collectively called the ‘financial revolution’, owed their true origin to a  much
earlier medieval innovation in the public finances of medieval Flemish and Artesian towns, from the 1220s,
which in turn was a response to the Church’s recent and much revivified anti-usury campaign.  The essence
of this so-called ‘financial revolution’ in establishing a permanent funded national debt, requires a
clarification of each of its three main components.
2 First it was ‘public’ because the debt was the
responsibility of the government itself, and not, as had so often been the case in medieval and early modern
Europe, the personal obligation of the prince.  Second, this public debt  was based not on loans, or on any
other forms of borrowing, but instead on the sale of perpetual though redeemable annuities, a financial
instrument that called a rente (renten in Dutch) in the Netherlands, France, and Germany (juros in Spain).
32
and England, 1688 - 1789’, Journal of Economic History, 49:1 (March 1989), 95-124; François Velde and
David Weir, ‘The Financial Market and Government Debt Policy in France, 1746 - 1793’, Journal of
Economic History, 52:1 (1992), 1-39.  For nineteenth-century European public finance based on annuities
or rentes (not bonds, despite the title), see Niall Ferguson, ‘Political Risk and the International Bond Market
between the 1848 Revolution and the Outbreak of the First World War’, The Economic History Review, 2
nd
ser., 59:1 (February 2006), 70-112.  For Spain (Aragon-Catalonia and Castile), see n.  6  below. 
4   See the sources in n.  2, above.  After the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and the overthrow of James
II (1685-88), Parliament invited William III of Orange, the Stadhouder of the (Dutch) United Provinces, to
rule jointly as William III (r. 1689-1702) with his wife Mary (r.1689-1694), the daughter and heir of James
II.  But William brought with him his ongoing war with Louis XIV (r.1643-1715) of France, a war that
England was then  ill equipped to finance.  The culmination of the English ‘Financial Revolution’ was
‘Pelhams’ Conversion’ (1749-1757) by which the Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Henry Pelhams
consolidated all of the outstanding issues of the now British public debt, chiefly in perpetual annuities, in the
Consolidated Stock of the Nation (Consols), which trade to this day on the London Stock Exchange. See the
very influential article on the role of the Glorious Revolution: Douglass North and Barry Weingast,
‘Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-
Century Britain’, Journal of Economic History, 49: 4 (Dec. 1989), 803–32; and see recent attacks on their
views in: Nathan Sussman and Yishay Yafeh, ‘Institutional Reforms, Financial Development and Sovereign
Debt: Britain, 1690 - 1790’, Journal of Economic History, 66:4 (Dec.  2006), 882-905; David Stasavage,
‘Partisan Politics and Public Debt: The Importance of the “Whig Supremacy” for Britain’s Financial
Revolution’, European Review of Economic History, 11:1 (April 2007), 123-53.
5  Tracy, A Financial Revolution (in n.  3 above),  James Tracy, ‘Taxation and State Debt’, in Thomas
Brady, Heiko Oberman, and James Tracy, eds., Handbook of European History, 1500 - 1600: Late Middle
Ages, Renaissance and Reformation, 2 vols. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994-95), vol. I: Structures and Assertions,
pp. 563-88; James Tracy, ‘On the Dual Origins of Long-Term Urban Debt in Medieval Europe’, in Karel
Because these rentes or annuities were  perpetual obligations (unless the state chose to redeem them), the
public debt was ‘permanent’ – in stark contrast to earlier forms of state borrowing, which were almost always
very short-term, and usually with a specific maturity date.  Finally, that public debt was ‘funded’ in the sense
that the governments concerned formally authorized (usually by legislation) that specific excise or
consumption taxes be used to make the annual annuity payments and, when necessary, to redeem these
annuities or rentes.
Whether the issue is medieval or more modern forms of European public finance, and related forms
of taxation, historians may justly assume one constant:  that the primary if not exclusive reason for such
public borrowing was financing either warfare or the military defence of the state.  Although financing public
works may have played a relatively greater role in late-medieval urban finances, the costs of urban defence
were still almost always a major issue.  Certainly in the late-medieval and early- modern Low Countries, the
towns were also responsible for their share of the costs for territorial defences of the feudal principalities in
this region (subsequently unified as the Habsburg Netherlands).
That English historians have so frequently used the term ‘financial revolution’ to refer their own
country’s establishment of a permanent funded debt between 1693 and 1752, itself a product of both the
Glorious Revolution (1688) and of wars more costly than England had ever before fought,  implies that
England had initiated this financial innovation, and during this very era.
4  James Tracy, however,  has
demonstrated beyond any question that, as a system of national public finance, this so-called ‘financial
revolution’, i.e., one based on the sale of rentes or annuities, was to be found much earlier, in the sixteenth-
century Habsburg Netherlands, and was then transmitted to England from the Dutch ‘Republic of the United
Provinces’.
5   One might cavil, however, that in the Habsburg Netherlands this form of public finance was3
Davids, Marc Boone, and Paul  Janssens, eds., Urban Public Debts: Urban Government and the Market for
Annuities in Western Europe, 14th-18th Centuries, Studies in European Urban History (1100-1800) vol. 3
(Turnout: Brepols, 2003), pp. 13-26; James Tracy, Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War: Campaign
Strategy, International Finance, and Domestic Politics (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2002).
6 See the arguments in Munro, ‘The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution’, pp.  505-62.  For
Spain, see Yvan Roustit, ‘La consolidation de la dette publique à Barcelone au milieu du XIVe siècle’,
Estudios de historia moderna, 4:2 (1954), 15-156;  Juan Gelabert, ‘Castile: 1504 - 1808’, in Richard Bonney,
ed., The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200-1815 (Oxford, 1999), pp. 207-212; Gabriel Tortella and
Francisco Comín, ‘Fiscal and Monetary Institutions in Spain (1600-1900)’, in Michael Bordo and Roberto
Cortés-Conde, eds., Transferring Wealth and Power from the Old to the New World: Monetary and Financial
Institutions in the 17
th Through the 19
th Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 140-
48.
7  See n.  3 above, and nn.  31-37 below.
8  For these circumstances see Munro, ‘Origins of the Financial Revolution’, pp.  506-13; Appendix
B on the usury doctrine.
still the responsibility of the provincial governments, and that a stronger ‘national’ case could be made for
Habsburg Spain, from at least the reign of Emperor Charles V (also Emperor of the Netherlands).
6
Nevertheless, the issue is not the actual form of the government so responsible but the nature of this form of
public finance; and in that respect,  Tracy, Van Werveke, and several other historians had noted that public
civic borrowing based on the sale of rentes/renten was being practised in the towns of northern France
(chiefly Artois) and Flanders from at least the 1220s, albeit on a small scale.
7
The thirteenth-century anti-usury campaigns: usury as a mortal sin against Natural Law
What none had noted, however, was the role of the anti-usury campaign in instigating or promoting
this quite revolutionary form of medieval public finance, for reasons that have to be found in a brief
examination of the medieval usury doctrine, as it had evolved by the thirteenth century.  Because the usury
doctrine itself goes back to the very earliest days of the Christian Church, in many respects one inherited from
Greek, Roman, and Jewish civilisations, one may argue that it had always provided a hindrance to any
European governments, whether those of towns or principalities, that had sought to meet its financial
obligations by borrowing.  But until the full evolution of the usury doctrine and especially before the
consequent intensification in the anti-usury campaign in the early thirteenth century, this doctrine had been
more of a nuisance than a real obstacle in public borrowing. 
Certainly the concept of ‘usury’ and the full evolution of the doctrine have both been misunderstood
by a majority of historians.  Before the sixteenth century (for reasons to be noted later, in Appendix B), the
term usury had never meant excessive interest: it meant any interest at all, any payment beyond the actual
loan, beyond the principal sum that had been borrowed (except under very special and narrow circumstances).
8  Nor, contrary to many views (‘conventional wisdom’), did usury apply only to so-called consumption loans.
Nevertheless, if the actual meaning of the tem had not changed, the severity of ecclesiastical opposition to
usury did evolve: first, from a sin condemned when practised by the clergy to one practised by any Christian
(thus it did not apply to Jews); from a sin against charity to a sin against justice, and finally to a truly mortal
sin against Natural Law – and thus a sin directly against God Himself.
The core of the Scholastic usury doctrine: the Roman law concept of the loan as a mutuum4
9  The codification of Roman law under Emperor Justinian I (527 - 565 CE).   Chiefly compiled by
the lawyer Tribonian, the Corpus iuris civilis consists of:  the Code (12 books) in 528-29 CE; the Digest (50
books) and Institutes (4 books) of CE 529-33; and the Novellae post codicem constitutiones, most of which
were completed by Tribonian’s death, in 542 CE.  Note that, for Roman citizens,  usury – lending money for
a specified rate of interest – had been prohibited by the Lex Genucia, in 322 BCE.  Under Roman law,
mutuum contracts themselves could therefore not specify interest, and permitted the repayment only of the
exact sum lent; but Roman law did permit auxiliary contracts (stipulatio) to specify interest payments under
certain conditions, with supposedly ‘moderate’ interest rates.  See Odd Langholm, Economics in the Medieval
Schools: Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money and Usury According to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200 -
1350,  Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, vol. 19 (Leiden and New York, 1992), p.
37; John T. Noonan, The Scholastic Analysis of Usury (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), pp. 22-33, 39-40, 51-81.
10  Decretum Gratiani D. 88, c.11,  cited in Odd Langholm, The Aristotelian Analysis of Usury
(Bergen and Oslo; and New York, 1984),  pp. 71-72.  The Decretum also incorporated decrees of the Second
Lateran Council (1139). Though not officially sanctioned by the papacy of this era, the Decretum ‘became
the first part of the body of canon law in the law curriculum’; and it was finally ratified as part of the Corpus
iuris canonici by Pope Gregory XIII in the Roman edition of 1582. See Kenneth Pennington, ‘Gratian’, in
Joseph Strayer, et al., eds., Dictionary of the Middle Ages, 13 vols., vol. V (New York, 1985), pp. 656-58.
11 Langholm, Legacy of Scholasticism, p. 59: ‘Si quis usuram accipit, rapinam facit; vita non vivit’.
(From De bono mortis, 12:56, CSEL 321/1, p. 752).  See Ezekiel 18.13: He who ‘hath given forth upon usury,
and hath taken increase: shall he live?  He shall not live ..  he shall surely die’.  The Holy Bible: King James
Version (1611), p.  711.
12  See Langholm, Legacy of Scholasticism, p. 59; Langholm, Aristotelian Analysis, pp. 71-2.
The core argument against usury was one based firmly on Roman Law, whose codification took place
during the reign of Emperor Justinian I (527 - 565 CE).
9   Derived from  Roman concepts of property rights,
the essential  Roman Law principle concerning a loan was the following:  that the ownership of the money
in a loan contract, in effect the ownership of  the capital and thus of all the property rights attached to the use
of that capital, was transferred from the lender, as the original owner, to the borrower, who become the sole
owner for the entire duration of the loan contract. Given the very great importance that medieval European
society continued to give to the Justinian Code,  it was included in the earliest compilation of canon law, the
Concordia discordantium canonum, commonly known as Gratian’s Decretum, compiled between 1130 and
1140.
10
  That principle can well be seen in the very exact term for a loan, found in both Roman and medieval
Latin, and thus the term used in both the Justinian Code and Gratian’s canon-law Decretum:  the mutuum –
literally, ‘what was thine becomes mine’. Consequently, usury was a sin, well beyond any concept of
violating Christian principles concerning charity,  because it was theft of property; and that concept – ‘usury
as theft’ –  can be found in virtually all later-medieval Scholastic and canon law literature.  Indeed, it can be
found even before the publication of the Justinian Code, as early as the fourth century, in a statement
attributed to Bishop St.  Ambrose of Milan (339-97 CE):  ‘if someone takes usury, he commits violent
robbery (rapina), and he shall not live’.  That seemingly harsh view is, in fact, based on very similar words
in Ezekiel, in the Old Testament.
11  And similar if less harsh views can also be found in the fifth-century
ecclesiastical palea  Ejiciens.  Both St.  Ambrose’s brutal stricture and this palea are quoted, with a strong
emphasis on their importance, in Gratian’s Decretum. Furthermore, as early as 1165, the Bolognese canon
lawyer Paucapalea had correlated the Justinian Code entries on the mutuum with Gratian’s entry on usura in
the Decretum;   and, in 1187, Huguccio, an even more renowned Bolognese canon lawyer, had explicitly
enunciated the arguments on the transfer of ownership rights in a mutuum to justify the usury doctrine.
12  If
not yet fully a sin against natural law, usury was, in this context of ownership rights, a sin against5
13 In typical and traditional partnership contracts from Graeco-Roman times, each partner was entitled
to a share of the profits that was in proportion to their individual capital investments; and they were similarly
liable for losses and debts, in the same proportion.  In the typical commenda contract, which was always
drawn up for only one maritime venture (and did not apply to land-based trade), in which one partner supplied
all the capital, and the other partner supplied all the enterprise and labour, the investor received 75 percent
of the profits and thus the active sea-going merchants received only 25 percent.  If the venture was a failure,
without any profit, the investor received nothing, but he also enjoyed ‘limited liability’ in that he was not
liable for any of the losses, debts, or other liabilities that the active sea-going merchant had incurred in this
or in any other related ventures.  See Robert S. Lopez and Irving Raymond, eds., Medieval Trade in the
Mediterranean World:  Illustrative Documents Illustrative Documents Translated with Introductions and
Notes, Records of Civilization, Sources, and Studies no. 51 (New York and London, 1955), Part III:
‘Commercial Contracts and Commercial Investments’, pp. 157-238.
14  See in particular Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. 38-39, 52-53.
15  Benjamin Jowett, trans. and ed., The Politics of Aristotle: Translated Into English, 2 vols., vol. I:
Introduction and Translation (Oxford, 1885), p. 19: Politics, Book I.10. 1258b. For the significance of
Aristotle’s Politics and Nichomachean Ethics, see Odd  Langholm, The Aristotelian Analysis of Usury
(Bergen and Oslo; and New York, 1984), pp.  5-21, 54-61; Odd Langholm, The Legacy of Scholasticism in
Economic Thought: Antecedents of Choice and Power (Cambridge and New York, 1998), pp.  21-22.
commutative justice – the equality of exchange – in that the lender, in exacting usury (interest), had received
a greater value on the redemption of the loan than he had originally given.
  Indeed, that principle on the ownership of capital still remains valid in modern financial
jurisprudence, and provides the fundamental distinction between equity investments and loan investments.
That, in essence, also explains why the only investment contract that the Church found to be sinful, as usury,
was the mutuum or loan contract, while the Church always readily accepted both profit and rent as fully licit
returns on any equity investments.  For, obviously those who invested in partnership contracts or commenda
contracts in some commercial enterprise or venture always fully retained the ownership of their capitals so
invested.
13   The very same was true of anyone who, having invested in physical property, then lent  the use
of that property (land, buildings, animals, etc.),  receiving in return a rental income. 
The Role of Aristotle: Natural Law and the ‘sterility of money’
It is now a commonplace in the literature to ascribe the full fruition of the medieval Scholastic usury
doctrine  to the thirteenth-century reintroduction of Aristotle’s principal treatises: first, the Nichomachean
Ethics, translated from Greek in to Latin, in 1246-47, and revised in the 1260s, when, second, his renowned
treatise on  Politics was also translated. Both works had a most profound influence on the two major
theologians of this era:  St. Albert the Great, or Albertus Magnus (b. 1193 or 1206 - d. 1280), and his most
famous student, St. Thomas Aquinas (1225- 1274).
14 The importance of Aristotle’s treatises for the usury
doctrine was based on the assumption that money, in the natural order, had only one function: as a medium
of exchange.  From that premise flowed two essential components of the medieval usury doctrine : first, the
concept of the ‘sterility of money’, and second, the concept that, because of that essential sterility, usury was
a sin against Natural Law, as can be seen in this quotation from his Politics: 
15
The most hated sort [of money-making], and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes
a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural use of it. For money was intended to be
used in exchange, but not to increase at interest.  And this term usury [J`6@H], which means
the birth of money from money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring
resembles the parent. Whereof of all modes of making money this is the most unnatural.6
16  That did involve some problems that only a few theologians recognized: namely, the repayment
of loans, made in silver coins, with debased silver coins of the same nominal value but therefore of inferior
real value.  On this important but neglected issue, see Thomas Sargent and François Velde, The Big Problem
of Small Change (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp.  69-99.
17  John Gilchrist,  The Church and Economic Activity in the Middle Ages (New York, 1969),  pp.
182-83: Canon 25:  ‘Seeing that almost everywhere the crime of usury has taken such hold that many pass
over other professions to devote themselves to the business of usury, as if it were lawful, and thus disregard
the strict scriptural prohibition, we decree that notorious [publicly known] usurers are not to be admitted to
the communion of the altar, nor, if they die in that sin, to receive Christian burial.’
Nevertheless, one must clearly recognize that the true and fundamental basis of the usury doctrine,
concerning the transfer of ownership of money in the mutuum loan contract, long predated the reintroduction
of Aristotle’s treatises into western Europe.  Furthermore, Aristotle’s ‘sterility of money’ argument did not
subsequently become the major feature of usury doctrine, for many theologians and canon lawyers came to
recognize that ‘money’, as investment capital, is not in fact ‘sterile’.  But the ‘sterility of money’ concept had
the great virtue of being so easy for the public to grasp, when the Church and its agents conducted a much
more intense anti-usury campaign in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. 
Finally, St. Thomas Aquinas himself made another major contribution to the anti-usury doctrine by
resolving any lingering doubts about the differences between usury, in lending money, and rent, in lending
property, by distinguishing between the role of fungibles and non-fungibles in such a loan (mutuum), without
specific references to the core issue of the ownership of capital.  Money (coins), and similar fungibles, such
as wine and grain, were necessarily totally consumed (and in St.  Thomas’s view, destroyed) in their use, so
that repayment, or redemption of the loan, necessarily involved their replacement with different but exactly
identical objects, i.e., objects of essentially identical value.
16  Nobody – or very few —  would rationally
borrow money (coins) in order to hoard it; and, as Aristotle had stipulated, money had only one use: as a
medium of exchange, a mechanism of payment in trade.  In contrast, the repayment of a loan of non-fungibles
– such as the leasing of property, buildings, farm animals, etc. – involved not their replacement but the return
of the very same objects,  which were, in their use, subject to ‘wear and tear’, thus further justifying the fully
licit payment of rent. 
At the same time, however, one may note that, since rents were also calculated on the basis of time
– so much rent per month or year  – another common Scholastic argument, namely, that ‘usury was the Theft
of Time, which belongs to God alone’, was clearly illogical.  The utility of that argument was, however, that
it clearly appealed more to  laymen, and especially to the large mass of the uneducated public, as a much more
readily understandable and thus convincing explanation why usury was truly a mortal sin.
The anti-usury campaign: the role of Lateran Councils and the mendicant preaching orders
  The origins of the revived and indeed harshly vigorous (almost virulent) ‘campaign against usury’,
which was to prove so important in altering the character of medieval urban public finances, had begun almost
a full century before the re-introduction of Aristotle’s treaties and the publication of St.  Thomas Aquinas’
Summa Theologica (ca.  1265-74).  One may well contend that this campaign had begun with the Third
Lateran Council of 1179, which, after endorsing all of the Second Lateran Councils prohibitions against usury
(1139),  issued the formal sanction or penalty of  excommunication – i.e., complete banishment from the
Church –  for all usurers who did not repent and restore their ill-gotten ‘stolen’ gains.  It also forbade them
to receive a Christian burial if they ‘died in sin’, as unrepentant usurers.
17
The next and Fourth Lateran Council, of 1215, apart from reiterating all of the prohibitions against7
18 See Constitution 67, from the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), translated and published in Gilchrist,
Church and Economic Activity,  pp. 182-83, in particular this passage: ‘The more that Christians are
restrained from the practice of usury, the more are they oppressed in this matter by the treachery of the Jews,
so that in a short time they will exhaust the resources of Christians...’; and thus, ‘we ordain in this decree that
if in the future ... Jews extort from Christians oppressive and excessive interest, the society of Christians shall
be denied them until they have made suitable satisfaction for their excesses’.  This passage is evidently a
source of the common erroneous view  that the Church opposed only ‘excessive’ interest. 
19  The Muslim presence was almost non-existent, especially in commerce and finance; and, in any
event, Muslims themselves were prohibited by the Koran from usurious lending practices (the Arabic term
is raba).  See Haym Soloveitchik, ‘Usury, Jewish Law’, and Seth Ward, ‘Usury, Islamic Law’, both in Joseph
Strayer, et al., eds. Dictionary of the Middle Ages, vol. XII (New York, 1989), pp. 339-41.  Jewish law,
however, permitted exacting usury from gentiles.  See n.  11, above (Ezekiel 18:13).
20 On licensed Jewish money-lenders, see Joseph Shatzmiller,  Shylock Reconsidered: Jews,
Moneylending, and Medieval Society (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1990); and Maristella Botticini,
‘A Tale of “Benevolent” Governments: Private Credit Markets, Public Finance, and the Role of Jewish
Lenders in Medieval and Renaissance Italy’, Journal of Economic History, 60:1 (March 2000), 164-89;
Daniel Bornstein, ‘Law, Religion, and Economics: Jewish Moneylenders in Christian Cortona’, in John
Marino and Thomas Kuehn, eds., A Renaissance of Conflicts: Visions and Revisions of Law and Society in
Italy and Spain, Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, Essays and Studies vol.  3 (Toronto, 2003),
pp.  241-56.  In late thirteenth-century Flanders, Lombards (north Italians) were also allowed to engage in
pawn-broking, at rates up to 18 percent.  See Raymond de Roover, Money, Banking, and Credit in Mediaeval
Bruges: Italian Merchant Bankers, Lombards, and Money-Changers: A Study in the Origins of Banking
(Cambridge, Mass., 1948), pp. 99-148.
21  See Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury , pp. 38-39, 52-53; Ralph McInery, ‘Aquinas, St.
Thomas’, in Joseph Strayer, et al., eds., Dictionary of the Middle Ages, vol. I (New York, 1982), pp. 353-66.
usury, and the prescribed punishments for this sin, provided two additional features of great importance.
First, it issued a vicious,  excoriating diatribe against Jews, for their supposed ‘treachery’ and ‘cruel
oppression’ in extorting ‘oppressive and excessive interest’, in engaging in licensed pawn broking.
18 The
prohibitions against usury, it must be noted, applied only to Christians; and the only non-Christians in western
Europe who were able to engage in lending were Jews. 
19  While both ecclesiastical and secular regulations
did limit the interest rates that Jewish money-lenders were allowed to charge, sometimes the legal limit
interest reached 25 percent (reflecting the high risk factor of non-payment): or up to 43.33 percent in
pawnbroking (2d per week).
20  By so associating Jewish money-lenders with usury, the Council certainly
made it appear to be all the more a heinous, and not just  mortal, sin to a largely anti-Semitic public.  And thus
these provisions proved to be a very powerful weapon in the new revival of the anti-usury campaign.  Second,
the Fourth Lateran Council made annual confessions obligatory for all; and that of course meant confessions
of usury, another powerful weapon for what became the prime agency for the anti-usury campaign: the new
mendicant preaching orders.
The first of these  was the Order of Friars Minor or Franciscans (St.  Francis of Assisi), founded
c.1206-10;  and the second was the Order of Friars Preacher or Dominicans (St.  Dominic), founded in 1216,
the very year after Lateran IV.  Of the two, the Dominicans became the even more hostile foe of usury.  In
the thirteenth century it would boast such leading theologians in the anti-usury campaigns as St. Albertus
Magnus and St.  Thomas Aquinas.
21  Obviously the far more powerful agents in this campaign were those
mendicant friars who were sent out to preach to the  chiefly illiterate and uneducated public.  Not content with
the formal statements and strictures issue by the Lateran Councils, the Dominican and Franciscan friars
concocted their own lurid exempla – diabolic and utterly horrifying stories about the ghastly fates awaiting8
22 See in particular, Jacques Le Goff, ‘The Usurer and Purgatory’, in Center for Medieval and
Renaissance Studies, UCLA, ed., The Dawn of Modern Banking (New Haven, 1979), pp. 29-34, contending
that the friars linked usurers ‘with the worst evildoers, the worst occupations,  the worst sins, and the worst
vices’. 
23 Canto XVII of Inferno, in Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy, Carlyle-Okey-Wicksteed
translation, ed. C.H. Grandagent (New York: Modern Library Editions, 1950), p. 93.   Set in the year 1300,
it was probably written between 1304 and 1321.
24 See LeGoff, ‘Purgatory’, pp.  29-34. No longer would one find open and direct references to
interest payments that had been fairly common in commercial contracts of the twelfth century.  For Genoese
examples, see Lopez and Raymond, Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World,  no. 66, pp. 158-59 (Genoa,
16 July 1161; and  John Pryor, ed.,  Business Contracts of Medieval Provence: Selected Notulae from the
Cartulary of Giraud Amalric of Marseilles, 1248, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts
no. 54 (Toronto, 1981).
25 For a good summary of the usury doctrine and the related clerical punishments, see James
Brundage, ‘Usury’, Dictionary of the Middle Ages, vol. 12 (New York, 1989), pp. 335-39; and also Lawrin
Armstrong, ‘Usury’, in Joel Mokyr, et al, eds., The Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History, 5 vols. (New
York, 2003), vol. 5, pp. 183-85.
usurers in the eternal fires of Hell, thereby convincing most of the public that usurers were amongst the very
worst of all evildoers.
22  That usurers so richly deserved this horrid fate was certainly the view of the famed
Florentine Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), who, in his Commedia (Divine Comedy), placed usurers in the lower
depths of Hell, the Seventh Circle (Inferno), as ‘the last class of sinners that are punished in the burning
sands’.
23 In their inflammatory preaching, with such enormous public appeal, the mendicant preachers also
convinced secular governments of their God-ordained duty to enforce the usury ban vigorously  during the
later Middle Ages.
24 
Finally, the mendicant preaching orders and others engaged in the anti-usury campaign received
much valued additional support from the famous Decretales that Pope Gregory IX (1227-1241) issued in
1234.
25   Amongst its many detailed provisions are the following: first, that usurers were forever to be classed
as infames: ineligible to hold public office, honours, or to testify in court.  To enforce that provision, all
princes were commanded to expel usurers from their realms and never readmit them; and landlords were
forbidden to rent property to those lending money at interest.  Indeed, clerics who permitted Church burials
of usurers were to be classed as usurers themselves.  The  wills and testaments of usurers were to be held
invalid; and the  heirs of usurers who failed to make restitutions were also to be held as usurers and infames.
Well before Gregory IX’s issue of these Decretales – which really just confirmed and codified the
Church’s now well established doctrines – and not long after the establishment of the two mendicant
preaching orders,  the anti-usury campaign had already borne fruit in a very fundamental change in urban
public finances: with the first successful issue of rentes, in the 1220s.
The origins and evolution of the rente contracts
As indicated above, the vital importance of the rente contract in the  medieval ‘financial revolution’,
involving urban public finances, was its essential character : that it  was not a loan, or any other related form
of borrowing, even though it did indeed constitute part of the public debt.  Instead, it represented the town
government’s sale of a future steam of urban income that was paid to the purchaser in return for a lump sum
of capital, paid in full at the time of purchase.  This peculiar form of public finance has no known antecedent
in the ancient world.  It first  appears in private rather than public finance: as a census contract that some9
26  Abbott Payson Usher, The Early History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe, vol. I: The
Structure and Functions of the Early Credit System: Banking in Catalonia: 1240-1723, Harvard Economic
Studies, vol. 75 (Cambridge, Mass., 1943; reissued New York, 1967), p. 146, citing Theo. Sommerlad, Die
Wirtschaftliche Thätigkeit der deutschen Kirche (Leipzig, 1905), vol. II, p. 171: reference to Abbey of St.
Gallen, 816 CE;   Tracy, ‘On the Dual Origins’, pp. 13-16, citing (p.  14) the seminal work of Bruno Kuske,
Das Schuldenwesen der deutschen Städte im Mittelalter, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft,
Ergänzungsheft XII (Tübingen, 1904), pp. 12-24 (whose earliest example is for the Abbey of St. Gallen, in
Hergau, ‘um 700’).   Raymond Van Uytven, Stadsfinanciën en stadsekonmie te Leuven: van de XII
e tot het
einde der XVIe eeuw (Brussels, 1961), p. 196,  citing M. Van Haaften, ‘Lijfrente’, Winkler  Prins
Encyclopaedie, 18 vols. (Amsterdam, 1947-54), vol. XIII,  p. 165 (footnote), in which he had contended that
the ancient Greek city state of Miletus (ca.  200 BCE) had used a similar census contract.  But there is no
evidence to substantiate this claim; and Van Haaften’s revised entry on ‘Lijfrente’, in the Grote Winkler
Prins, vol. XII (Amsterdam-Brussels, 1971), pp. 351-52 does not repeat this unfounded assertion.
27  See Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. 154-70 (quotation on p. 155).
28 See Bernard Schnapper, Les rentes au XVI  siècle: histoire d’un instrument de crédit, S.E.V.P.E.N,
École Pratique des Hautes Études: Centre de recherches historiques: Affaires et gens d’affaires, vol. 12 (Paris,
1957), pp. 50-61; Herman Van der Wee, ‘Monetary, Credit, and Banking Systems’, in E.E. Rich and Charles
Wilson, eds., The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol. V: The Economic Organization of Early
Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp.  303-05.
29  See David Herlihy, Medieval and Renaissance Pistoia, 1200-1430 (New Haven, 1967), pp. 136-
45, and Table 18, with graph 3: median price of a perpetual rent of one staio of  wheat); p. 241 (church
revenues in perpetual rents); Pryor, Business Contracts of Medieval Provence: see censuales, in  notulae 55
(pp. 168-71), 93 (pp. 230-31).
Carolingian monasteries had been issuing from about the early eighth century.  In order to secure bequests
of  lands from the laity, monasteries had guaranteed the donor that, in return for surrendering all property
rights to the land, the donor would receive an annual usufruct income (redditus) from the lands donated, i.e.,
‘fruits’ of that property, delivered either  in ‘kind’, as a share of the harvest,  or later, more commonly in
money, for the rest of his or her life, and sometimes also for the lives of designated heirs.
26  Because that
annual income was quite obviously deemed to be part of the rental value of the land, the census contract more
commonly came to be known as rente, from which the now common financial term rentier has been derived.
27
In the realm of medieval private finance, that Carolingian contract developed into two somewhat
different contracts: (1) the bail à rente, more closely related to the Carolingian contract:  the sale of real estate
or some form of immobile property in return for a perpetual annual income (normally  hereditary); and its
variant, (2)  the constitution de rente,  also known as the rente à prix d’argent: by which a property holder
sold, for a specified lump sum of money,  the right to receive a fixed annual income from his property or other
real assets, though the property itself remained under his ownership. 
28  Long before its use in public finance,
this contract had become a widespread vehicle for private investment in the agricultural economies of
Mediterranean western Europe (Italy and Aragon in particular): one by which small peasant landholders
received needed capital by ‘selling’ such contracts to wealthy bourgeois merchants and financiers, who
received in return this form of perpetual rente income.
29  The property-holding seller or issuer of the rente
contract was known as the débirentier, who normally pledged all of his goods and assets to meet the annual
payment, on penalty of forfeiture; and the buyer of the contract, the one receiving the future stream of income,
was known as the crédirentier.  The transfer of this contract to the realm of public finance meant that the city
government assumed the role of the débirentier seller or issuer of the rentes (and, in theory at least, similarly
obliged to pledge urban assets as collateral for the annuity payments).10
30  See Georges Bigwood, Le régime juridique et économique du commerce de l’argent dans la
Belgique du moyen âge, Academie Royale de Belgique, Classe des Lettres, vol. XIV, 2 vols.  (Brussels, 1921-
22), vol. I, pp. 120-23; and Appendix A, below; Munro, ‘Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution’, pp.
505-62; Tracy, A Financial Revolution, pp.  108-38; Herman Van der Wee, ‘Anvers et les innovations de la
technique financière aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles’,  Annales: E.S.C., 22 (1967), 1067-89, republished as
‘Antwerp and the New Financial Methods of the 16th and 17th Centuries’, in Herman Van der Wee, The Low
Countries in the Early Modern World , trans. by Lizabeth Fackelman, Variorum Series (Aldershot, 1993),
pp. 145-66; Van der Wee, ‘Monetary, Credit, and Banking Systems’, pp. 290-393;
31   Tracy, ‘On the Dual Origins’, pp.  16, citing in particular (in n.  19) Pierre Bougard and Carlos
Wyffels, Les finances de Calais au XIIIe siècle (Brussels, 1966).
32  Pierre Desportes, Reims et les Rémois au XIIIe et XIVe siècles (Paris, 1979), pp. 127-29; Tracy,
‘Dual Origins’, pp.  16-17 (I am much indebted to James Tracy to this reference).
33  Desportes, Reims et les Rémois, p. 128; similarly cited in Tracy, ‘On the Dual Origins’, pp.  16-17.
For the ecclesiastical opposition, see below, p.  13 and nn.  47-50.
Those towns that sold or issued these rente contracts used, from the very beginning, two distinct
forms: (1) perpetual hereditary rents, known as rentes héritables (erfelijk renten, erfrenten, and later called
losrenten, in Flemish/Dutch); and (2)  life-rents, known as rentes viagères (French) and lijfrenten (Flemish),
which were normally extinguished on the death of the holder.  Some of the latter  were issued, however, for
two or three designated lives, i.e., to be transferred to a spouse, child, or some other close relative.  Frequently
the designated recipient of the annuity income was an infant, who thus earned income over a far longer life-
span than that left to the actual investor.  In general, through the centuries, the annual ‘annuity’ payments on
single life-rents, though always far lower than interest rates on voluntary short-term loans,  were always much
higher than those on perpetual or hereditary rents, sometimes double, perhaps reflecting the fact that the latter,
by their very nature inheritable and also assignable, ultimately proved to be more marketable, certainly by
the sixteenth century.
30
The first documented and successful urban sale rentes took place in or just before 1228: at Troyes,
one of the major towns of Champagne Fairs, which then governed the commerce between north-western
Europe and Italy.  That transaction involved the sale of a series of several rentes viagères to a group of
Artesian financiers from Arras and St. Quentin.
31  Subsequently, in December 1232, Troyes sold another set
of 32 rentes viagères, 26 of them to Rheims financiers, who may have resold them to local citizens.  Because
a very important feature of this new form of public finance was its transferability, if by no means outright
negotiability, we must note a very important feature of this transaction: that they buyers (crédirentiers) were
explicitly permitted  to sell their rentes to third parties.  Furthermore, if they still held them on  their death,
some rentes were then, by contract provisions, to be transferred to wives (if they outlived the husbands), who
were entitled to receive half of the annual income for the rest of their  lifetime.
32  
At almost the same time, In 1235, Auxerre also sold rentes viagères, chiefly also to Rheims
financiers, whose town government was possibly also then selling rentes, despite some prior ecclesiastical
opposition.
33   While Arras, deemed to be the most important financial centre in northern France, may have
sold rentes before this time, our earliest evidence comes only from the first extant financial accounts, for the
period October 1241 to February 1244, which record the sale rentes viagères, with a total value of £2,500
parisis, for one or two lives. The ‘rate of return’, the annual annuity payments, was reckoned at 1/6.5, which
in modern terms means  15.38  percent;  and the annual annuity payments accounted for almost 75 percent11
34 Pierre Bougard, ‘L’apogée de la ville (1191-1340)’, in Pierre Bougard, Yves-Marie Hilaire, and
Alain Nolibos, Histoire d’Arras, Collection Histoire des villes du Nord - Pas de Calais (Arras, 1988), pp. 61-
62.  Tracy, ‘On the Dual Origins’, pp.  16-17 cites Desportes, Reims et les Rémois, for a somewhat different
figure of £2,610 parisis (a year). Note that in medieval Europe, percentages were always expressed as
fractions.
35 Tracy, ‘On the Dual Origins’, pp.16-19; Tracy, Financial Revolution, pp.13-15; Hans Van
Werveke, De Gentsche stadsfinanciën in de middeleeuwen, Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen,
Letteren, en Schone Kunsten van België, Klasse der Letteren, Jaargang XXXIV (Brussels, 1934), pp. 164-71,
282-90.
36  Quotation from Desportes, Reims et les Rémois, pp. 126, and 131, also cited in Tracy, in ‘Dual
Origins’, pp.  16-17.
37  Desportes, Reims, p. 126.
38  Bigwood,  Régime juridique et économique, vol.  I, pp. 567-603. For example, in July 1288 the
Synod at Liège excommunicated all manifest usurers and forbade acceptance of their donations (p. 580).
Some of his views are challenged, but  not entirely successfully, in Carlos Wyffels, ‘L’usure en Flandre au
XIII
e siècle’, Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire/Belgisch tijdschrift voor filologie en geschiedenis, 69:4
(1991), 853-71.
39 De Roover, Money, Banking, and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges, pp. 99-148; Wyffels, ‘L’usure’, pp.
866-67; Bigwood, Régime juridique, vol. I, pp. 319-88, 639-48. In 1280-81,  eight Yprois citizens and two
Lombards were condemned for usury; but  Lombards also lent funds to the towns, at rates up to 18 percent.
of Arras’s expenditures in servicing its total debt during these years.
34  Subsequently, many other northern
French towns (Artesian,  Picard, and Flemish) began issuing rentes from just after the mid-century: Douai,
in or about 1250; Roye, in 1260; Calais, in 1263;  Saint-Riquier, in 1268; and Saint-Omer, in 1271.
35 
The relationship between urban rentes and the anti-usury campaign in the thirteenth century
 What did this evidently important  financial innovation in urban public finances, in the sale of the
various rente contracts,  have to do with the anti-usury campaign?  The first direct evidence of such a link
comes from an event that Pierre Desportes has recorded in his history of Rheims during the thirteenth century:
that, in 1234, after ecclesiastical authorities, in so vigorously pursuing this campaign, threatened the Rheims
bourgeoisie with dire consequences for their suspected  ‘usures’, provoking a ‘véritable terreur’, so much so
that those who had been financing the town government quickly came to prefer ‘les achats de rentes aux prêts
proprement dits’.
36  Furthermore, in 1254 Innocent IV relieved the monks of Saint-Rémi and the commune
of Beauvais of any obligation to pay interest owing to their creditors, ‘notwithstanding their obligations’.
37
 In his study of thirteenth-century Flanders (both francophone and Flemish regions), Georges Bigwood
asserted that  ‘the struggle against usury was energetically and remorselessly conducted’ by the Church, town
governments (citing Douai, in particular, from 1247), and the counts of both Flanders and Artois.
38  To be
sure,  from 1281, Count Guy de Dampierre and successor counts of Flanders had licensed Italian ‘Lombard’
merchants to maintain regulated pawn-broking ‘tables’, with, to all appearances, interest charges contained
in their transactions.  But such pawn-broking could be interpreted as a discounted sale and repurchase of
goods, rather than as genuine usury.  Even so,  Raymond de Roover has contended that  ‘the lombards in
Flanders as elsewhere lived in constant fear of a sudden reversion to repressive methods and under the
permanent threat of expulsion and spoliation’.
39 David Nicholas has also observed that in the thirteenth
century  ‘the Flemings seem to have been more concerned than the Italians to avoid the imputation of12
40  David Nicholas, The Metamorphosis of a Medieval City:  Ghent in the Age of the Arteveldes, 1302-
1390 (Lincoln, 1987), p. 122 (though referring in fact to the fourteenth-century private transactions). 
41  See Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, pp. 180-94.
42  Bigwood, Régime juridique, vol. II, doc. no. 17, pp. 299-300.
43  Ibid., vol. II, doc. no. 19, pp. 303-04 (26 Feb 1294): ‘plures pecuniarum quantitates extorquere
nitantur per usurariam pravitatem’.
44 Ibid., vol. I, pp. 578-83; vol. II, doc. no. 21, p. 306 (21 Jan 1296), imposing those penalties
prescribed by the Lateran councils. 
45  Bigwood, Régime juridique, vol. II, doc. no. 15, pp. 293-98, for a partial list of Count Guy’s loans
to the Crespin brothers.  See also Michael M.  Fryde, ‘Public Credit, with Special Reference to North-Western
Europe’, in Michael Postan et al., eds., The Cambridge Economic History of Europe,  Vol. III: Economic
Organization in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 495.
46  See Munro, ‘Medieval Origins’, pp.  220-45; and Appendix A.
usury’.
40 
The continuous risks of debt repudiation for ‘usurious’ lenders was demonstrated during the financial
crises that the Flemish towns were experiencing in the 1290s.
41  In November 1291, the Parlement de Paris
issued a formal decree cancelling Flemish communal debts deemed to be usurious ‘ou soupetenneuse
d’usure’, while also stipulating the  punishment of civic ‘administrateurs par lesquelz la commune aura estre
dommagé’ by such usuries.
42 In February 1294, King Philip IV ordered his bailiffs in Ghent to take any
measures necessary to protect the town’s victims of ‘usurious transactions’.
43  Shortly after, in January 1296,
Pope Boniface VIII, evidently under pressure from Philip IV, issued a decree to relieve Bruges from the
‘vicious usurious obligations’ (per usurariam pravitatem de solvendis) owed to the prominent Arras
financiers Robert and Baldwin Crespin, ‘beyond the principal sums owed to them’.
44  At the same time, Count
Guy de Dampierre also appealed for papal assistance in releasing him from the ‘usurious loans’ owed to these
very same Arras bankers.
45
Quite possibly, as some may argue, the real purpose of these harsh measures was not to eliminate
usury as such, but rather to enhance the ability of severely indebted town governments and princes to extort
new loans at much lower rates of interest, with the implied threat of the renunciation or abrogation of existing
loans.  The risk that such measures might have severely injured their ability to secure new financing – i.e.,
if potential lenders had refused to co-operate and to offer new loans – had the town governments and princes
not had available that alternative source in the form of the relatively new rente contracts.  If most investors
were not as frightened and timid as those of Rheims had supposedly been in 1230s, to invest only in rentes,
a fair proportion of them now probably preferred to hold a more balanced investment portfolio that consisted
of both high-interest short term loans and rentes, both life- and perpetual-rents, with much lower but both
financially, legally,  and morally ‘safer’ rates of return.
46 
These rentes were, of course, ‘safer’ in these respects only if they were not deemed to be a subterfuge
for usury.  At the very beginning of their financial history, about 1220, the future of the rentes, in any form,
did not look to be very secure.  In 1218, in that very same city of Rheims, which later became so prominent
in resorting to this new financial instrument, the city’s Archbishop had forbidden the town (or the Hôtel-Dieu)
to sell any rentes viagères for reasons that may have involved the usury question – though the document does13
47  Desportes, Reims et les Rémois , pp. 127-28 and n. 226.  The proposed sale of a rente viagère for
£45 parisis, to Hugues, coûtre of the church of Rheims, for an annual payment of  50 sols parisis (thus: 5.55
percent).
48  Geoffrey of Trani (Goffredo da Trani), Summa super titulis decretalium.  For this and many other
similar canonical sources (esp.  in n.  49), I am indebted to Lawrin Armstrong, Usury and Public Debt in
Early Renaissance Florence: Lorenzo Ridolfi on the Monte Comune, Studies and Texts no.  144 (Toronto:
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2003), pp.  53-84, and p.  400.  See also Lawrin Armstrong, ‘The
Politics of Usury in Trecento Florence: The Questio de Monte of Francesco da Empoli’, Mediaeval Studies,
61 (1999), 1-44.
49 Innocent IV, Apparatus seu commentaria super libris quinque decretalium, ad X 5.19.6,  In
Civitate (Frankfurt, 1570; reprinted Frankfurt, 1968).  See  Fabiano Veraja, Le origini della controversia
teologica sul contratto di censo nel 13 secolo, Storia ed economia 7 (Rome, 1960), pp. 30-43; Schnapper,
‘Les rentes chez les théologiens’,  pp. 966-67; Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools, p. 97; and
Philippe Godding, ‘Wilhelmi Bont Lovaniensis de redditibus perpetuis et ad vitam (1451)’, Tijdschrift voor
rechtsgeschiedenis/Revue d’histoire du droit/The Legal History Review, 58 (2000), 261-62;
50  Veraja, Origini della controversia, pp. 43-47: Summa aurea or Summa super titulis decretalium
(ca. 1253); and Commentaria in V  librum decretalium, ad X.5.19.6, In civitate (ca. 1270).
51  Veraja, Origini della controversia, pp., 50-52, 55-81, 106-11, 125-31; Schnapper, ‘Les rentes chez
les théologiens’, pp. 969-72; Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools, pp. 249-73.  Henry of Ghent
(d. 1293) had issued his  Quodlibets in response to questions from the Flemish Beguines on the morality of
investing in rentes. He advised them to use their funds instead to purchase real estate or other property that
they could then lease out for annual rents, to achieve the same financial goals.  
not supply the actual reason.
47  But if suspicions of usury were the issue, the Archbishop had no papal or
canon-law authority to issue a ban on these grounds.  As indicted earlier, Rheims’ town government was
evidently selling rentes, in lieu of accepting interest-bearing loans, during that  bitter  ecclesiastical anti-usury
campaign of the 1230s, even if the licit nature of rentes still remained unclear.  In the following decade, the
Italian canonist Geoffrey of Trani (Gottofredo da Trani, d. 1245), who also taught at Bologna, levied the
specific charge of usury against those purchased rentes, on the grounds that they were guilty of an ‘immoral
hope’ that the value of their annual annuity payments over time would exceed their costs in purchasing the
rentes.    Shortly after, about 1250, the Dominican canonist Guillaume de Rennes, in his gloss on the
Summa of Raymond de Peñafort, agreed with Geoffrey that the rente contract was indeed immoral and
illegitimate, even if not in itself  intrinsically (ex forma) usurious.
48
 The very next year (c. 1251), however,  a fully contrary and official pronouncement came from the
ultimate Christian source, the papacy, when Innocent IV (1243-1254) declared that  rentes were not loans but
legitimate contracts of sale, and thus not usurious, provided that the annual payments were based on ‘real’
properties and the income from such properties  –  a contentious issue that would not be fully resolved for
two more centuries.
49  Shortly after (c.  1253), one of the most eminent theologians of the day, Henry of Susa
(or Hostiensis, later Cardinal Archbishop of Ostia, 1261-1271) fully supported Innocent IV, in carefully
rejected all of Geoffrey of Trani’s arguments against the rentes.
50  
Nevertheless, their views had not yet gained universal acceptance.  For,  in 1276, Henry of Ghent,
the leading theologian in the Paris faculty, reiterated Geoffrey of Trani’s views that rentes promised gains
well beyond the principal sum, especially perpetual rentes, offering the purchaser ‘immoral hopes to gain’.
In any event, he further contended, the sale of rentes was in actuality the ‘sale of money [itself], which is
non-vendible’.
51   But even within his own University of Paris, Henry of Ghent found no support; for by this14
52  In 1278, almost immediately after Henry of Ghent has issued his Quodlibets, Giles of Lessines
justified the return on census contracts in this very same context.  See  Veraja, Origini della controversia, pp.
89-99; Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. 155-57; Langholm, Economics of Medieval Schools, pp.
310-17.
53 Veraja, Origini della controversia, pp. 69-73, 101-24, 131-62; and conclusions, pp. 163-95;
Schnapper, ‘Les rentes chez les théologiens’, pp. 969-7;  Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools, p.
283; Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. 154-70. 
54  Leonardus Lessius (Theologian at the University of Leuven, 1554-1623), De justitia et jure (Paris,
1606), Liber 2, cap. 21, dub 2, n. 9, cited in Raymond de Roover, Leonardius Lessius als economist: de
economische leerstellingen en van de latere scholastiek in de Zuikdelijke Nederlanden, Mededelingen van
Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Klasse der Letteren,
XXXI (Brussels, 1969), p.  11; and on renten, p. 26.
55  See Schnapper, Les rentes au XVI siècle, pp. 50-61.
56  For the more complicated issue of the legal recognition of full negotiability, see Munro, ‘Medieval
Origins of the Financial Revolution’, pp.  542-62, and other sources in n.  30 above; and John Munro,
‘English “Backwardness” and Financial Innovations in Commerce with the Low Countries, 14th to 16th
Centuries’, in Peter Stabel, Bruno Blondé, and Anke Greve, eds., International Trade in the Low Countries
(14
th - 16
th Centuries): Merchants, Organisation, Infrastructure, Studies in Urban, Social, Economic, and
Political History of the Medieval and Early Modern Low Countries (Marc Boone, general editor), no. 10
(Leuven-Apeldoorn: Garant, 2000), pp. 105-67.
time, almost all theologians had accepted the contrary view:  that the census or rente contract was a fully licit
agreement of ‘purchase and sale’ (emptio in forma) of future streams of income or usufruct from property,
provided that Innocent IV’s stipulations were fully observed. 
52  In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth
centuries numerous Scholastic treatises – inter alia, from Gervais de Mont Saint-Eloi, Matthew d’Aquasparta,
Godfrey of Fontaines, Richard of Middleton, and Alexander Lombard – fully endorsed  the census and the
various related rente contracts.
53 
The governing principle of this theological discussion was that, since the census and rente contracts
had no provisions for repayment, as did the mutuum (and on a stipulated date), they were – to repeat the point
made earlier — not true loan contracts, the sole form of usury. As the later theologian Leonardius Lessius
contended,  ubi non est mutuum, ibi non est usura (‘where there is no loan, there is no usury’ ).
54  Thus, in
full accordance with that principle, anyone who purchased a rente, i.e., the crédirentier, could never ever
demand redemption – repayment of the principal sum -- so long as the seller or débirentier continued to
honour the obligation to make the annual annuity payments.  For, if such redemption rights were ever granted,
 their rentes would be nothing more than a devious and most sinful device to cloak a usurious loan.
Otherwise, any crédirentier  who wished to regain some or all of the principal had to find some third party
willing to buy the rente, with its annual income, but often at some discount.
55  As noted earlier, from the
beginning,  rentes, or more specifically perpetual rents, and the annuity and other privileges attached to them,
could be sold and transferred to third parties, though full and legally sanctioned negotiability would not be
established until the early sixteenth century.
56
As the history of the rente contracts fully reveal, rentes were indeed often redeemed, but, only at the
option, the exclusive option, of the issuer and seller of rentes, i.e., the débirentiers.  That usually, if not
always, was a right that pertained to perpetual rents – i.e., to erfelijk renten or rentes héritables.  Town and
princely governments usually chose to redeem such rentes only when it was profitable to do so,  particularly
when interest real interest rates declined, allowing them to refinance their rentes at lower costs.  Obviously15
57  Schnapper, ‘Les rentes chez les théologiens’, pp. 977-87; Schnapper, Les rentes au XVIe siècle,
pp. 65-59;  Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. 160-61, 206-08, 230-37; Van der Wee, ‘Monetary,
Credit, and Banking Systems’, pp. 304-05. The bull of Martin V (1425, confirmed by Calixtus III in 1455,
in Extravagantes communes, 3.5.2 Regimini) had been restrictive in limiting the validity of rentes to those
based on real estate (fixed, real properties). Thus the crucial bull was that of Nicholas V in 1452, which
recognized the validity of rentes based merely on the assets or patrimony of the vender. That bull in turn had
been influenced by the quodlibet that Willem II Bont of Leuven issued in 1451: as a refutation of Henry of
Ghent’s treatise, so that, in conclusion, the purchase of all such rents – de redditibus perpetuis et ad vitam
est omni iure licita et nullo modo usuraria. See Godding, ‘Wilhelmi Bont Lovaniensis de redditibus’, pp. 262-
67.  The maximum rates actually ranged from  1/10 (10.0 percent) to 1/14 (7.14 percent). 
58  See in particular  Usher, Early History of Deposit Banking, p. 137, thereby denying any link
between rentes and the usury question: ‘Although the sale of rent-charges began in the thirteenth century, the
practice was not explicitly recognized by the Church until 1425’; Van der Wee, ‘Monetary, Credit, and
Banking Systems’, pp. 303-04. In 1569, Pope St. Pius V issued the bull Cum onus, which revalidated the
fifteenth-century bulls.  Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, p. 237; Schnapper,  Les rentes au XVIe siècle,
pp. 117-20.
59 See nn.  30 and 56, above.
such choices injured the financial interests of the crédirentiers, who usually preferred to maintain the real
value of their investments.  Whether or not town and princely governments, as débirentiers, always had the
completely independent right to redeem rentes without consulting the crédirentiers became an issue of
considerable debate during the later Middle Ages.  
Finally, in 1416, the outstanding issues concerning the validity of rentes, and especially those
concerning redemption, were brought before the Council of Constance (1414-18) for a final resolution.  All
those consulted, seven jurists and four theologians, confirmed the fully licit nature of rentes, as a non-
usurious contract, and the exclusive right of the débirentier to redeem rentes at any time, but with one major
provision:  that such redemptions did not involve any reduction in (nominal, not real) capital values.  All of
these conclusions of the Council, and the earlier views of Innocent IV,  were finally confirmed by the three
papal bulls, which finally removed any remaining doubts and any remaining taint of usury for the rente
contracts:  those of Martin V (Regimini, 1425), Nicholas V (Sollicitudo pastoralis, 1452), and finally,
Calixtus  III (Regimini, 1455).
57  Nevertheless, for rente contracts to be fully licit and acceptable to the
papacy, three further conditions had to be met:  that the rentes had to be tied to real estate, or other real
property  - i.e., that payments related to such rentes must in essence be a form of  rental income; that the
annual return or annuity payments could not exceed ten percent of the capital sum (almost never observed);
and, once more,  that the débirentier alone had the exclusive right to redeem the census or rente contracts.
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Rentes in the public finances of later-medieval Flemish towns: Douai, Bruges, and Ghent
If a continuing public debate about the licit nature of rentes and the moral ‘taint of usury’ were not
fully and finally resolved until the promulgation of those three papal bulls in the early to mid-fifteenth
century, we may better understand why the role of these financial instruments in public finance – urban and
territorial – did not really become prominent until the fifteenth century in the finances of west European
towns . There were, however, several other legal issues of lesser importance and also the very major issue of
fully-fledged, legally-sanctioned negotiability that were also not fully resolved, as noted earlier,  until the
early sixteenth century:  important issues that have been analysed in other publications.
59  But no one can
really question the growing importance of rentes in both urban and territorial public finances from the later
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: throughout the Low Countries, south and north; France, for northern urban
public finances, but also royal, national finances; in the Rhineland and other regions of western Germany;16
60  See nn.  3 and 6 above; and especially Munro, ‘Medieval Origins’, pp.  505-62; Tracy, Financial
Revolution in the Habsburg Netherlands; and especially Tracy, ‘On the Dual Origins’, pp.  13-24; see also
Roustit, ‘La consolidation de la dette publique à Barcelone au milieu du XIVe siècle’, pp.  15-156; Antonio
Furio, ‘La dette dans les dépenses municipales’, in D. Menjot and M. Sánchez Mártinez, La fiscalité des villes
au Moyen Age (Occident médiéval), vol.  3: La redistribution de l’impot (Toulouse, 2002),  pp.  321-50.
61   Georges Espinas, Les finances de la commune de Douai, des origines au XVe siècle (Paris, 1902),
p. 314, n. 3; and p. 315-56. For perpetual rents, see pp. 314-21; for life-rents, see  pp. 321-46. See also
Georges Espinas, La vie urbaine de Douai au moyen âge (Paris, 1913).
62 Van Werveke, Gentsche stadsfinanciën, pp. 289-90. 
63  Ordinance of 1 July 1288: ‘ke li eschevins puissent vendre a leur bourgois ki aisiet en second et
a autre gent, rentes sur le vile devant dite, pour convertir les deniers en payements des debts de le vile ke ele
doit à ore, leskeles rentes on puis racater kant le vile en iert aisie’: in Charles-Louis Diericx, ed.,  Mémoires
sur les lois et coutumes et les privilèges des Gantois, depuis l’institution de leur commune jusqu’à la
revolution de l’an 1540, 2 vols. (Ghent, 1817-18), cited in Van Werveke, Gentsche stadsfinanciën, pp. 289-
90; see also pp.  164-71.   The guarantees, however, probably did not extend beyond using his coerceive
powers to ensure that the town governments made their annual payments.  From October 1288 to 1290, a total
of 118 erfrenten brieven, with a yearly average of £2,046 parisis, with an annuity rate of 10 percent (£1
parisis for each £10 par.) 
and in the Spanish union of Castile and Aragon (beginning in Catalonia, in the 1330s).  The reasons for and
nature of that diffusion – and why such forms of urban public finance were not, however, to be found in
southern France and in Italy – have also been fully discussed in many other publications .
60
This current study must therefore be focused on the role of renten in the public finances and taxation
in only the late medieval Flemish towns (up to the mid sixteenth century), limitations imposed in part by the
current status of the very labourious and very voluminous research that I have so far conducted.  Thus, the
historical analysis of this ‘financial revolution’ requires us to return to the Flemish towns of the mid-thirteenth
century, which were then part of the kingdom of France.
In Flanders, the francophone town of Douai (the leading textile producer, in the mid thirteenth
century) was evidently the first to sell rentes.  One financial document, dated about 1250, provides a
substantial list of  ‘les rentes que li ville doit a hiretage’: i.e., rentes héritables, while another document, more
accurately dated to March 1270, lists the town’s current obligations for current life-rents:  rentes viagères.
Douai continued to sell issue rentes héritables, even after being incorporated directly into the French
kingdom, in 1305, but the king (Philip IV) forbade the town to sell any rentes viagères without royal
permission.  Those that were sold were marketed chiefly in Arras, Tournai, and Valenciennes, and were
transferable to the spouses and offspring (sometimes grandchildren) of the buyers.
61 
In the northern, Flemish-speaking zone, the leading industrial city of Ghent was certainly selling
renten, from at least 1275: but evidently only  lijfrenten, then amounting to £1,600  parisis.   The Ghent town
government also found most of its purchasers in Arras, whose financiers had agreed to convert Ghent’s short
term debts into these much longer-term rentes.
62  Then, three years later, in July 1288, Ghent’s town
government began selling perpetual or erfelijk renten, after Count Guy de Dampierre (1278-1304) had issued
an ordinance authorizing all the Flemish town governments to sell and to redeem such renten whenever they
chose to do so, while also guaranteeing the principal values and annuity payments on these renten.
63
Meanwhile, the other leading Flemish town of Bruges had become heavily indebted to Arras bankers, in
particular the renowned Crespin family, who collectively held almost half of Bruges’s  financial obligations:
as of 1298,  £157,093 parisis of a total of debt of £346,880 parisis, of which £124,307 were in ‘usurious17
64  See Alain Derville, ‘La finance Arrageoise: usure et banque’, in Marie-Madelaine Castellani and
Jean-Pierre Martin, eds., Arras au moyen âge: histoire et littérature (Arras, 1994), pp.  40-41: based upon
the municipal accounts in Carlos Wyffels and  Jan de Smet, eds.,  De rekeningen van de stad Brugge, 1280 -
1319, 2 vols. (Ghent, 1965 - 1971), Vol. I: 1280 - 1302 (evidently based doc. no. 10, for 14 Sept 1297 - 23
Dec. 1298, pp. 509-675).  The total financial obligations were 13.62  times as much as Bruges’s revenues that
year: £25,460.75 parisis; though my calculations of the data differ from those of Derville.
65  In the account for Sept. 1297 to Dec. 1298, the total payments made to holders of rentes viagères
or lijfrenten (redditus ad vitam) amounted to  £3,154 5s 11d parisis (225 persons, including Robert and
Baldwin Crespin and Jehan Boinebroke); but payments for rentes héritables  (redditu hereditario or rente
yretaule) were only £99 (4 persons).   Wyffels and De Smet, Rekeningen van de stad Brugge, vol. I, p. 551.
66 See Bigwood,  Le régime juridique,  vol. II, doc. no. 17, pp. 299-300; Bernard Schnapper, ‘Les
rentes chez les théologiens et les canonistes du XIIIe au XVIe siècles’, in Georges Vedel (Centre National
de la Recherche Scientifique), ed.,  Études d’histoire du droit canonique dédiées à Gabriel le Bras, 2 vols.
(Paris, 1965), vol. I,  pp. 965-95, especially p.  972.
67  David Nicholas, Medieval Flanders (London and New York, 1992), pp. 186-202, 212-24; David
Nicholas, Town and Countryside:  Social, Economic, and Political Tensions in Fourteenth-Century Flanders
(Bruges, 1971); Nicholas, Metamorphosis, pp.  1-16; Henri Nowe, La bataille des éperons d’or (Brussels,
loans’ and £32,787 in lijfrenten or rentes viagères (20.9 percent).
64   Issues of erfelijk renten or rentes
héritables do not appear to have been of any great importance: just 3.14 percent of the value of lijfrenten, in
1297-98. 
65
During this period, the leading Flemish towns were engaged in a serious conflict with their count,
Guy de Dampierre, whose mother, Countess Marguerite de Constantinople (r.1244-78, d. 1280) had provoked
the conflict, in 1275, by deposing Ghent’s oligarchic civic government, the so-called XXXIX.  In response,
the Flemish town governments then secured support from the French king, whose Parlement de Paris restored
the Ghent government, though imposing external financial audits. In 1289, Philip IV (1285-1314) placed
Ghent under his personal protection, while also installing the Bailiff of Vermandois as the governor of
Flanders.  Two years later, in  November 1291, Ghent’s town government  had secured from the Parlement
de Paris a judicial decision that permitted all the Flemish towns to suspend further payments to all those
holding rentes à vie who had already received more than their original investment, ‘jusques à tant que la
commune sera délivrée des debtes’.
66  Possibly connected to this decree was Ghent’s decision to suspend all
further issue of rentes.
The subsequent events may explain why Ghent did not, in fact, resume the sale of rentes for another
four decades. In 1296-97, Count Guy de Dampierre rashly sought to remove the French royal presence from
Flanders: he again abolished the Ghent XXXIX oligarchy, and then formed an alliance with Philip IV’s chief
enemy, Edward I (1272-1307) of England, which country was also a major source of the wools so necessary
for Flanders’ textile-based economy.  In retaliation, Philip IV invaded Flanders, in  June 1297, defeating the
Flemish forces at the Battle of Furnes, and then occupying half the county.  In 1299-1300, a French royal
army again invaded, and occupied the remainder of the county,  while also imprisoning Count Guy.   In 1302,
when oppressive rule from the French occupiers had provoked a major rebellion, the urban guild militias,
aided by the count’s forces, won an astonishing victory over the French cavalry at the Battle of Kortrijk.  For
many Belgian historians that marked the first step towards Flemish independence – though certainly not
immediately.  In 1305, Philip IV’s armies finally forced the Flemings to accept defeat, by the Truce of Athis-
sur-Orge, which subjected Flanders to enormous indemnities, and to the loss of the major francophone towns
of Lille, Douai, and Orchies.  Further Franco-Flemish conflicts then ensued, so that peace was not achieved
until 1319-20.
67  There is no evidence that, during this protracted  era of conflicts, any of the Flemish towns18
1945), pp. 13-113.
68  Jules Vuylsteke, ed., Gentsche stads- en baljuwsrekeningen, 1280 - 1336/ Comptes de la ville de
Gand, 1280 - 1336, in the series Oorkondenboek der stad Gent, eerste afdeeling: Rekeningen [Cartulaire de
la ville de Gand, première série: Comptes] (Gent: F. Meyer-Van Loo, 1900); and Van Werveke, De Gentsche
stadsfinanciën, pp.  235-36; 353-53.
69 The war ended when Philip VI’s French armies defeated the rebel forces of Bruges and Ypres (at
Cassel, August 1328).  See Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, pp.  209-17.
70 For legal actions undertaken against some sixteenth-century defaulting Dutch towns, see Tracy,
Financial Revolution, pp.  28-107.
71 For the political events, see David Nicholas, The Van Arteveldes of Ghent: the Varieties of Vendetta
and the Hero in History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 19-98; Nicholas, Medieval Flanders,
pp. 219-24; and Hans Van Werveke, Jacques Van Artevelde (Brussels, 1943), pp. 37-110.  Jacob Artevelde
himself had been assassinated in July 1345.
72  The transactions involving the sale of renten are contained in the annual civic treasurer’s accounts,
in the Stadsarchief Gent,  stadsrekeningen, Series 400, which have been published in the sets of documents
listed as the sources for Table 1.  Note that £12 parisis = £1 groot Flemish.
73  From: Napoleon De Pauw and Julius Vuylsteke, eds., De rekeningen der stad Gent: Tijdvak van
Jacob Van Artevelde, 1336 - 1349, 3 vols. (Ghent: Ad Hoste, 1874 -85), vol. III, pp. 21- 22. Payments made
resorted to the use of renten to finance their wars or to pay these heavy indemnities. 
Thus, after more than four decades, and not until the mid 1320s – in 1325-26, to be more exact – the
city government of Ghent finally resumed its sale of  renten, which now consisted almost exclusively of
erfelijk renten.  It also resumed its annual annuity payments  on those suspended renten from the 1290s.
68
At this time, Ghent was also in the midst of yet another civil war, the so-called Revolt of Maritime Flanders
(1323-28), in which Ghent wisely refused to participate, thereby gaining considerable economic power
ascendancy in Flanders.
69   We may well wonder what had happened to the holders of Ghent’s civic renten
in the intervening three decades.  If the city, as the seller of the renten and thus as  legal débirentier had
pledged its assets (properties and tax incomes) to honour its commitment to make the annual payments, had
any rentier sued the town government for non-payment?  There is no evidence that any such law suits had
been launched.
70  But obviously the Ghent town government well knew that, unless it honoured its
commitments to pay the arrears on previously issued renten, it would have little success in selling any new
issues.
In virtually every succeeding year of the fourteenth century, Ghent continued to sell small but
respectable amounts of such renten   The most remarkable financial event to be observed in the Ghent town
accounts took place in the fiscal year 1346-47, towards the end of the revolutionary ‘Artevelde era’ (1335-
1349), when Ghent, governed by  a weaver-led guild regime, dominated Flanders, to the exclusion of the
count (Louis de Nevers, 1322-46); and in doing so, it was antagonizing the other leading Flemish towns.
71
 In that year, which was also just on the eve of the Black Death,  the Ghent civic government marketed a
remarkably large amount of  lijfrenten:  in total worth  £21,295 parisis (£1,774.583 groot Flemish), almost
thirty times the value of the erfelijk renten sold that year.
72  These political circumstances may explain the
other remarkable feature of this financial experiment: that virtually all of these renten were sold outside the
county of Flanders, in the neighbouring duchy of Brabant, especially in the major drapery towns of Brussels
and Leuven.
73  In view of the fact that lijfrenten, if indeed for one life only, were extinguished on the death19
on these lijfrenten in 1347-48: pp. 190-96.
74  De Pauw and Vuylsteke, De rekeningen der stad Gent, vol. III, pp. 397-445; A. Van Werveke,
Gentse stads- en baljuwsrekeningen (1351-1364) (Brussels, 1970), pp. 226-42; 369-41 (account for 1358-59).
See also:  See also Van Werveke, De Gentsche stadsfinanciën, pp. 282-90; Fryde, ‘Public Credit’, pp. 430-
543; Tracy, Financial Revolution, pp. 13-15.
75  See Table 1, below.
76  See Table 1.  Tracy, Financial Revolution, p. 14, states ‘between 1346 and 1356;’ but clearly the
annual issues extended long beyond that year, certainly up to the next Ghent (Artevelde) revolt of 1379 and
beyond.  My statistical analyses of the public finances from the town accounts of Ghent (from 1400-1550),
Bruges (1302-1550), Ypres (1408-1550), and Kortrijk (1393-1550) will be presented in future publications
(given the enormous amount of labour involved in some further archival research and especially in the
statistical analyses).
77   See the previous note.  For currently available publications on fifteenth-century Ghent (though
only to the 1450s), see especially Marc Boone, Geld en macht: de Gentse stadsfinanciën en de Bourgondische
of the holders, one may well speculate on how much the Ghent civic government enjoyed a reduction in its
public debt from the ensuing and highly fortuitous Black Death of 1348.
 Subsequently, in the fourteenth century, Ghent marketed just two further issues of lijfrenten, in far
more modest amounts:  £2,311 parisis (= £193.583 groot) in 1349-50, shortly after the overthrow of the
weaver-dominated regime;  and even less, just  £1,232 parisis (£102.667) in 1355-56. Some of these had been
sold in Mons (Bergen), in the nearby francophone but Imperial county of Hainaut.  There is, however, no
conclusive evidence that during the fourteenth century  Ghent or other Flemish towns were unduly dependent
on external sources in financing civic debts.
74 
In sum, in only two periods of the fourteenth century were revenues from public borrowing
significant in Ghent (see Table 1).  The first was the previously noted resumption of renten sales in the mid-
1320s, with the latter phase  of the Revolt of Maritime Flanders (1323-28), when revenues from public
borrowing accounted for 11.46 percent of Ghent’s total income; but only 4.06 percent in the form renten, and
the rest came from loans.  The second was the aforementioned Artevelde era, with such disruptive civil wars,
from 1336 to 1350.  In 1336-40, 43.83 percent of total civic income came from public borrowing, but now
only 2.19 percent came from renten sales.  Conversely, in 1346-50, 27.56 percent of total civic income came
from public borrowing, of which, this time renten sales accounted for 16.14 percent.  In the later fourteenth
century, from 1361 to 1390, when only the only form of annuities that the city sold were erfelijk renten, they
accounted for an average of only 3.0 percent of total civic revenues during these three decades (followed by
a long gap in the accounts, to 1400).
75
In these same decades, however, when Ghent usually experienced annual deficits, payments on the
civic public debt accounted for an average of 20.70 percent of total expenditures.
76 Over the fourteenth-
century as a whole (or, rather from 1320 to 1390, when civic accounts are available), the percentages of total
expenditures in the form of debt payments ranged from an initial  high, for the first half of the fourteenth
century,  of 37.20 percent in 1321-25; and in the second half of the century, the maximum shares of total civic
expenditures in debt payments were 41.28 percent in 1361-65, and 44.31 percent in 1366-70.  The lowest
shares of total expenditures in debt payments were just  2.21 percent in 1351-55, and then shares of about 4.5
percent of total expenditures in each of the quinquenniums from 1376-80 to 1386-90 (Table 1b). Clearly the
role of renten in Ghent’s fourteenth-century civic finances had not yet assumed the major role that it would
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
77 20
staatsvorming (1384-1453) Verhandelingen der Maatschappij voor Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde te Gent,
vol. XV (Ghent, 1990), pp. 60-67, 163, and Table 11 (sales of lijf- and erfrenten, but only for the years 1453-
1461), available only in a microfiche.  This book regrettably pays almost no attention to this form of civic
finances. But see also the important article of Marc Boone,  ‘Plus deuil que joie: Les ventes de rentes par la
ville de Gand pendant la période bourguignonne: entre intérêts privés et finances publiques’, Credit
Communal: bulletin trimestriel, 176 (1991-92), 3-24.  Somewhat surprisingly there are no studies on Ghent
itself in Marc Boone, Karel Davids, and Paul Janssens, eds., Urban Public Debts: Urban Government and
the Market for Annuities in Western Europe (14th-18th Centuries), Studies in European Urban History vol.
III (Brepols:  Turnhout, 2003); but for Flanders and Holland in this volume see nn.  88-93, below.
78  Kuske, Schuldenwesen der deutschen Städte, pp. 27-45; Tracy, ‘Dual Origins’, pp.  14-17.
79  See  Veraja, Origini della controversia, pp. 89-99; Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. 155-
57; Langholm, Economics of Medieval Schools, pp. 310-17: ‘.. a present and assembled thing is estimated
at a higher value than a future and divided one’ (i.e., in terms of future annuity payments).  On the demand
side, that observation explains the reality of interest; on the supply side, it is the opportunity cost of foregone
alternative investments.
Financing rentes with excise taxes on food consumption, drink, and other household necessities in late-
medieval Flemish towns
The most important issue to be examined now is the question:  precisely how did the Flemish (and
other) urban governments finance the annual annuity payments – obviously the term ‘interest payments’ is
quite inappropriate –  and also any redemptions of renten?   As indicated earlier, the papal acceptances of
renten as fully licit, non-usurious contracts depended in part on their link with income from real property.
As an examination of the Flemish town accounts for the late-medieval and early modern eras reveals, and as
independent analyses of Bruno Kuske and James Tracy confirm, the annual payments (and redemptions) came
from two different sources, each linked to the specific corresponding type of the two major kinds of rentes.
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The payments for the perpetual rents – the  rentes héritables or erfelijk renten – were usually derived from
the rental incomes from actual real estate or some other form of immobile property, and thus in accordance
with the three fifteenth-century papal bulls.  
For the rentes viagères (à vie) or lijfrenten, payments  normally came from the accijnzen or excise
taxes that the town levied on the inhabitants’ consumption of various foodstuffs (alcoholic beverages, grain,
flour, bread itself, meat and dairy products, herring, and other species of fish),   textile products (wool, cloth,
linen), and building products (wood, iron, coal and other fuels). Note that, in accordance with the principles
established by the fifteenth-century papal bulls on rentes, all of these commodities were products of the land
(and the sea): certainly they were all the  fruits of ‘real property’ (real estate). The obvious significance of
this form of public-finance related taxation was that it was essentially very regressive, in representing a far
greater burden on the poor than on the middle classes, let alone the rich.  Most governments today do not tax
the consumption of vital necessities, especially foodstuffs for home preparation:  as opposed to packaged
‘junk foods’, and food and drink purchased and consumed within restaurants and bars. 
More generally most if not all towns (and later, many territorial or national governments) collected
such tax income not from the specific excise taxes levied on individual urban consumers, but rather from the
annual or even monthly sale of the pachten or tax farms.   Tax-farming was the major feature and indeed
major curse of public finances in medieval and early-modern Europe.  Most governments were almost always
in urgent need of ready cash, and could ill afford to wait until tax receipts slowly percolated from the citizenry
into the civic or territorial treasury.   Indeed, as the theologian Giles of Lessines had observed (in 1278):
‘future things over a period are not estimated of such value as things collected in an instant [in the present]’.
7921
80 See Louis P. Cain and Elcye J.  Rotella, ‘Death and Spending: Urban Mortality and Municipal
Expenditure on Sanitation’, Annales de démographie historique, 101:1 (2001), 139-54; and also Michael
Haines, ‘The Urban Mortality Transition in the United States, 1800-1940’, Annales de démographie
historique, 101:1 (2001), 33-64.  Possibly the introduction into western Europe, of first coffee, reputedly by
the Ottoman Turkish siege of Vienna in 1529 (certainly by 1600), and then of tea, by the Dutch, in 1655
(from Ceylon), provided an effective alternative, in that both required boiling water, which action would kill
the harmful bacteria.
81  Pasteur’s 1878 paper on micro-organisms in various beverages led to the ‘pasteurization’ process
of heating milk to kill harmful bacteria in milk.  See the website for Louis Pasteur et l’Institut Pasteur:
http://www.pasteur.fr/pasteur/histoire/histoireUS/index.html.   In 1876, Robert Koch had demonstrated that
the bacterium Bacillus anthracis causes anthrax, a disease of animals also transmissible to humans. He
subsequently discovered the two bacteria that cause tuberculosis and cholera.  In 1905, he won the Nobel
prize in medicine.
82  See K.L.  Wood-Legh, A Small Household of the Fifteenth Century (Manchester, 1956). 
Usually, these tax farms were sold at auction, to the highest bidder; and we must therefore assume that the
sales values underestimate the actual tax burden on the urban citizenry, since the tax farmers obviously hoped
to make a profit, over and beyond the amounts that they paid to the city.  On the other hand, if the bids were
truly competitive,  such auctions would have reduced the extent of ‘economic rent’ that the tax farmers could
have extracted from urban consumers.
 The two most important commodities, by far, on which these excise-taxes were levied were beer and
(secondly) wine. Of course, they also represent the principal exception to the just-enunciated dictum that most
modern governments do not tax the consumption of foodstuffs.  On the contrary, virtually all governments,
past and present, have levied very heavy taxes on alcoholic beverages; and the modern justification is that
they are ‘sin taxes’, taxes on ‘morally dubious’ luxuries that anyone can now choose to avoid.  But of course,
from the point of view of any government, past or present, the highly addictive nature of alcohol has meant
that most consumers (or those lacking will power) cannot avoid  the consumption of such beverages, for
which, therefore, demand is very highly inelastic and thus virtually guaranteed to produce high tax revenues.
Apart from the arguably irrelevant moral considerations about ‘sin taxes’ involved in late-medieval
public  finances, one may well contend that beer and wine, especially beer in northern Europe, were in fact
vital necessities, because most other beverages, water and milk, especially, were so generally unsafe to drink.
Most sources of water for urban public consumption came from highly polluted rivers, streams, and lakes.
Indeed, the single most important cause of the remarkable drop in European and North American mortalities
in the later nineteenth-centuries was the introduction of urban systems of water-purification and related
sanitation systems.
80  Those innovations in turn were the product of the almost identical discovery of  the
bacterial transmission of diseases in the mid-1870s: first, in 1876, from the researches of the German micro-
biologist Robert Koch (1843-1910); and then, in 1878, from those of the  French biologist Louis Pasteur
(1822-1895).
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The importance of beer especially in late-medieval consumer expenditures can demonstrated from
various household and institutional budgets, which are also important for this study, in that they are major
components of the cost-of-living or Consumer Price Indexes [CPI] that will be used to measure the burden
of these excise taxes.  For fifteenth-century England, the best known budget is the set of household accounts
of William Savernak, in Bridport, Dorsetshire for the years 1453-1460, which allocated a share of 23 percent
to beer (with barley malt), compared to 20 percent for cereal grains and 37  percent for meat, dairy products,
and fish combined.
82  In the well-known Phelps Brown and Hopkins ‘Basket of Consumables’ Price Index22
83 E. H. Phelps Brown and Sheila V. Hopkins, ‘Seven Centuries of the Prices of Consumables,
Compared with Builders’ Wage Rates’, Economica, 23:92 (November 1956), 296-314: reprinted in E.M.
Carus-Wilson, ed., Essays in Economic History, 3 vols. (London, 1954-62), vol. II, pp. 168-78, 179-96, and
in E.H. Phelps Brown and Sheila V. Hopkins, A Perspective of Wages and Prices (London, 1981), pp. 13-39
(with indexes not in the original).  They allocated, in addition to the 22.5% for drink, 20.0% for cereal grains,
12.5% for dairy products (butter and cheese), 21.0% for meat (mutton and pork), totalling 80.0% for
foodstuffs.  The remaining 20% of the household budget consisted of 7.5% for fuels and 12.5% for textiles.
84  Steve Rappaport, Worlds Within Worlds : The Structures of Life in Sixteenth-Century London
(Cambridge-New York, 1989), p. 125 (Table 5.1). 
85  Herman Van der Wee, ‘Prijzen en lonen als ontwikkelingsvariabelen:  Een vergelijkend onderzoek
tussen Engeland en de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, 1400-1700’, in Album aangeboden aan Charles Verlinden
ter gelegenheid van zijn dertig jaar professoraat (Wetteren: Universum, 1975), pp. 413-47; reissued in
English translation (but without the tables) as ‘Prices and Wages as Development Variables: A Comparison
Between England and the Southern Netherlands, 1400-1700’, Acta Historiae Neerlandicae, 10  (1978), 58-78;
republished in Herman Van der Wee, The Low Countries in the Early Modern World , trans. by Lizabeth
Fackelman (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press and Variorum, 1993), pp. 223-41.
86  See Herman Van der Wee,  ‘Voeding en Dieet in het Ancien Régime’, Spiegel Historiael, 1 (1966),
94-101, republished in translation: as ‘Nutrition and Diet in the Ancien Régime’, in Herman Van der Wee,
The Low Countries in the Early Modern World , trans. by Lizabeth Fackelman (Cambridge and New York,
1993), pp. 279-87.  In this Lier Beguignage expenditure accounts, the allocation of food consumption shares
are: 44% for bread, 16% for beer, 1% only for wine, 20% for meat, 3% for fish, and 10% for dairy products.
But note, however, that fuels and textiles are not included.  See also Herman Van der Wee, The Growth of
the Antwerp Market and the European Economy (fourteenth-sixteenth centuries), 3 vols.  (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), Vol.  I: Statistics, Appendix  47: Budget of the Infirmary of the Béguignage of Lier
for Foodstuffs, 1526-1602), pp.  534-38.
87  Van der Wee, ‘Nutrition and Diet’, pp. 282-84, and Figure 151; and p. 286 (on water
consumption).  See also Erik Aerts, Het bier van Lier: de economische ontwikkeling van de bierindustrie in
een middelgroote Brabantse stad, einde 14de - begin 19de eeuw (Brussels, 1996).
88  Richard Unger, A History of Brewing in Holland, 900 - 1900: Economy, Technology, and the State
(Leiden, 2001), Table III-4, pp. 90-1, noting also that the daily beer ration for English and Hanseatic sailors
was then about 5 litres. For Leuven, see also Van Uytven, Stadsfinanciën en stadsekonomie, pp. 313-36,
especially  p. 335; and Raymond Van Uytven, ‘Beer Consumption and the Socio-Economic Situation in the
[CPI], the share allocated to beer is almost identical: 22.5 percent.
83  Subsequently, Steve Rappaport allocated
a 20-percent share for beer and ale, in his consumer price index for early-modern London.
84  For the southern
Low Countries (the Antwerp-Lier region in Brabant), Herman Van der Wee chose a slightly lower share for
beer: 17.1 percent, even though in principle he sought to adopt the same weights employed in the Phelps
Brown and Hopkins price index.
85  His choice was influenced by the accounts for Lier’s Beguinage Infirmary
(1586-1600), which indicate that, on average, beer accounted for 16 percent of total foodstuffs expenditures
(while wine accounted for only 1 percent).
86  Van der Wee also observed that the annual per capita beer
consumption in Lier (near Antwerp) was about 310 litres in 1472 – well more than double the Belgian per
capita consumption in 1958 (115 litres).
87  According to statistical analyses of Richard Unger, the  mean
annual per capita beer consumption in various towns of the  fifteenth-  and sixteenth century Low Countries
was  as follows: in Antwerp, 319 litres; Bruges, 263 litres; Leuven, 257 litres; Leiden, 255 litres; Haarlem,
236 litres; and Ghent, 202 litres.  Unger further notes that beer was not just a beverage but an important and
highly nutritious component in household cuisine.
88  Finally, and most recently, Robert Allen’s independently23
Franc of Bruges in the Sixteenth Century’: English translation of ‘Het bierverbruik en de sociaal-economische
toestand in het Brugse Vrije in de zestiende eeuw’, Handelingen van het Genootschap voor Geschiedenis,
gesticht onder de benaming ‘Sociéte d’emulation’ te Brugge, 131 (1994), 5-34; republished in Raymond Van
Uytven, Production and Consumption in the Low Countries, 13
th - 16
th Centuries, Variorum Collected Studies
Series CS 714 (Aldershot: Ashgate-Variorum, 2001), XII, 1-24; Aerts, Het bier van Lier.  Furthermore,
according to T.R. Gourvish and Richard Wilson, ‘beer was the largest item of working-class expenditure,
ranking well above amounts spent on meat or bread’, around 1870.  Citing evidence of Victorian observers,
they estimate that ‘between 14 and 25 percent of working-class incomes was spent on beer’, with a mean per
capita beer consumption, in England and Wales, during the years 1875-79, of about  £4.36 in expenditures,
and 40.5 gallons (184.12 litres)  in physical consumption, which, however, fell to 29.4 gallons (133.66 litres)
per person annually, in 1910-13.  See  T.R. Gourvish and Richard G. Wilson, The British Brewing Industry,
1830 - 1980 (Cambridge and New York, 1994), tables 2.1, p. 30, table 2.5, p. 34, and data and quotation on
p. 36.
89  Robert Allen, ‘The Great Divergence in European Wages and Prices from the Middle Ages to the
First World War’, Explorations in Economic History, 38:4 (October 2001), 411-47, Table 3, p. 421.  For
southern Europe, the equivalent average annual per capita alcoholic consumption in was  68.25 litres of wine.
90 It is interesting to note, as well, that in late-eighteenth century England, beer (sum of beer, malt,
and hops) accounted for 24.6% of the ‘Major Taxes’ (about 90% of the presumed total) collected, while wine
accounted for only 4.63%. The sum of all taxes on alcohol and tobacco than accounted from 43.30% of all
such English tax revenues (£6,917,000 out of £15,973,000).  O’Brien, ‘British Taxation’, Table 5, p.  11.  See
also the following note, on beer and wine taxes.
91  See Table 6.  In the Bruges annual town accounts, for the years 1308-1500 [Stadsarchief Brugge:
Stadsrekeningen 1307/08 to 1499/1500], there is a very marked shift from a predominance of wine excise tax-
farm revenues in the early fourteenth century to a predominance of beer excise-tax farms in the late fifteenth
century – sometimes as much as 81% for beer and thus just 19% for wine, for the combined total of the farms
on the two beverages.  Over this entire period, the mean percentages for beer excise-tax farm revenues is
52.38%, and for wine, 47.62%.  I have not yet calculated the total annual tax farm revenues for this entire,
almost two-century long, period.
constructed price-index base for early-modern northern Europe (1500 - 1900) also allocates a 20.6 percent
share to beer and ale, in his household budget, representing an estimated average annual per capita
consumption of 182 litres.
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Clearly the burden of excise taxes on beer consumption was a very heavy one for the average lower-
class or working-class household in the late-medieval Low Countries (and for northern Europe in general).
90
The burden of consumption taxes on wine, however, may have been correspondingly and relatively lighter
for the working and artisanal classes, if we may assume that they drank principally beer, and little wine.  As
just noted, the Lier Beguignage expenditures on food and drink indicate that wine accounted for  only 1.0
percent of total expenditures.  As Tables 6 and 7 below indicate, for Aalst’s urban excise tax-farm revenues,
the beer excise-tax farm normally accounted for four to five times the revenue acquired from the wine excise-
farm for the 150-year period from 1396-1400 to 1546-50,  Over this entire period, wine accounted for a mean
of 11.93 percent of total excise-tax farm revenues, beer for 43.17 percent –  and the total of the excise tax
farms for the two beverages account for 55.11 percent of the total.
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Since we may further assume that most of those who purchased rentes from urban or territorial
governments, came principally, if by no means entirely,  from the wealthier strata of late-medieval and early-
modern European societies, this highly regressive form of taxation to finance the payments on these various
rentes presumably also meant a substantial transfer of income from the urban poor to the wealthy (who were24
92 For the economy, demography, and society of Aalst and neighbouring Oudenaarde, the
fundamental study is: Erik Thoen, Landbouwekonomie en bevolking in Vlaanderen gedurende the late
Middeleeuwen en het begin van de Moderne Tijden.  Testregio: de kasselrijen van Oudenaarde en Aalst
(einde 13de – eerste helft 16de eeuw), Belgisch Centrum voor Landelijke Geschiedenis no.  90, 2 vols.
(Ghent, 1988), Part I: ‘De demografische evolutie’, pp.  15-233 (but more on Oudenaarde). For the population
figures, see also Peter Stabel, De kleine stad in Vlaanderen: Bevolkingsdynamiek en economische functies
van de kleine en secundaire stedelijke centra in het Gentse kwartier (14de - 16de eeuw), Verhandelingen van
de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Klasse der Letteren,
Jaargang 57, no.  156 (Brussels: Paleis der Academiën, 1995), p.  n.  18, stating that Aalst had about 3,600
inhabitants in 1338 and possibly 4,000 in 1500; but see also Peter Stabel, Dwarfs among Giants: The Flemish
Urban Network in the Late Middle Ages, Studies in Urban, Social, Economic and Political History of the
Medieval and Modern Low Countries, no.  8 (Leuven-Apeldoorn: Garant, 1997), p.  41, indicating that
Aalst’s fifteenth-century population was ‘3,600 or more’, which ‘grew further in the middle of the 16
th
century’.  See nn.  97 and 111 below.
93 Aalst  Stadsrekeningen (1395-1550) in Algemeen Rijksarchief Brussel, Rekenkamer, doc. nos.
31,412 - 31,553.  The account no. for this year 1402-03 is: 31,487.
94  In fifteenth-century Bruges, the renten roles indicate a very large number of foreign buyers: from
almost all of the major towns in the Low Countries, the Hanseatic towns, and mercantile towns of Portugal
and Italy.  See Laurence Derycke, ‘The Public Annuity Market in Bruges at the End of the 15
th Century’, in
Marc Boone, Karel Davids, and Paul Janssens, eds., Urban Public Debts: Urban Government and the Market
for Annuities in Western Europe (14
th - 18
th Centuries), Studies in European Urban History (1100-1800) 3
(Turnout: Brepols, 2003), pp. 165-82.
95 Derycke, ‘Public Annuity Market’, p.  167: the marked reduction in the number of foreign buyers
was partly the goal of urban government policies.
not all necessarily urban).  Even today, or certainly in the previous three centuries, the common term rentier
– obviously directly derived from the very word rente –- refers to those who live from investment income
(rather than from ‘earned income’, such as wages or business profits), and often principally from their
holdings of government debt; and the most common implication of this term, so often used with a negative
connotation, is that such people come from the ultra-richer strata of society.  Who would doubt, for example,
that the Arras banking family of the Crespins, who held such a very large share of Bruges’ public debt in the
1290s – in ‘usurious’ loans and renten – were not among the very richest to be found in north-western France
(and Flanders) in this era?
While that assumption may well be generally valid for the late-medieval era, it was not necessarily
true of all towns.  For example, in the small town of Aalst (Alost), in eastern (Imperial) Flanders, the annual
town accounts (stadsrekeningen) indicate that the urban market for lijfrenten was remarkably broad,
especially for such a small and economically lesser town, whose early fifteenth-century population has been
estimated at 3,600 to 4,000 (today’s population: 76,800). 
92  One random sample, taken from the account for
February 1402-February 1403, lists annuity payments to 769 recipients.  If they were all citizens of Aalst –
and the accounts do not designate their residences –  that number would represent almost 20 percent of the
town’s estimated total population (3,600 – 4,000), and perhaps 40 percent of the adult population.  If so,  by
no means all of them could have been ‘rich’.
93   But, as has just been shown for fourteenth-century Ghent,
and has also been demonstrated for other late-medieval towns in the Low Countries, many purchasers of
urban renten were non-residents, some from very distant towns.  Some  others were resident foreign
merchants, though obviously more so in towns such as Ghent and Bruges, rather than in small towns such
as Aalst.
94  For Bruges’ annuity markets, Laurence Derycke found that in much of the fifteenth century,
citizens were generally not in the majority, not until the early sixteenth century.
95  The breadth of the market25
96 See the studies in Boone, Davids, and Janssens, Urban Public Debts (2003), cited in nn.  72,  88-
89, 90-92; and see also Marc Boone,  ‘Plus deuil que joie’, pp.  3-24, in n.  72 above..
97  Especially in textiles, building trades, leather- and luxury-wares; butchers and brewers, etc. See
Marc  Ryckaert and A.  Vandewalle, Brugges: de geschiedenis van een Europese stad (Tielt, 1999), pp.  41-
42, cited in Derycke, ‘Public Annuity Market’, pp.  171-72; and also Marc Ryckaert, Bruges : l'histoire d'une
ville européenne (Lannoo, 1999).
98  Derycke, ‘Public Annuity Market’, pp.  171-77.
99 Manon van der Heijden, ‘Renteniers and the Public Debt of Dordrecht (1555-1572)’, in Marc
Boone, Karel Davids, and Paul Janssens, eds., Urban Public Debts: Urban Government and the Market for
Annuities in Western Europe (14
th - 18
th Centuries), Studies in European Urban History (1100-1800) 3
(Turnout: Brepols, 2003), pp. 183-96.
100 Martijn van der Burg and Marjolein ‘t Hart, ‘Renteniers and the Recovery of Amsterdam’s Credit
(1578-1605)’, in Marc Boone, Karel Davids, and Paul Janssens, eds., Urban Public Debts: Urban
Government and the Market for Annuities in Western Europe (14
th - 18
th Centuries), Studies in European
Urban History (1100-1800) 3 (Turnout: Brepols, 2003), pp. 197-216:  with the remaining 4 percent classed
for annuities varied, of course, by town, region, and period, and may have become broader by the eighteenth
century, especially in the northern Netherlands.
96  
But, as Laurence Derycke has demonstrated  in a meticulous study on late fifteenth-century Bruges,
the domestic ‘annuity purchasers belonged to the same socio-economic strata as those from which the
members of the urban government were recruited’. To be sure that included ‘craftsmen’, but principally the
very wealthy craftsmen-entrepreneurs who were the guild leaders represented in the town government, which
(since 1302) had allotted 16 of the 24 magistracies (seats) to the craft guilds.
97 As she also notes, those who
were socially and economically considered to be  poorters – merchants and wealthy property owners – were
often technically also guild leaders.  She contends that by the early fifteenth-century, the Bruges civic
government was ‘almost exclusively in the ends of the city’s commercial and industrial elite,’ which she calls
an  ‘alliance of the poorterij on the one hand and the rich and powerful craft guilds on the other’, who held
‘an iron grip on the public finances’.  For the ‘richer craft-guilds and the poorterij were time and again the
socio-economic circles par excellence where enough money was available to buy public renten, as urban
annuities were expensive and not attainable for everyone’.  She contends in particular, that ‘the cheapest
annuity that was sold on the occasion of the three issues [1472, 1489, 14592] studied  cost 9 lb.  gr, an amount
that corresponded ..  to the wage of a skilled mason for nine full months of labour’.  Therefore,  ‘the lower
layers of the population were fully excluded from participation in the consolidated public debt.’ According
to her analyses, only 20 percent of the buyers were responsible for 75 percent of the total revenues produced
from annuity sales; and that the major purchasers were ‘the major office holders in the government, treasurers,
and noblemen and those linked by marriage to noble families,’ including many of their widows.
98 
Similar circumstances may be found in some sixteenth-century Dutch towns.  In Dordrecht, over the
century 1550-1650, 23 percent of those purchasing urban renten came from outside the city, according to
Manon van der Heijden, whose research, for the much shorter period of 1549-1577, also indicates that  34
percent of the urban magistrates bought annuities.
99   For Amsterdam, in the years, 1578-1608, Martijn van
der Burg and Marjolein t’Hart found that merchants accounted for 63 percent of purchases of urban debts and
annuities; industrial entrepreneurs, for 21 percent; professionals (doctors, chemists, notaries), for 7 percent;
office-holders, for 5 percent.  But if, to that last group are added those from the other categories known to
have held government offices, this category of urban magistrates would account for about 22 percent of the
total annuities market.
100  Similarly, James Tracy had earlier demonstrated the overwhelming prominence of26
as ‘others’.  See also Van der Heijden, ‘Public Debt’, pp. 190-94: stating that in Dordrecht ‘urban
officeholders and their kin were thus highly involved in urban finances’, and that in the century 1550-1650,
an average of 58 percent of female buyers of renten were ‘related to the political elite’; and that 69 percent
of the women were widows.  For other studies on Dutch towns in this volume, see Wantje Fritschy, ‘Three
Centuries of Urban and Provincial Public Debts: Amsterdam and Holland’, pp.  75-92; and Remi van Shaïk,
‘The Sale of Annuities and Financial Politics in a Town in the Eastern Netherlands: Zutphen, 1400 - 1600’,
pp.  108-26. 
101 Tracy, Financial Revolution, chapter 5, ‘The Renteniers’, pp.  139-92; quotations on p.  171.
102  In assessing my most recent and successful Social Science and Humanities Research Council of
Canada research grant application, for my project ‘Warfare, taxation, depopulation, and living standards in
the southern Low Countries’, one anonymous referee asserted that ‘It is not true that those receiving payments
of the renten were only the “rich”.’ See n.  1 above.
103   Sources: Aalst  Stadsrekeningen (1395-1550) in Algemeen Rijksarchief Brussel, Rekenkamer,
doc. nos. 31,412 - 31,553.  For various reasons, I have set 1550 as the terminal date for my analysis of urban
finances in the southern Low Countries; and I certainly so no valid reason to go beyond 1568, with the
outbreak of the Revolt of the Low Countries against Spanish rule, so destructive for Flanders and Brabant.
urban office-holders and their surviving widows as purchasers of renten in eight sixteenth-century Dutch
towns: especially those whose occupations were ‘grain dealers, Baltic exporters, merchants, and shippers’
(along with some drapers, brewers, and professionals). 
101 From all these studies, therefore, we may safely
assert that, even if not all buyers of urban renten in the late-medieval and early-modern Low Countries were
‘rich’, the preponderant majority of them most certainly were, and further that they also held an even greater
share of the aggregate urban public debt.
102
Later medieval and sixteenth-century Flanders: the role of renten Aalst’s civic finances
The Flemish town that constitutes the major object of this study on late-medieval urban finances,
renten, and excise taxes is the aforementioned Aalst, from the very late fourteenth to the mid sixteenth
century.  A small town near the border with the duchy of Brabant, to the east, Aalst had a  far different
financial history from that just seen in fourteenth-century Ghent.  The role that renten played in Aalst’s civic
finances can be seen in Tables 2 - 9, for the period 1395-96 (first extant account) to 1550, when this study
terminates.
103  While accounts for some years within this long 155-year era are missing, especially in the
1490s, there are fewer gaps in these accounts than in the Ghent accounts;  and, even more important, almost
all of the extant Aalst accounts are fully complete, while many of the fourteenth-century Ghent accounts have
survived in only partial form.  
Tables 2 - 7, all in quinquennial (five-year) means, provide the following data from the Aalst civic
annual treasurer’s accounts, for the period 1396 to 1550 (account year beginning Candlemas, or 2 February):
# Table 2 (figure 1):  revenues from the annual sales of both erfelijk renten and lijfrenten, and as
percentages of total civic revenues.
# Table 3 (figure 2): annual expenditures on both erfelijk renten and lijfrenten (annuity payments and
redemptions); the proportional shares accounted for by each form of renten; and total renten
payments as percentages of total civic expenditures.
# Table 4 (figure 3): Annual balance sheets of total incomes, total expenditures, and consequent
surpluses or deficits, in both livres parisis and ponds groot Flemish (£12 parisis = £1 groot).
# Table 5 (figure 4): Total annual mean incomes from the sales of excise tax farms (accijnzen); annual
payments for renten (both kinds) as percentages of total income from the tax farms and, for27
104 On the differences in yields on public debts in France and the medieval, early modern Low
Countries, see Munro, ‘Medieval Origins’, pp.  524-40, and Appendix A below.
comparison, as percentages of total civic expenditures.
# Table 6 (figure 5): Annual mean incomes from the excise-tax farms on the consumption (sales) of
wine, beer, woollen cloth, grain, and the total excise tax farms, in £ parisis (only), with an index
based on mean values for 1451-75, the statistical base period used throughout this study. 
# Table 7 (figures 6 and 7): Total revenues from the combined sale of the wine and beer excise-tax
farms; total revenues from the sales of all excise-tax farms; and the shares of total civic incomes
accounted for by both the sales of excise-tax farms and the sales of renten, in £ parisis and groot.
These six tables together permit an interesting comparison between the civic finances of Ghent and
Aalst (in the periods indicated).  Thus if  erfelijk renten had been the predominant form of annuities that were
sold in financing  -- if only to a small extent --  the government of fourteenth-century Ghent, the exact
opposite was true for Aalst, for the 155-year period of this study, from 1395 to 1550.  Thus,  lijfrenten were
always vastly more important by an almost 25:1 ratio. In summary, over this 155- year period, lijfrenten
accounted for 96.04 percent of the total sales value of annuities, and thus erfelijk renten accounted for only
3.96 percent.  Together, over this same period, the sales of all renten provided (as an annual average) 11.86
percent of total civic revenues, ranging from an unusual low of 0.37 percent in 1511-15 (quinquennial mean)
to a high of 25.42 percent in 1431-35 (years of strife).  Over this same 150-year period, erfelijk renten
accounted for a correspondingly small share, 2.37 percent, of the annual payments for renten obligations (i.e.,
both annuity payments and redemptions) , while the lijfrenten thus accounted for 97.63 percent of those
annuity expenditures. The difference, albeit small, between the relative proportions for sales revenue and
expenditures, for these two forms of civic annuities, is readily explained by the fact that rate of return on
erfelijk renten was always lower than that for lijfrenten  – often only half that for lijfrenten; and both forms
of renten evidently always had a much lower yield than interest on loans (information for which is
understandably scarce, because of the usury prohibition).
104
As indicated in Table 5 (figure 4), on renten-related expenditures, the annual payments for both kinds
of renten in Aalst (for both annuity payments and redemptions)  accounted for an annual  mean of 36.47
percent of total civic expenditures, over this 155-year period.  Those shares of total civic expenditures ranged
from a low 22.17 percent, at the end our period,  in 1541-45 (and only 22.27 percent in 1546-50) to a high
of 74.65 percent in 1436-40, during the very costly and economically disruptive Anglo-Burgundian war. 
Of equal interest in this important table is the relationship between expenditures on renten and the
revenues derived from the annual sale of excise-tax farms on consumption: especially if we assume that the
major if not exclusive reason for those excise taxes was to finance such annuity expenditures.  Thus, renten-
related annual expenditures ranged from a low of 33.28 percent – again in 1541-45 –  to a very unusual high
of 110.55 percent if the sales value of the excise-tax farms, again in the years of the Anglo-Burgundian war:
1436-40; but that was the only quinquennium in this entire period in which renten expenditures exceeded
such income from the excise-tax farms.
The next two tables, Table 6 and 7 (figures 5 and 6), provide more detailed information on the mean
annual revenues from the various excise-tax farms: principally wine, beer, cloth (Aalst was a textile-town),
and grains.  It will be readily seen, as was previously noted, that together the wine and beer excise-tax farms
usually accounted for well over half of the tax-farm revenues: ranging from an unusual low (in quinquennial
means) of 44.96 percent in 1476-80 to a high of 67.95 percent in 1546-60.  For the first half of the sixteenth
century, the sum of the wine and beer tax-farms accounted for 63.1 percent of total excise-tax farm revenues.
In the same period, as indicated in Table 7, the revenues from the sales of excise-tax farms accounted for a
mean of 78.5 percent of total civic revenues..  Over the entire 150 year period, that share of total civic
revenues accounted for by the sales of the excise-tax farms averaged almost the same: 74.53 percent; and it28
105  See John Munro, ‘The Monetary Origins of the “Price Revolution:”   South German Silver
Mining, Merchant-Banking, and Venetian Commerce, 1470-1540’, in Dennis Flynn, Arturo Giráldez, and
Richard von Glahn, eds., Global Connections and Monetary History, 1470 - 1800  (Aldershot and Brookfield,
Vt:  Ashgate Publishing, 2003),  pp. 1-34.
106 See John Munro, ‘Wage-Stickiness, Monetary Changes, and Real Incomes in Late-Medieval
England and the Low Countries, 1300 - 1500:  Did Money Matter?’ Research in Economic History, 21
(2003), 185 - 297; John Munro, Wool, Cloth and Gold:  The Struggle for Bullion in Anglo-Burgundian Trade,
1340-1478 (Brussels:  Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles; and Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 1973)
and various studies in John H.  Munro, Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the Low
Countries, 1350 - 1500, Variorum Collected Studies series CS 355 (Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield,
Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1992).
107 See sources cited in nn.  105-06, above.
ranged from a low of 50.16 percent in the civil war years of 1486-90 to a high of 84.74 percent in 1446-50,
virtually matched by the 84.58 percent share in 1526-30.
The burden of taxation in Aalst: 1396 - 1550: a new look at the ‘standard of living’ controversy
The central issue of this study is a  measurement of the burden of taxation – though only a partial
measurement – in financing urban renten, specifically in later-medieval and early modern Flanders.  The
measurement of this taxation provides us, in turn,  with another statistical mechanism to evaluate the still
ongoing ‘standard of living’ debate in late-medieval and early modern western Europe, at least for the first
part of the Price Revolution era.  The major problem facing the economic historian in dealing with the
statistical data of this era that involve monetary values is to convert the those ‘nominal’ values that are
expressed in the current money-of-account (livre parisis and pond groot)  into some estimate of ‘real’ values,
as statisticians and economists always do today with current values.  The monetary problem was, in many
ways, a much bigger one for this era, from the mid-fourteenth to mid-sixteenth centuries, involving two
separate sets of factors, both concerning alternating cycles of inflation and deflation, finally culminating in
the 130-year period of sustained inflation, throughout Europe known as the ‘Price Revolution’ (ca.  1520 -
ca.  1650).
105 
The first was coinage debasement (i.e., reductions in the precious-metal contents), almost always
inflationary, followed by its opposite, coinage renforcements, usually deflationary, which provided monetary
disturbances and price fluctuations that were far more severe in the southern Low Countries than in England,
if generally less severe than those in late-medieval France.
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Complicating these fluctuations in the price  levels was a quite separate second set of factors: those
that produced first monetary contraction and then monetary expansion.  The problems of monetary
contraction and consequent (further) deflation affected the Low Countries in three major periods: the late
fourteenth, early fifteenth-century (ca.  1380 - ca.  1415), the mid fifteenth century (ca.  1440 - ca.  1475),
and the late fifteenth-early sixteenth century (ca.  1495 - ca.  1510).  That was then followed by a new form
of monetary expansion, involving both precious metals (the South-German silver mining) boom and credit
(i.e., innovations in financial institutions), which provided the true origins of the Price Revolution, long
before any important influxes of silver came from the Spanish Americas (and also before any significant
demographic expansion).  The nature of these various monetary forces, and the economic characteristics and
consequences of the cycles of inflation, deflation, and then inflation have been dealt with very extensively
elsewhere and need not detain us further in this study.
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The major issue that the economic historian must resolve is the proper method of ‘discounting’ the29
108  Phelps Brown and Hopkins, ‘Seven Centuries’, pp.  1-12.  See n.  83 above.
109  Van der Wee, ‘Prijzen en lonen als ontwikkelingsvariabelen’, pp.  413-47.  See n.  85 above, and
Table 11 below.
110  See John Munro,‘Builders’ Wages in Southern England and the Southern Low Countries, 1346
-1500:  A Comparative Study of Trends in and Levels of Real Incomes’, in Simonetta Cavaciocchi, ed.,
L’Edilizia prima della rivoluzione industriale, secc. XIII-XVIII, Atti delle “Settimana di Studi” e altri
convegni, no. 36, Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica  “Francesco Datini” (Florence: Le Monnier,
2005), pp. 1013-76; and Munro, ‘Wage-Stickiness’, pp.  185-297.
111  I have in fact been able to use the working papers of the Phelps Brown and Hopkins project, now
maintained in the Archives of the British Library of Political and Economic Science (London School of
effects of inflation and deflation and thus of converting ‘nominal’ values into ‘real values’.  In other words,
a sharp rise in the aggregate value of the excise-tax farm revenues may be only the result of inflation and thus
illusory. The following Tables 8 and 9 (figures 8 and 9) seek to provide that solution, and, at the same time,
to provide a better method of measuring the burden of urban taxation in Aalst.  The first, Table 8 (figure 8),
presents the mean annual value of the revenues from the sale of all the excise-tax farms in Aalst (with nominal
values in both livres parisis and pond groot) in terms of fixed ‘baskets of consumables’, similar in nature to
those that statisticians compile today to measure the Consumer Price Index (or cost of living index).  For
England, over a period of almost seven centuries (from 1264 to 1954), this statistical technique was pioneered
(in 1956) by the English team of Henry Phelps Brown and Sheila Hopkins; and it is still the most widely used
method of measuring changes in the English price level, at least until the Industrial Revolution era.
108  In
essence their basket consists of fixed shares of foodstuffs and industrial goods: 80 percent and 20 percent,
respectively (but the grain-weight itself – wheat, rye, barley, and peas – is only 20 percent).  The base that
they chose for their Consumer Price Index is the mean of all commodity prices for the quarter century 1451-
1475.  Obviously, such a weighted price  index – despite many imperfections – is vastly superior to one based
solely on wheat or rye: ‘for man lives not by bread alone’.
In 1975, Professor Herman Van der Wee adopted the Phelps Brown and Hopkins methodology, and
the same statistical base (1451-75),  selecting as far as possible the same commodities, in the same or similar
quantities, to produce his own ‘basket of consumables’ Consumer Price Index for the Antwerp-Lier region
of Brabant for the three centuries from 1400 to 1700.
109  I myself then followed Van der Wee’s methodology
to construct a ‘basket of consumables’ Consumer Price Index for Flanders, from 1350 to 1500.
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Unfortunately, while there are ample grain prices for the following centuries, we do not possess adequate
price data for the other commodities in this basket, either before 1350 or after 1500.  To resolve this problem,
I have utilized the Van der Wee Consumer Price Index for the first half of the sixteenth century (but
converting prices in Brabant groten into Flemish groten, and using the Flemish price base of 1451-75), on
the assumption that by 1500 the market economies of Flanders and Brabant had become sufficiently
integrated – long after their coinages had been unified (in 1433-35) –  to justify this technique, all the more
so since Aalst was fairly close to Brabant, and not so distant from the Antwerp market (which indeed its
textile industries then served).
One very major difference between our price indexes for the southern Low Countries and the Phelps
Brown & Hopkins English price index must be noted.  While the latter consists only of disembodied index
numbers, with fixed expenditures shares for all commodities in the basket, our two price indexes can be
expressed in both index numbers (on that same base of 1451-75) and in current nominal money-of-account
values: i.e., in pence (d.)  groot of Flanders and Brabant (£1.0 groot Flemish = £1.5 groot Brabant).  The
major benefit of this technique is that the commodity expenditure shares are not rigidly fixed, but vary with
the changes in relative prices, and thus provide a better method of representing relative purchasing power.
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Economics), and have converted all of their commodity index numbers into monetary values (from 1264 to
1700), in pence sterling.  I have also used them in my comparative study of real wages, in late-medieval
England and the Low Countries, where I have also examined the statistical nature of this difference in the
consumer price indexes. See Munro, ‘Builders’ Wages’, pp. 1013-76.
112 On these issues, see Munro, ‘Wage Stickiness’, pp.  185-297; and Munro, ‘Wages in Southern
England and the Low Countries’, pp.  1013-76.  For the Aalst wage data, see the sources for the tables.
The components of the Flemish and Brabantine commodity baskets, and their mean individual money-of-
account values (in pence groot), for the base period 1451-1475, are presented in Table 11.
As Table 8 (figure 8) indicates, the quinquennial mean real value of the sales revenue from the
aggregate excise-tax farms, as expressed in the number of Flemish ‘baskets of consumables’ of equivalent
value,  rose from 865.37 Flemish ‘baskets’ in 1396-1400 to a mid-century peak of 1,283.39 baskets – an
almost 50 percent (48.3) increase – for the economically depressed post-Anglo-Burgundian war years of
1441-45.  Thereafter, after temporarily declining,  that real tax burden rose again to a new peak of 1,523.48
baskets in 1471-75: i.e., 76 percent higher than in 1396-1400; and that peak was surpassed at the end of the
century, in 1496-1500, with an excise-tax burden of 1,593.471 baskets.  In the sixteenth century, however,
that excise-tax burden was evidently diminished, as the equivalent number of (Brabantine) ‘baskets of
consumables’ steadily fell to a low of 599.319 baskets in 1521-25 (only 69.25 percent of the real tax burden
in 1396-1400), but thereafter rising to 882.57 baskets at the very end of our period of statistical analysis, in
1546-50, representing about the same tax burden as that for 1396-1400, at the beginning of our period.  The
final column of  Table 8 may provide the most effective means of measuring changes in the tax burden over
this 155-year period: i.e., the index numbers, with a base of 1451-75, for the equivalent value of the aggregate
tax-excise farms in terms of the Flemish basket of consumables (thus indicating, for example, that the burden
in 1496-1500 was 27.1 percent higher than for the base period, 1451-75.
Monetary factors concerning inflation and deflation may explain some of the differences in these
excise-tax burdens: i.e., in that nominal values of the excise taxes and thus of the farms were ‘sticky’, and
thus did not smoothly change with the rise and fall of prices.  Note, for example, that the fifteenth-century
peaks were during periods of severe deflation (except in the years of civil strife and war, in the 1470s and
1480s).  Conversely, the fall in the real values of the excise-tax farms during the initial phase of the Price
Revolution may reflect a ‘stickiness’ of the nominal tax rates during the onset of prolonged inflation.
Table 9 (figure 9) presents an even better measure of the real tax burden, especially for middle and
lower classes of Aalst’s urban society: the value of the excise-tax revenues as expressed in the equivalent
value of the number of days’ wages for master masons and carpenters.  These were building craftsmen who
periodically obtained employment from the civic government for building projects, while also employed, in
other periods of the year in institutional and other private construction projects.  Some  masters in the Aalst
building trades, if by no means a majority, were more than just artisans. They were also industrial
‘contractors’ and entrepreneurs, who often earned substantial additional incomes from trading in construction
materials  – selling building supplies to town governments, and various institutions, such as hospitals,
churches, guilds, etc.   They also generally earned much higher wages – which have thus been excluded from
this study.  Perhaps an even better measure might have been to use the daily wages of their journeymen
helpers, all the more so since journeymen (knapen) earned virtually all of their income from wages. But while
the journeymen’s wages in, say Bruges, were virtually always one-half (50 percent) of the master’s wage,
they varied in Aalst from about 43 percent (e.g., 3d/7d) to 50 percent (e.g., 4d/8d) or 57 percent (e.g.,
4d/7d).
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Some historians, however, have contended that masons and carpenters – or other similar building
craftsmen – are not a good choice, as representatives of skilled artisans, since they do not necessarily rank31
113 See for example: Bruno Blondé, De sociale structuren en economische dynamiek van
's-Hertogenbosch 1500-1550 (Antwerp: Stichting Zuidelijk Historisch Contact, 1987); and also Bruno
Blondé, ed., Labour and Labour Markets Between Town and Countryside, Middle Ages-19th century
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2001).
114 See John Munro, ‘Urban Wage Structures in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries:
Work-Time and Seasonal Wages’, in Ian Blanchard, ed., Labour and Leisure in Historical Perspective,
Thirteenth to Twentieth Centuries,  Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Beiheft series,
no. 116  (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994), pp.  65-78; and Munro, ‘Wage-Stickiness’, pp.  185-297.
115 For published statistics on the available wage data for late-medieval Ghent, see Thoen,
Landbouwekonomie, Vol.  II, Part IV: ‘Loonevolutie en loonarbeid’, pp.  941-79, especially Figure (graph)
43, p.  950; and also Appendix XVI, pp. 1317-26.  For wages of building craftsmen in Bruges, Antwerp, and
Mechelen, see the data provided in Munro, ‘Wage-Stickiness’, Tables 10-14, pp.  252-61; and also in
Munro,’Builders’ Wages’, Tables 3-7, pp.  1053-1066; Van der Wee, ‘Prijzen en lonen’, pp. 413-47;  and in
Van der Wee, Antwerp Market, vol.  I: Statistics, pp.  383-89; Synoptic Tables of Wages and Appendices 27-
30, pp.  393-92; for beer excise taxes in Antwerp, in scattered years only from 1560 to 1600, see Appendix
43/5, p.  521.  As Van der Wee notes (p.  510), ‘the town accounts of Antwerp have only been conserved in
full from the last quarter of the sixteenth century ....’.
all that high in the hierarchy of urban wages.
113 But that objection misses the point – which is not to present
such wages as though they truly ‘representative’ of the artisan labour force, and certainly not as the highest
of such urban wages.   There is one fundamental reason why all of use such builders’ wages: because they
are, for most medieval and early modern towns and villages (and also English manorial estates) the only
daily-wage labour statistics available in a verifiable and continuous series over many, many centuries.  In
medieval economic history, ‘beggars cannot be choosers’.  We must also remember that most artisans and
labourers worked for piece-work wages (never or rarely available in such continuous series); and thus
building craftsmen also provide one of the few examples of daily wages, based on a working day from 8
hours in the winter to 12-14 hours in the summer, thus explaining why the records often distinguish between
summer and winter wages.
114
 Such a measurement, based on builders’ wages, explains another very major reason for choosing the
town accounts of Aalst: the fact that they provide, along with all of the aforementioned statistical data on
rentes and excise-taxes, a very complete set of data on urban wages  — providing, year after year,  the wages
(summer and winter) for specified artisans –  from which I have chosen just the daily (summer) wages for
master masons and carpenters.  In contrast to these rich and so informative Aalst civic accounts, the Ghent
accounts provide almost no such annual, useable wage data (except a very few years in the fourteenth
century); and the individual wage data in the Bruges civic accounts cease in the 1480s, when the town
treasurers chose to provide, thereafter, only the annual totals of wage expenditures (as do the later Ypres
accounts).  Conversely, while we have abundant wage data for Antwerp (1400-1700), we have virtually no
civic records of revenues from excise tax farms until the later sixteenth century.
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In Table 9, the mean daily wages for these artisans are indicated, in pence groot Flemish, in the fifth
(middle column), ranging from a mean of 7.2d in 1396-1400 to a nominal peak mean of 10.0d from the mid
1480s to the mid 1490s.  For purposes of comparative analysis, this Table 9 also provides the estimated
annual wage income (for a mean estimated  employment year of 210 days) for these master masons and
carpenters, again, in terms of the equivalent number Flemish (and Brabantine) ‘baskets of consumables’: i.e,
the amount of real goods that these artisans could purchase yearly with their money wage income.  That32
116 For an explanation and justification for the choice of a mean employment year of 210 days, see
Munro, ‘Wage-Stickiness’, pp.  185-297; Munro, ‘Builders’ Wages’, pp. pp. 1013-76l; and especially Van
der Wee, Growth of the Antwerp Market, Vol.  I: Statistics, Appendix 48, pp.  540-44 (for Antwerp and Lier,
in the period 1437-1600).
117  The harmonic mean is ‘the reciprocal of the arithmetic mean of the reciprocals of the individual
numbers in a given series’; and it is always somewhat less than the arithmetic mean.  For the statistical
explanation, see F.C. Mills, Introduction to Statistics (New York, 1956), pp. 108-12, 401; and Harold S.
Sloan and Arnold J.  Zurcher, A Dictionary of Economics, 3
rd edn, (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1953), pp.
149-50.  The mathematical equation is: HM = 1/ [ 3 (1/r1 + 1/r2 + 1/r3 + ... 1/rn) ] / N.  The letter ‘r’ indicates
the prices or wages in a series, so that 1/r means the reciprocal of that price or wage for each year in the
series.  For an explanation of why harmonic and not arithmetic means must be used in such historical studies,
see, Munro, ‘Builders’ Wages’, pp. 1013-76.  The usual method of presenting real wages as index number
employs the formula: NWI/CPI = RWI: i.e, the nominal wage index divided by the consumer price index
provides the real wage index numbers.  For reasons too complicated to examine here, those results are inferior
the method employed here, using the values of actual consumer baskets. 
118 For Aalst’s population, see note 90 above.
indeed is the true meaning of the often misunderstood term ‘real wages’.
116  For reasons that I have supplied
in depth in other publications, this measure of annual income in commodity baskets, along with the real-wage
index (final column), are and must be presented in harmonic rather than arithmetic means.
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The most striking feature of this table is the very large number of days’  wages, for master masons
and carpenters, whose aggregate money value provides the equivalent value of the annual tax-farms in Aalst.
That number rise from an annual mean of 13,205.93 days wages in 1396-1400 (62.89 years wage income)
to an initial peak, again in those depressed post-war years of 1441-45: when the excise-tax burden represented
20,201.43 days’ wages (96.2 years’ wage income, almost a century)  for these artisans.  But that burden was
subsequently exceeded consistently in the years from 1466 to 1485: varying from 21,640.64  days’ wages
in 1466-70 to a new peak of 24,419.60 days’ wages (116.3  years’ wage income) in 1471-75.  While falling
somewhat in the 1480s, but only because of a rise in nominal money wages, that tax burden again rose (to
21,442.91 days’ wages in 1496-1500) and never fell below 20,000 days wages in the first two decades of the
sixteenth century, falling only briefly in  the early fifteenth century, thereafter rising to a new and final peak
of 29,949.60 days’ wages (142.6 days’ wages) in the final quinquennium of this study, 1546-50.  The
principal reason for this rising tax burden on such artisans should be obvious as well from Table 9: the fact
that nominal money wages did not rise to keep pace with inflation, and sometimes even fell, during this first
phase of the Price Revolution, while, at the same time, the nominal value of the excise taxes did rise, if not
as much as the price level, at least  more in accordance with inflation.
For the early fifteenth century, when, as noted earlier, Aalst had between 3,600 and 4,000 inhabitants,
this tax burden must have been a very heavy one indeed for adult master artisans, let alone their far less well
paid journeymen labourers.
118  However, as Table 9b indicates, that tax burden appears to have been far less
draconian, if measured on a per capita basis (for a population of 3,600): thus ranging from 3.668 days’ wages
in 1396-1400 to the onerous peak of 8.319 days’ wages in 1546-50.   If instead we measure the burden in
terms of the estimated number of employed adult males (taken as one-quarter of that population), the burden
correspondingly rises from 14.673 days’ wages in 1396-1400 to 33.277 days’ wages in 1546-1550: i.e, with
a work-week of six days, about 5.5 weeks’ wages. 
Another recent study on Flemish taxation – taxation in the Flemish countryside, from the late
thirteenth to eighteenth centuries – now permits us to make another and most valuable comparative33
119 Tim Soens and Erik Thoen, ‘The Impact of Central Government Taxation on the Flemish
Countryside (end 13
th - 18
th Centuries): Some Reflections’, in Simonetta Cavaciocchi, ed., La fiscalità
nell’economia europea, Seccoli XIII - XVIII/Fiscal Systems in the European Economy from the 13
th to the 18
th
Centuries, XXXIS Settimana du Studi (Florence: Le Monnier, 2008).
120  See Aerts, Bier van Lier; Judith M.  Bennett, Ale, Beer and Brewsters in England : Women's Work
in a Changing World, 1300-1600 (Oxford University Press, 1996).
121 See, for example: Franklin F. Mendels, ‘Proto-Industrialization: The First Phase of the
Industrialization Process’, The Journal of Economic History, 32 (March 1972), 241-61; Donald C. Coleman,
‘Proto-Industrialization: A Concept Too Many’, Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 36 (August 1983),
435-48;   L. A. Clarkson, Proto-Industrialization:  The First Phase of Industrialization?,  Studies in
Economic and Social History Series (London, 1985), pp. 9-57; Eckart Schremmer, ‘Proto-Industrialisation: A
Step Towards Industrialisation?’  Journal of European Economic History, 10 (1981), 653-70; Sheilagh C.
Ogilvie and Markus Cerman, eds.,  European Proto-Industrialization (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1996); P. Kriedte, H. Medick, J. Schlumbohm, Industrialization Before Industrialization
(Cambridge, 1977); Sheilagh Ogilvie, ‘Guilds, Efficiency, and Social Capital: Evidence from German Proto-
Industry’, The Economic History Review, 2
nd ser., 57:2 (May 2004), 286-333.
122 See Michael Postan,  ‘Some Economic Evidence of Declining Population in the Later Middle
Ages’, Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 2 (1950), 130-67, reprinted in his Essays on Medieval Agriculture
and General Problems of the Medieval Economy (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 186 - 213 (with the revised title of
‘Some Agrarian Evidence of Declining Population in the Later Middle Ages’); Michael Postan, The Medieval
Economy and Society:  An Economic History of Britain, 1100-1500 (Cambridge, 1972);  Georges Duby,
Rural Economy and Country Life in the Medieval West, trans. Cynthia Postan (London, 1962), Book IV: pp.
289-360.  See also John Munro, ‘Postan, Population, and Prices in Late-Medieval England and the Low
Countries’, in John Drendel, ed., Michael Postan, Georges Duby, and the Malthusian Paradigm of Crisis in
the Later Middle Ages (Leiden: E.  J., Brill, forthcoming).  See also the next note.
observation.
119 As Tim Soens and Erik Thoen have demonstrated, the levels of taxation – direct taxation –
were far, far lower in the Flemish countryside, and much less regressive, at least before the seventeenth
century; and, furthermore, they have concluded that very few if any rural inhabitants purchased urban
commodities subject to these excise taxes.  Beer, for examples, was a widespread object of production and
consumption in rural households, as were most foodstuffs.
120  Thus, if the tax burden between town and
countryside widened in the later middle ages and sixteenth century, that gap may have provided yet another
incentive for some artisans to seek industrial employment in the countryside: a contention that is indeed
widespread in the now extensive literature on the ‘proto-industrialisation’ debate.
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The late-medieval ‘standard of living’ debate: the role of demographic and monetary factors
The evidence in these tables, especially table 9, provides us – as promised earlier –  with important
new insights into the ongoing controversy about  real incomes and living standards in late-medieval western
Europe, especially after the Black Death.  The still prevailing opinion amongst medieval economic historians,
deeply influenced by the Postan and Duby schools, using  fundamentally a  Ricardian theory, is that the Black
Death and subsequent, if periodic, declines in population, amounting to perhaps 40 percent by the fifteenth
century, so altered the land:labour ratio that the marginal productivity of labour ‘must’ have risen
substantially, as did, therefore, real wages.
122  For, according to Classical economic theory, the real wage is
determined by the marginal product of labour  –  though more precisely it is determined by its marginal
revenue product.  For an even simpler explanation, one may  contend that such a decline in population and
thus in aggregate demand led to the abandonment of relatively infertile, high-cost ‘marginal lands’, so that
the foodstuffs needed to feed such a smaller population were largely produced at much lower costs on lands34
123 For the following, see in particular Munro, ‘Wage-Stickiness’, pp.  185-297; and Munro,
‘Builders’ Wages in Southern England and the Southern Low Countries’, pp. 1013-76.  For another valuable
perspective, specifically on Flanders, see Thoen, Landbouwekonomie, vol.  I, part II: ‘Het algemeen kader
van prijzen en levensduurte’, pp.  234-99.
124 See Munro, ‘Wage-Stickiness’, pp.  185-297.
125  See Munro, ‘Wage-Stickiness’, pp.  185-297, and other sources in nn 102-103 above.
126 See the evidence in Munro,’Builders’ Wages’, pp. pp. 1013-76.
127  For the original ‘Golden Age’ view, though more correctly placed well after the Black Death, see
James E.  Thorold Rogers, Six Centuries of Work and Wages: the History of English Labour (London, 1903),
p.  326: ‘the fifteenth century and the first quarter of the sixteenth were the Golden Age of the English
that were far more fertile, and closer to markets (and thus with lower Ricardian economic rent).  Since the
living standards of the later-medieval urban lower classes were largely determined by food prices –
accounting for about 80 percent of household budgets, as indicated earlier – those lower agricultural costs
and thus food prices, and (presumably) lower rents would largely explain the rise in their real wages and thus
also in their real incomes.
In several publications on real incomes in late-medieval England and the Low Countries, I have
challenged these theoretical notions, which I find simplistic and unhistorical.
123  In particular, I have sought
to  demonstrate that real wages for urban craftsmen generally fell – not rose – in the aftermath of the Black
Death, for about three decades, when inflation and the real cost of living rose more than did money-wages.
By the late fourteenth centuries, in both regions,  real wages had not only recovered from the pre-1340 levels,
but then experienced a sustained rise to reach an unprecedented  peak in the mid-fifteenth century.  I had
contended that this ultimate rise in real wages is chiefly explained, not by changes in labour productivity, but
by the combination of sustained deflation and institutional ‘wage stickiness’.  Thus, with deflation and the
even sharper fall in the cost of living, the purchasing power of stable (‘sticky’) money wages rose, especially
in England but also in the southern Low Countries (both Flanders and Brabant) during especially the mid-
fifteenth century:  from the mid 1440s to the mid 1470s, and peaking in both principalities in the
quinquennium 1461-65.  But otherwise, in the fifteenth century (except for the late 1490s), real wages
suffered a very considerable deterioration, chiefly because of warfare, coinage debasements, and consequent
inflations. In this current study, Table 9, on nominal and real wages in Aalst provides additional evidence for
this thesis. Note the long-term ‘wage stickiness’ for building craftsmen in Aalst (if not quite as ‘sticky’ as
builders’  wages in Bruges, Mechelen, and Antwerp);
124  and note therefore that in Aalst, as elsewhere in the
southern Low Countries, real wages rose only when consumer prices fell, and thus fell when those consumer
prices rose.
England, however, enjoyed a more prolonged and continuous, if by no means fully continuous, rise
in real wages from the later fourteenth century into the early sixteenth century, principally because of a highly
unusual degree of monetary stability:  first between 1351 and 1464, when Edward IV debased the silver
coinage by 20 percent; and thereafter from 1465 until 1526 (with Henry VIII’s first if relatively minor
debasement).
125  Partly because of that difference,  real wages in southern England, whose level, on the eve
of the Black Death, had been only about 50 percent  of those in urban Flanders (Bruges and Ghent), had risen
rose to about 80 per cent of the urban Flemish level by the 1480s, when, as also noted earlier, the Bruges
wage data cease to be presented in the annual town accounts.
126
But even some of those who still accept the view that the Black Death ultimately ushered in a ‘golden
age’ for the artisan and labourer do evince some doubts.
127 Thus Ralph Davis has asserted that while,  in late-35
labourer, if we are to interpret the wages which he earned by the cost of the necessities of life.’ See also, and
from this same era, Gustav F. Steffen, Studien zur Geschichte der englischen Lohnarbeiter, 3 vols.  (Stuttgart,
1901-05).
128 Ralph Davis, The Rise of the Atlantic Economies, World Economic History series (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicholson; Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1973), p.  16.
129  Ted Robert Gurr, ‘Historical Trends in Violent Crime: a Critical Review of the Evidence’, Crime
and Justice: An Annual Review of Research, 3 (1891), 295-353, esp.  pp.  312-15, asserting that ‘there was
a tremendous upsurge in violent crime in England (or at least in its cities) during the early fourteenth century’,
i.e., well before the Black Death (with homicide rates of about 23/100,000).  See also Manuel Eisner,  ‘Long-
Term Historical Trends in Violent Crime’, Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, 30 (2003), 83-242, esp.
Table 1, p.  99; for Europe as a whole, homicide rates dropped from a peak of 41 per 100,000 in the 15
th
century, to 1.4 in the 20
th century (Table 2, p. 99); David Nicholas, ‘Crime and Punishment in
Fourteenth-Century Ghent’,  Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire/ Belgisch tijdschrift voor filologie en
geschiedenis, 48 (1970),  289-334, 1141-76;  reprinted in David Nicholas,  Trade, Urbanisation and the
Family, Variorum Collected Studies Series CS531 (Ashgate Publishing: Aldershot, 1996), no.  VI [same
pagination], esp.  pp.  314-16, 1176: ‘Crime was not the assassination of one’s neighbor, but the failure to
offer suitable atonement to his kindred’.
130 Douglass North and Robert Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History
(Cambridge, 1973), pp.  71-96 (quotation on p.  78), 93; 134-38; Douglass North, Structure and Change in
Economic History (New York, 1981), chapters 1-5; Douglass North, ‘Government and the Cost of Exchange
in History’, Journal of Economic History, 44 (1984), 255-64; Douglass North, ‘Transaction Costs in History’,
Journal of European Economic History, 14 (1985), 557-76.
131 See my publications on coinage debasements and princely finances in n.  106 above.
medieval Europe, ‘the most powerful upward regulator of income per head was a calamitous drop in
population’,  nevertheless ‘the economy of modern Europe would never have come into existence on the basis
of population decline’.
128   Of course, several economic historians have argued that the late-medieval
population decline did not occur peacefully; that, in accompanying the ravages of plagues and warfare, was
often extremely disruptive to the economy, especially to trade and commerce.   We must also take account
of the extremely high levels of physical violence, apart from warfare, in late-medieval society, especially in
the Low Countries.  In this region, the homicide rates were about 45.0 - 47.0 per 100,000 persons in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (vs a rate of 23.0 in late-medieval England), compared to just 0.9 per
100,000 in the Netherlands and Belgium during the late twentieth century.
129 The Nobel-prize winning
economist Douglass North has more clearly discerned the key issues about the late-medieval European
economies  than have most historians, in stating that:
130 
The decline of population, coupled with war, confiscation, pillage and revolution, reduced
the volume of trade and stimulated a trend toward local self-sufficiency.  The losses to
society due to the decline in specialization and reduced division of labor certainly argues
against a rise in the standard of living.  This change was synonymous with increased
transaction costs from using the market, a change which increased the incentives for
independent groups to rely upon the coercive powers of government to organize economic
activity.
To this we may add two very specific coercive powers of government: greatly increased taxation and coinage
debasements, which are also, of course, a major form of taxation that so many medieval princes utilized,
above all in financing warfare.
13136
132   Hans Van Werveke, De Zwarte Dood in de zuidelijke Nederlanden, 1349-1351, in Mededelingen
van de koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor wetenschappen, letteren, en schone kunsten van België, Klasse
der Letteren, Vol. XII. no. 3 (Brussels, 1950).  See the next note.
133  For a very cogent and convincing rebuttal of Van Werveke’s thesis, though not involving these
specific issues, see Willem Blockmans,  ‘The Social and Economic Effects of Plague in the Low Countries,
1349-1500’, Belgish tijdschrift voor philologie en geschiedenis/ Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, 58
(1980), 833-63.   See also Georges Despy, ‘La ‘Grande Peste Noire de 1348’:  a-t-elle touché le roman pays
de Brabant?’ in Georges Despy, ed., Centenaire du seminaire d'histoire médiévale de l'Université Libre de
Bruxelles, 1876-1976 (Brussels, 1977), pp. 195-217.
Demography and the burden of taxation
What has not so far been clearly specified is the very adverse economic consequences in the
relationship between depopulation and taxes, especially excise taxes.  Thus the increasingly expensive
warfare of late-thirteenth and early fourteenth-century western Europe, i.e, even before the even more
expensive Hundred Years’ War (1336-1453), created an ever increasing mountain of public debt (hence the
Italian term, the monte) whose financial burdens had to be borne by a greatly reduced number of survivors,
for no governments could afford to repudiate public debts and the interest or annuity payments that an ever
smaller urban citizenry had to finance principally through consumption taxes.  The fact that the level of excise
taxes did not appreciably change in Bruges and Ghent after the Black Death had led the famed Belgian
historian Hans Van Werveke to believe that the Black Death had largely spared  mid-fourteenth century
Flanders.
132  He evidently did not consider the alternative: that a plague-reduced urban population had to bear,
as well, a significant increase in the per capita burden of taxation, at a substantial cost to its living
standards.
133
Thus the most serious and most misleading deficiency in this late-medieval standard of living debate,
especially for urban society,  has been the failure to take  into account, in proper quantitative fashion,  the role
of taxation:  in particular steep increases in excise or consumption taxes for the lower middle and working
classes in all towns of the southern Low Countries.  What is also especially revealing about Tables 8 and 9
is the contradictory evidence about real wages for master masons and carpenters in Aalst:   that when, in the
mid fifteenth century, they supposedly experienced a rise in their real wages, as computed by the normal
method  – i.e., by dividing the nominal money wage index by the consumer price index (RWI = NWI/CPI)
– these artisans and their labourers also experienced a steep rise in the burden of the excise taxes.   In so far
as the real incomes of the Aalst building craftsmen are being measured, in this study, in terms the number of
‘baskets of consumables’ that could have been purchased with annual money wage incomes, one may wonder
if any of these excise taxes had been included in the prices of the commodities contained in these baskets.
If they had been, that presumably would have been true only those that were sold as final products, at retail
outlets:  such as butter, cheese, meat, fish, and textiles.   The major items in the baskets, by value, were
primary commodities, such as grains, and thus were not subject to these excise taxes, which would have been
imposed instead on the products manufactured from them: e.g, bread and beer (whose wholesale or retail
prices are not in the price indexes, but only their grain components).  Furthermore, of these commodities just
listed, only textiles figured prominently in the total value of all the Aalst excise-tax farms.
The issue of excise taxes also adds yet another dimension to the comparison of the actual levels of
real wages in England and the Southern Low Countries: a factor that may well have narrowed the statistically
evident gap between the real wages for urban building craftsmen even more, in these two countries.  For
England, unlike almost all of the continent (or continental towns), had not and did not experience excise taxes
on consumption until as late as July 1643, when the Long Parliament, under the leadership of John Pym,
shortly after the outbreak of the Civil War between Crown and Parliament, introduced this continental method37
134  See Maurice Ashley,  Financial and Commercial Policy Under the Cromwellian Protectorate
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934; revised edn: London: Frank Cass and Co.  Ltd, 1962), chapter VII:
‘Taxes, ii.  Excise’, pp.  62-71; Patrick O’Brien and Paul Hunt, ‘The Emergence and Consolidation of Excises
in the English Fiscal System before the Glorious Revolution’, British Tax Review, 1 (1997), 35-58;  O’Brien,
‘Political Economy of British Taxation’, pp.  1-32; William Ashworth, Customs and Excise: Trade,
Production and Consumption in England, 1640 - 1845 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,
2003).  Such taxation, of course, also helped make possible England’s ‘financial revolution’, following the
1688 ‘Glorious Revolution’.  See n.  2 above.
135 O’Brien, ‘Political Economy’ , pp.  8-17, esp.  Table 5, p.  11 ( but my calculations from that table.
136 See John H.  Munro, ‘Medieval Woollens:  Textiles, Textile Technology, and Industrial
Organisation, c.  800 - 1500’, in David Jenkins, ed.,  The Cambridge History of Western Textiles, 2 vols.
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Vol. I, pp. 181-227; W.  M. Ormrod, ‘The
Crown and the English Economy, 1290 - 1348,’ in Bruce M.S. Campbell, ed., Before the Black Death:
Studies in ‘Crisis’ of the Early Fourteenth Century (Manchester and New York, 1991), pp. 149 - 83.  Even
in 1640, over 85 percent of the value of English exports came from wool and textiles.  For London’s finances
in this period, see Vanessa Harding, ‘The Crown, the City, and the Orphans: the City of London and its
Finances, 1400 - 1700’, in Marc Boone, Karel Davids, and Paul Janssens, eds., Urban Public Debts: Urban
Government and the Market for Annuities in Western Europe (14
th - 18
th Centuries), Studies in European
Urban History (1100-1800) 3 (Turnout: Brepols, 2003),  pp. 51-60.
137  Roger Schofield, Taxation Under the Early Tudors, 1485 - 1547 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing,
2004).
138 See O’Brien, ‘British Taxation’, Table 5, p.  11; and other sources cited in n.  131 above.
of taxation.
134  By the late eighteenth-century (and presumably much earlier), the sum of excise and import-
customs duties on such consumables accounted for about 78.8 percent of  the ‘Major Taxes’ (accounting for
over 90 percent of total taxes), while direct taxation (chiefly the land tax) account for only 21.2 percent.
135
Of course  a major reason why such excise taxes had not been necessary before the mid seventeenth
century  was the very high level of revenue that the English crown had gained from both export taxes, chiefly
on wool and cloth, and the land taxes, along with such direct taxes as the levies of ‘fifteenths and tenths’
136
It is also interesting to note that an experiment in a progressive income tax, undertaken by Henry VIII, in the
period 1513-1547, did not survive the reign of Elizabeth I (1558-1603).
137  At the same time, it must be
observed that English import  customs duties on wine, and then from 1660s, the era of the so-called ‘New
Colonialism’, customs duties on such colonial imports as tea, sugar, rum, tobacco, linens, Indian cottons,
timber, and iron, provided a consumption-tax burden that was equivalent in nature to urban excise taxes in
continental towns.
138
It must here be stressed that in both these countries, and indeed in most of western Europe, excise
taxes were principally, perhaps almost exclusively an urban form of taxation, and thus may be used in
comparing only urban industrial wages.  At the same time, we must also recognize that, as important as excise
taxes and related forms of indirect taxes were for late-medieval, early-modern town-dwellers, it was not the
only form of taxation: hearth taxes (see Table 10), property taxes, and other forms of direct taxes were also
important, if also far less regressive.  Consider in particular, in Table 10, the rise in the proportion of tax-
exempt ‘poor hearths’ in the duchy of Brabant (combined with demographic decline), especially in the
smaller towns and villages, between 1437 and 1480: for the small towns, in particular, from 9.2 percent in
1437 to 28.1 percent of total hearths in 1480 (no data for 1496).  This provides yet another statistical indicator
to challenge the commonplace notion of ‘Golden Age’ of the artisans (and peasants)  in this era.  But we lack38
139  See P. Jeremy and P. Goldberg, Women, Work, and Life Cycle in a Medieval Economy: Women
in York and Yorkshire, c.1300 - 1520 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Susan Bardsley, ‘Women’s Work
Reconsidered: Gender and Wage-Differentiation in Late Medieval England’, Past & Present, no. 165
(November 1999), 3-29;  Lee Soltow, Income and wealth inequality in the Netherlands, 16th-20th century
(Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1998); Tine de Moor and Jan Luiten van Zanden, Vrouwen en de geboorte van
het kapitalism in West-Europa (Meppel, 2006); Jan Luiten  Van Zanden, ‘Wages and the Standard of Living
in Europe, 1500 - 1800’, European Review of Economic History, 3:2 (August 1999), 175-97, in which he
states (p.  178): ‘This [artisan’s household] budget is made up of different sources of income, of which wage
income is only one. But we assume it was an important source (and not a marginal one) for the European
working classes of the early modern period. Moreover, the wage rate is exogenous for the household: it
cannot influence its level in the short or the long run. This means that a rationally acting household will adapt
its strategy to this given wage-level’: i.e., will adjust the family’s non-wage forms of income accordingly.
140 See Munro, ‘Medieval Woollens’, pp. 181-227: especially in wool-sorting, wool-preparation
(cleansing and greasing), combing, card, spinning, warping (on the loom); while weaving, fulling, dyeing,
and shearing were essentially male occupations.
141 For England, see Bruce M. S. Campbell, ‘The Population of Early Tudor England:  A Re-
evaluation of the 1522 Muster Returns and the 1524 and 1525 Lay Subsidies’, Journal of Historical
Geography, 7 (1981), 145-54; Julian Cornwall, ‘English Population in the Early Sixteenth Century’,
Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 23:1 (April 1970), 32-44;  Ian Blanchard, ‘Population Change, Enclosure,
and the Early Tudor Economy’, Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 23:3 (December 1970), 427-45. 
sufficient data on most of the other taxes, just as we lack full data on urban household incomes, for which
women (wives, daughters, resident widows) were presumably also important contributors, especially after
the Black Death, in any attempt to measure inter-regional urban differences in ‘after-tax’ real incomes in
later-medieval, early-modern western Europe.
139 Unfortunately, for Aalst in particular, we lack any significant
data on female incomes, even for the important woollen textile industry, for which over 60 percent of the
employment was probably then female (earning piece-work incomes).
140
But the plight of these urban artisan and labouring consumers may have been even worse, since these
statistics do not take account of the per capita burden: i.e., of the effects population decline throughout the
fifteenth century.  Another common mistaken belief, concerning medieval demography, one still found in the
current literature, is that western Europe suffered a major fall in population only after the first phase of Black
Death (from 1348, and into the 1360s),  and the corresponding belief that Europe’s population began to
recover from at least the mid fifteenth century.
Recent studies indicate however, for both the southern Low Countries (except the Antwerp region)
and England, that general demographic recovery did not commence until the early sixteenth century, perhaps
not until the 1520s.
141  As Table 10 indicates, for the population of Brabant,  the recorded number of ‘hearths’
for the entire duchy fell by 18.76 percent, from 1437 to 1496, despite the very significant (and expected)
growth of Antwerp (by 91.5 percent), which became the commercial and financial capital of Europe from the
1460s.  The population decline was the most severe for the small towns (i.e., those like Aalst) and villages,
whose number of hearths fell by 25.14 and 26.35 percent, respectively.   Finally, if we assume that population
decline consists not just in the disappearance of households but also in a smaller average family size of those
that survived, the demographic decline may have been much more serious than these grim data would
indicate.
Unfortunately we lack any such comparable demographic data for Aalst (nothing beyond that already
presented), but, thanks to Erik Thoen and Peter Stabel, we do have information on significant demographic
decline for some but not all neighbouring towns in eastern Flanders. For example, Hulst’s population (about39
142 See Thoen, Landbouwekonomie, vol.  I, pp.  1-233;    Stabel, Kleine stad, pp.  17-24; Stabel,
Dwarfs among Giants, pp.  38-43.  According to estimates put forth by Walter Prevenier, ‘La démographie
des villes du comté de Flandre aux XIVe et XVe siècles: État de question: essai d’interpretation’, Revue du
Nord, 65: no.  257 (Apr - June 1983), p.  264 (Table D), Kortrijk had a population of 9,517 in 1469 (based
on the Burgundian census); and Oudenaarde then had a population of 7,290.  All of his estimates seem to be
unduly high, and based on a high multiplier of 4.5 persons per household.
143 Henri Pirenne, ‘Les dénombrements de la population d’Ypres au XVe siècle (1412-1506)’,
Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial und Wirtschaftsgeschichte (1903), republished in Henri Pirenne, Histoire
économique de l’occident médiéval, ed.  Etienne Coornaert (Bruges: Declée de Brouwer, 1951), pp.  458-488,
especially p.  467 (also presenting alternative figures of 10,736 inhabitants in 1412 and 9,390 in 1437).  But
see Prevenier, ‘ Démographie des villes’, pp.  259-60, 270: who provides slightly different alternative
estimates for Ypres’ 1412 population: 10,782 and 10,489 inhabitants, and an estimate of perhaps 9,878 in
1469 (Table G: 2,195 hearths with an average family size of 4.5 persons).
144  Peter Stabel believes that Aalst enjoyed relative stability during this century.  See  Stabel, Dwarfs
among Giants, pp.  38-43.  Prevenier, ‘La démographie’, Table D, p.  264 provides an estimate of Aalst’s
population in 1469 (extrapolated from the Burgundian census of that year): 3,962 inhabitants, about the same
as other estimates for 1400.  See n.  92 above.
145 Conversely, of course, the evident growth in Aalst’s population by the mid sixteenth century
would have reduced the per capita tax burden indicated in Table 9.
the same as that of Aalst) had fallen from 3,600 in 1417 to 3,000 in 1469, a decline of about 17 percent.  From
the mid-fourteenth to the mid or later fifteenth century, the population of Dendermonde had fallen by about
one half: from about 9,000 to about 4,500.   But Kortrijk seems to have maintained a stable population of
about 5,300 from 1440 to 1477; and Oudenaarde’s population (with a thriving tapestry industry) actually
grew from 5,700 in the 1440s to 6,200 in about 1500.
142  Perhaps the worst Flemish demographic crisis took
place in Ypres (Ieper), whose traditional woollen cloth industry suffered a greater decline than that of any
other major Flemish city during the fifteenth century.  According to estimates of Henri Pirenne, though
disputed by some historians, Ypres’ population had fallen from 10,523 in 1431 to 7,626 in 1491: a decline
of 27.53 percent (but thereafter recovering  to 9,563 in 1506).
143 
Whether or not Aalst had suffered any demographic decline in the fifteenth century cannot,
regrettably,  be ascertained with any certainty.
144  If it did, then these data on the burden of excise taxes in
Tables 8 and 9 still provide a very grim picture; and of course if there had been demographic decline, the per
capita tax burden would have risen commensurately, with very possibly very significant reductions in real
incomes for the urban working classes.
145 On the other hand, the urban excise-tax burden was not entirely
negative for craftsmen and labourers in the building trades: for such taxes also financed much of their
employment, in urban public works.40
146 Van Shaïk, ‘Zutphen’, p.  112.
147  See Van Werveke, De Gentsche stadsfinanciën, pp. 166-71; Tracy, Financial Revolution, p. 92,
n. 57.
148  Johan de Witt, Waerdije van lijfrenten naer proportie van losrenten (The Hague, 1671). He
advocated that lijfrenten be sold instead at 7.143 percent (1/14), with higher rates for older buyers and lower
rates for children. See James Riley, International Government Finance and the Amsterdam Capital Market,
1740 -1815 (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 74-75, 110; Tracy, Financial Revolution, pp.206-08.
APPENDICES:
Appendix A: 
The differences in the rates of return or yields on perpetual rents and life-rents and loans
Whether or not the predominant form of rentes issued by late-medieval town governments was in life-
rents (rentes viagères, lijfrenten) or perpetual rents (i.e., rentes heritables,  erfelijk renten, losrenten) had
some considerable significance for urban and also territorial public finances, primarily because the annual
payment rates or the rate of return was so much higher on the former than on the latter.  If not initially, the
rates of return on lijfrenten normally came to be double those for erfelijk renten, even if the historic, long-
term trend was falling for both.  Thus, in late-thirteenth- century Flemish towns, the rates on erfelijk renten
were typically 1/10 or 10 percent; and while they were  1/8 or 12.5 percent in late fourteenth-century Ghent,
these rates fell to 6.25 percent (1/16) in the fifteenth and  sixteenth centuries, in most towns of the Habsburg
Netherlands.  The late-thirteenth-century rate of return on lijfrenten was typically 12.5 percent (1/8),
subsequently declining to 10 percent and sometimes even to as low as  8.0 per cent (1/12.5).  In fifteenth-
century Zutphen, in the northern Netherlands, the rates or yields on lijfrenten were 10.0 percent (1/10), and
those on erfelijk or losrenten (as perpetual rents were now more commonly known)  generally had a yield of
6.25 (1/16) percent. 
146 In early sixteenth-century Leiden, while the rates on perpetual annuities (losrenten)
remained low at 6.25 percent (1/16), those on lijfrenten for two lives  were 10.0 percent, and those for one
life were as high as formerly, at 12.5 percent (1/8), and thus double the rate for losrenten. 
147 
The explanation for these differences is two-fold.  In the first place,  in European financial history,
from ancient times to the very present, short-term rates or yields are always much higher than those for long-
term investments: and none can be longer term than perpetual rents.  Furthermore, those holding lijfrenten
ran the risk of dying, most commonly with a non-transferable asset, in the near future, and hence demanded
compensation for that risk of loss.  Second, perpetual rents, being in their very nature both inheritable and
transferable, were much more marketable than lijfrenten, so that purchasers were much more amenable to a
lower rate of return.  If town or territorial government benefited in the short run from lower financial service
costs on perpetual rents, they were a perpetual obligation, unless the government chose to redeem them, while
life-rents were, again by their nature, self-extinguishing on the death of the holder, without any further
financial obligations from the issuing authorities.  Any doubts or debates about which form of renten urban
or territorial governments were laid to rest, in 1671, when Johann de Witt, the Grand Pensionary of the
Republic  of the United Provinces (Dutch Republic), employing an early form of probability theory,
mathematically demonstrated that the sale of lijfrenten was very costly for the government, if the age of the
designated nominee was not taken into account, especially if the one so named was an infant.
148 That certainly
had an influence on England’s so-called Financial Revolution when (from 1720), the government shifted
totally from life or long term annuities (33 and 99 years)  to perpetual annuities (forming the Consolidated
Stock of he Nation, known as ‘Consols’, in 1752).  In contrast, France’s public debt in the eighteenth century
continued to be heavily based on rentes viagères; and, surprisingly, a considerable proportion of Holland’s41
149  See Dickson, Financial Revolution, pp.  129-56, 177-98, 204-45, 522-33 and n.  2 above;
Marjolein ‘t Hart, Joost Jonker, and Jan Luiten van Zanden, Financial History of the Netherlands; and other
sources  cited in n.  3 above.
150  See Richard Bonney,  The King's Debts : Finance and Politics in France, 1589-1661 (Oxford,
1981), Table VII, pp. 315-16; and Julian Dent, Crisis in Finance: Crown, Financiers, and Society in
Seventeenth-Century France (Newton Abbot, 1973), pp. 44-64.  By 1648, the total of the outstanding royal
rentes was £19.920 million tournois.
151  Martin Wolfe, The Fiscal System of Renaissance France, Yale Studies in Economic History (New
Haven, 1972), pp. 233-35; Bonney,  The King's Debts pp. 19, 57-58.
152 Charles Kindleberger, A Financial History of Western Europe (London, 1984), p. 41.
debt also remained in lijfrenten.
149 
Whatever form of rentes-renten the urban or territorial governments chose to sell, its servicing costs
were always far lower than the interest charges incurred in selling bonds or engaged in related forms of
borrowing.  Because of the usury laws, the historian finds it most difficult to collect valid information on
interest rates.  But it is most instructive to compare seventeenth-century French interest rates on loans with
the rates of returns on rentes.  From 1631 to 1657 the annual average rate on loans and other forms of short-
term borrowing was 25.88 percent.
150 But by 1634, the rate of return on rentes had fallen from 8.33 percent
(1/12) to just 5.56 percent (1/18). 
151   While the contrast in the rates of return may again be partly, if only
partly explained, by the historic difference between yields on short and long-term investments, these
exceptionally high French interest rates reflect two other very adverse factors encumbering these loans, both
of which required compensation to the lender : the frequent high risk of government default; and the deep
social opprobrium that the lender bore by engaging so openly in usury, a concept that is further developed
in Appendix B.
APPENDIX B:
The impact of the usury doctrine for the late-medieval, early-modern European economy and its
significance for the origins of the modern ‘financial revolution’
Many readers, and certainly many current-day historians, will still have difficulty in believing that
the medieval usury doctrine did play any significant role in this historic shift in urban and then territorial
public finances:  from interest bearing loans, bonds, and debenture to rentes or (in England) annuities.  As
the renowned economist and economic historian Charles Kindleberger so acidly commented, in his Financial
History of Western Europe, usury ‘belongs less to economic history than to the history of ideas’.
152 
Furthermore, in reflecting on the later-medieval culmination of the usury doctrine, many historians
have expressed their surprise that this anti-usury campaign, culminating in the many and voluminous
Scholastic treatises of the later thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, chiefly Italian, should have occurred at
the very time that the Italian-dominated Commercial Revolution, and one that was so clearly dependent on
commercial loans, was reaching its fruition.
The Canonical Extrinsic Titles: the supposed ‘exceptions’ to the later-medieval usury doctrine.
Many historians have also contended that even the Scholastic writers had permitted certain
‘exceptions’ to the usury doctrine that seemingly provided a legal and licit mechanism for charging interest:
i.e., an amount to be paid on redemption, over and above the principal value.  In the view of most such critics,42
153   The most widely cited text for the concept of lucrum cessans is the following observation by
Henry of Susa (Cardinal Hostiensis) sometime before 1271: ‘If some merchant, who is accustomed to pursue
trade and the commerce of fairs, and there profit from, has, out of charity to me, who needs it badly, lent
money with which he would have done business, I remain obliged to his interesse, provided that nothing is
done in fraud of usury... and provided that the said merchant will not have been accustomed to give his money
in such a way to usury.’  Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, p. 118, citing Hostiensis [in modern form:
In Decretalium libros commentaria, ad X 5.19.16, n.4, vol. V, fols. 58vb-59ra. (repr. in 2 vols. Turin, 1965)].
According to Noonan, Azo, a member of the twelfth-century Bologna law school, was the first to compress
the Roman law term ‘quod interest’  – what remains, lies between, or differs from  (from intersum) –  into
the substantive interesse, to mean any licit payment beyond the principal; and this concept was further
developed by his student Roland of Cremona; also see Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools, p. 88.
these were simply a face-saving device by which Scholastic theologians, though clearly unable to challenge,
let alone renounce the usury, doctrine sought to reconcile that doctrine with the ever more clear necessity of
accepting interest on investment loans, again just when the Commercial Revolution was reaching its peak.
But the Church could not and did not ever recognize any valid distinction between investment and
consumption loans: for, quite simply, usury was usury.  The Church could not permit any dilution of this vital
doctrine by permitting exceptions for investment loans, even if merchants and other entrepreneurs were
obviously only too willing to pay interest (usury) to acquire the capital so necessary for their enterprises.
Indeed, much of the Scholastic treatment of usury is  at least implicitly directed to the question of investment,
and not consumption, loans.
The so-called ‘exceptions’ were in fact known as extrinsic titles, and those that were in fact generally
accepted by the later-medieval Church were in no way ‘exceptions’.  The most important were the following:
 poena, damnums emergens, and the much disputed  lucrum cessans.  The first two, at least,  constituted fully
licit extra payments, beyond the principal of the loan, that were logically justified on the basis of commutative
justice: i.e., to restore equality of exchange between lender and borrower.  Thus, the lender, in specifying the
exact period  or duration of the loan in a contract, was fully entitled to receive the repayment on the exact and
stipulated  redemption date.  For the first of these extrinsic titles,  any borrower who was late in his repayment
was thus obligated to pay the lender a fixed penalty known as poena.  By the second title, damnums
emergens, the lender was also entitled to compensation if he had unexpectedly found himself afflicted by a
financial crisis that had been due to some sudden fortuitous disaster – such as the destruction of property by
flood, fire, or war – and thus had badly needed possession of his now unavailable capital to replace the
damaged property. But if either of these forms of compensation had been calculated and specified as
obligatory payments before the principal had been lent, then they were invalid and hence usurious, and thus
mortally sinful, for both the lender and the borrower.
That was also the general Scholastic verdict in rejecting the third and thus highly disputed title:
lucrum cessans.  That literally means ‘cessant gains’:  more specifically foregone potential gains that the
lender could have earned from alternative but legitimate investments – in commerce, industry, agriculture,
etc. – had he not given the barrower these funds in a loan.   For any modern economist, any such payments
exacted on a loan would be equal to the lender’s opportunity cost.  The most forceful medieval argument in
favour of this proposed ‘extrinsic title’ was Hostiensis (Henry of Susa), Cardinal Bishop of Ostia (1261-71),
who, in doing so, used the recently developed medieval Latin term interesse –   i.e., the origin of our term
‘interest’ –  to mean any legitimate title beyond the principal. 
153  
The obvious problem in accepting as licit this ‘extrinsic title’ was that it could easily be interpreted
as a pre-determined and fixed compensation, which claim therefore violated the stipulated conditions of
unexpected losses in any valid  consideration of commutative justice.  At the same time, many Scholastic
theologians, certainly from the later thirteenth century,  found this claim to be  far too strong a repudiation43
154  See Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. 118-21, 31-32, 249-68; and Langholm, Economics
in the Medieval Schools, p. 51, for Robert of Courçon’s rejection of lucrum cessans in 1208; and  p. 246, for
St. Thomas Aquinas’ rejection (ca. 1266-73).  According to Langholm, this doctrine was first judged fully
acceptable by the Church only in 1642.  See Langholm, Aristotelian Analysis of Usury, pp. 25-26; 98-110;
and Langholm, Legacy of Scholasticism,  p. 75, citing the 1642 treatise De iustitia et iure by Juan de Lugo
of Salamanca, as one finally accepted by canon lawyers.  For a prominent sixteenth-century treatise favouring
lucurum  cessans, by Leonardus Lessius of Leuven (1554-1623), see De Roover, Leonardius Lessius pp. 3-15,
23-27.
155  Based upon Gregory IX’s decretal  Naviganti (X 5.19.19: c. 1234);  but the purchase of property
or goods (by a de facto lender) and subsequent resale to the original owner (de facto borrower) at the same
(let alone lower) price was denounced by most theologians as usurious. See Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of
Usury, pp. 90-93. Furthermore, Raymond de Roover, San Bernardino of Siena and  San'Antonino of
Florence: The Two Great Thinkers of the Middle Ages (Boston, 1967),  pp. 29-30, notes that most fifteenth-
century theologians remained suspicious of emptio-venditio contracts with prices higher for future goods than
for current goods, as contracts in fraudem usurarum.
156  See for example, Wyffels,  ‘L’usure en Flandre’, 855; but also noting that such cloaking was
virtually impossible with demand loans (à manaie), pp. 859-71.
of the Aristotelian concept of the ‘sterility of money’.  For these reasons, most medieval canon lawyers,
theologians — above all, St. Thomas Aquinas – popes, and other  Church authorities refused to accept
lucrum cessans as licit, certainly not before the mid seventeenth century.
154
Was the late-medieval usury doctrine and anti-usury legislation easily evaded?
Instead, the key and most realistic argument for doubting the real economic significance of the usury
doctrine was the seeming ease with which it could be circumvented, with little risk of detection and thus a
very low risk of prosecution in either secular or ecclesiastical courts, which seemed to have focused their zeal
on ‘notorious’, ‘infamous’,  and ‘publicly outrageous’ usurers. One such device was to cloak the loan in a
sales contract that specified future payment.  While such a transaction could have indeed been deemed
usurious if the goods were actually sold on credit, a sales contract, carefully written, could have more easily
been deemed  a licit venditio sub dubio, if the stipulated future price was considered to be a fair market or
‘just price’, and a lower current cash price as ‘a discount gratuitously given by the seller’.
155
Undoubtedly, the far simpler and much more common device to circumvent the ban was to disguise
the actual amount of the loan simply  by augmenting the stipulated principal to be repaid – over and above
the amount actually lent – by the amount of the required interest payments.
156  But a defaulting debtor might
claim that he/she had been the victim of extortion in agreeing to a fraudulent contract, thus leaving both
parties open to prosecution for violating the usury ban.  
Apart from the threat or prospects of unpleasant and costly prosecutions, the participants would also
have known that they were guilty of both usury and fraud.  Indeed the crucial issue is not the risk of
prosecution, as such, but more the risk of social opprobrium in being considered a usurer; and the worst risk
of all, and certainly the greatest soul-destroying fear, was that of damnation in Hell – the eternal punishment
of the all- consuming flames of Hell.  As Noonan has remarked, even if the Church normally chose to inflict
excommunication only rarely on ‘flagrant’ or ‘notorious’ usurers, nevertheless ‘all hidden usury was still a
mortal sin, and the ultimate punishment of [eternal] damnation still awaited all hidden usurers’. Thus, in not
just Noonan’s view, but in the view of so many medieval ecclesiastical historians,  ‘the real force of the usury
law lay in its hold on men’s souls, and there no evasion was possible’. Particularly in both the medieval and
early modern eras, when few dared defy the Church, and far fewer were actual atheists, Noonan was right to44
157  Noonan, Scholastic Analysis, pp. 35-36; cf. LeGoff, ‘The Usurer and Purgatory’, pp. 25-26. As
the Dominican Domenico Pantaleoni (c.1362-1376) and the Franciscan St. Bernardino (c. 1430-44) both
exclaimed, those who escaped convictions in ecclesiastical courts, for lack of concrete evidence, would
nevertheless ‘be found guilty of usury in the confessional and before God (quoad deum)’   Cited in Julius
Kirshner, ‘Storm over the Monte Comune: Genesis of the Moral Controversy over the Public Debt of
Florence’, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 53 (1983), p. 256.
158  St.  Mark 8:36, in The Holy Bible: King James Version (1611); see also St.  Matthew 16:26: ‘For
what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?’  Less forceful is the text in
The Holy Bible: Revised Standard Version (1952).  Mark 8:36:  ‘For what does it profit a man, to gain the
whole world and forfeit his life?’; Matthew 16:26 in the RSV is virtually identical to Mark 8:36.
159 See Exodus 22:25, Leviticus 25:37; and especially Ezekiel 18 :8-13 (see n.  11 above);
Soloveitchik, ‘Usury, Jewish Law’, pp.  339-40; Ward,‘Usury, Islamic Law’, pp. 340-41. 
ask this question:  ‘who will say that there is no meaning to the salvation or damnation of a  man’?
157   Indeed,
in two passages in the Gospels, familiar to any medieval preacher, Christ is quoted as asking: ‘For  what shall
it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?’
158  As for non-Christians, one must
recall the virtually universal abhorrence of usury, and its prohibition in both the Hebrew Pentateuch and the
Islamic Koran (as riba).
159 The hatred of usury seems to be one of the most universal concepts in all of human
history.
The moral burden of legal interest payments on the public debts of Italian city republics
One of the most important aspects of the late-medieval moral debates and the consequent burden of
guilt for many merchants concerns the question of legal interest on Italian civic debts in the form of forced
loans (prestanze, prestiti): the chief form of public debt to be found in later medieval Florence, Venice, Milan,
Siena, and Genoa.   In Florence, it was and is known as the Monte (literally the mountain of public debt).  The
Church soon came to accept the validity or licit nature of interest paid on this form of public debt (the Italian
counterpart to the northern rentes), for three reasons.  First, and most obvious, the ‘loans’ were involuntary
and truly forced upon those citizens financially able to furnish such funds, on pain of confiscation, prison,
or exile.  For the Church, volition was a very important part of the usury doctrine, and thus to the guilt
attached to its evasion.  Second, the justification for these forced loans was the defence of the city state; and
thus no true citizen could morally escape that honourable civic obligation to share in the costs of defending
the commune.  Third, the obvious alternative to forced loans was taxation: chiefly taxation of land and other
forms of property (in effect, a wealth tax), which would have had at least the same financial burden for those
compelled to subscribe to the prestanze.
These three reasons, which satisfied most theologians – though Franciscans perhaps more so than
Dominicans - also explains why these Italian Republics preferred forced loans to the sale of rentes.  Another
related reason is that in the sale of rentes, and other similar forms of public annuities, in northern France, the
Low Countries, Germany, and Catalonia (later Castile, and the kingdom of Spain itself) anyone, citizen or
not of that town or principality, was entitled to buy these annuities and receive the annual incomes attached
to them, either directly from the state or in a secondary market. The Italian city states, however, insisted on
restricting both the forced loans and the interest payments on them uniquely to the citizens of the Republic
(with very few exceptions) – and thus not become reliant on foreign investors.
The debate that did arise – what Julius Kirshner called ‘the storm over the Monte’ – concerned the
licit nature of interest payments paid not to those who originally furnished the loans but to those who had
purchased these prestanze certificates, and thus the income attached to them, in the secondary market.  That45
160  Both Dominicans and Franciscans condemned any participation in secondary markets for crediti
di monte as ‘unnatural and nutritive of sin’, in fraudem usurarum, or else expressed severe reservations,
counselling all citizens ‘to refrain from such investments’.  See  Julius Kirshner, ‘The Moral Theology of
Public Finance: A Study and Edition of Nicholas de Anglia’s Quaestio disputata on the Public Debt of
Venice’, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 40 (1970), 47-72;  Julius Kirshner, ‘ “Ubi est ille?”: Franco
Sacchetti on the monte comune of Florence’, Speculum: A Journal of Medieval Studies, 59 (1984), 556-84;
Kirshner, ‘Storm Over the Monte’, pp. 219-52;  Armstrong, ‘Politics of Usury’, pp. 1-44; Armstrong, Usury
and Public Debt, p. 80. 
161 At the same time, these theologians conceded  that civic governments had every right to exact
forced loans and to pay an annual compensation in the form of  dampnum, interesse, provisione, or donum.
 See In particular Armstrong,  ‘The Politics of Usury’, pp.  1-44; Armstrong, Usury and the Public Debt, pp.
53-111.
162  Lawrin Armstrong, ‘Usury, Conscience and Public Debt : Angelo Corbinelli’s Testament of
1419’, in John Marino and Thomas Kuehn, eds., A Renaissance of Conflicts: Visions and Revisions of Law
and Society in Italy and Spain, Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, Essays and Studies vol.  3
(Toronto, 2003), pp.  173-240, acknowledging Prof. Kirshner’s discovery of the document in the Florentine
state archives (ASF).
163  For Venice, see Julius Kirshner, ‘The Moral Theology of Public Finance: A Study and Edition
of Nicholas de Anglia’s Quaestio disputata on the Public Debt of Venice’, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum,
40 (1970), 47-72;  Frederic C. Lane, ‘Investment and Usury’, Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, 2:2
(1964), 3-15, republished in Venice and History: the Collected Papers of Frederic C. Lane (Baltimore, 1966),
pp. 56-68.  For Genoa, see Julius Kirshner,  ‘Conscience and Public Finance: A Quaestio Disputata of John
of Legnano on the Public Debt of Genoa’, in Edward Mahoney, ed.,  Philosophy and Humanism: Renaissance
Essays in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller (New York, 1976),  pp. 439-40; Julius Kirshner, ‘The Moral
Controversy Over Discounting Genoese Paghe, 1450 - 1550’, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 47 (1977),
109-67.
debate, much analysed in many other publications, need not concern us here.
160  But what is so very indicative
of strong moral convictions about the sin of usury was the guilt that many Italian merchants incurred in
accepting fully licit interest on the public debt when they themselves were the original subscribers to the
prestanze or shares of the Monte.  Many of them were clearly troubled by the contentions of some fourteenth-
century theologians who contended that anyone who had willingly subscribed to loans, forced or not, ‘out
of greed’, hoping for interest payments, should be treated as ‘plain usurers’. 
161  
One major example to be cited is the early fifteenth-century will of Angelo Corbinelli,  a very
wealthy Florentine merchant,  that Lawrin Armstrong has recently analysed in a publication on this very
subject.   In that Last Will and Testament (dated 1419), Corbinelli confessed that he was ‘uneasy in his
conscience’ about the income earned from credits in the Florentine monte, accounting for thirty percent of
his assets, even though these credits were solely ‘on account of prestanze’ that he and his parents had been
forced to purchase.   His will therefore stipulated that ‘if a declaration or decision is  made by the Roman
church or a general council’ [the Council of Constance]  that should determine the illicit nature of such
income, then his ‘heirs shall act in every respect in conformity with the decree, decision, determination or
conclusion of the Roman church’.
162 
While the majority of the literature on this debate concerns late-medieval Florence, very similar, and
similarly heated, debates may also be found in late-medieval Genoa and Venice; and even if the majority
opinion was favourable to the payment of interest on original subscribers to forced loans, the nature of these
debates left many very troubled.
163   Thus, for example, Julius Kirshner cites some ‘well-documented cases46
164  Kirshner, ‘Conscience and Public Finance’, p. 450.  See also Lane, ‘Investment and Usury’, p.
64:  Usury’s ‘greatest importance was its moral influence’, while also noting that from 1254 the Venetian
government had enacted civil legislation against usury.
165  Francesco L. Galassi, ‘Buying a Passport to Heaven: Usury, Restitution, and the Merchants of
Medieval Genoa’, Religion, 22 (October 1992), 313-26.
166  Richard Goldthwaite, ‘Local Banking in Renaissance Florence’, Journal of European Economic
History, 14:1 (Spring 1985), 13-16, 31-37, noting also that interest paid on time deposits was always a
discrezione; and Reinhold Mueller, Money and Banking in Medieval and Renaissance Venice, vol. II: The
Venetian Money Market, Banks, Panics, and the Public Debt, 1200 - 1500 (Baltimore and London, 1997),
p.  13. See also Raymond de Roover, The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397-1494 (Cambridge,
Mass., 1963), pp.  77-141.
167 Goldthwaite, ‘Local Banking’, pp. 13, 32.
168  Lawrence Stone,  The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558 - 1641 (Oxford, 1965), p. 529; also cited,
for similar purposes, in Geoffrey Parker,  ‘The Emergence of Modern Finance in Europe, 1500 - 1750', in
Carlo Cipolla, ed., The Fontana Economic History of Europe, Vol. II: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Centuries (London, 1974), p. 539.
of investors who, because of scruples of conscience, were hesitant about purchasing shares in the public debt’,
the Genoese public debt known as the comperi. 
164
Some other late-medieval evidence for the impact of the usury doctrine on merchants
Some concrete evidence of the actual economic and social impact of the intensification of the anti-
usury campaign in later-medieval Genoa has been provided by Francesco Galassi.  In essence, he concluded,
from regression analyses of substantial data in wills and other notarial documents, that  merchants, financiers,
and other businessmen evidently sought  ‘fire insurance’ or ‘passports to Heaven’, by increased donations
to the Church,  some clearly in the form of restitution of illicit gains from usurious transactions.
165  Richard
Goldthwaite, in analysing records of fifteenth-century Florentine banks, comments on a significant
peculiarity: ‘the lack of a cash account, which ... resulted from what was perhaps the strongest external
constraint imposed on the banker, the usury doctrine’.   Contending that the risk of disclosure was not trivial,
he provides examples of  usury prosecutions brought against Florentine bankers, such as  Lorenzo di
Buonaccorso Pitti in 1493.
166  He also  relates a significant anecdote concerning the famous merchant-banker
Francesco Datini of Prato.  When Datini  had asked an associate for advice about opening a Florentine bank
in 1398, he received the reply that he  ‘risked the ruin of his reputation as a merchant by entering this
business, since no banker could avoid usurious contracts’.
167
That very statement is echoed in one of the most eloquent historical comments on the social costs of
the usury doctrine: from Lawrence Stone, in commenting about sixteenth-century English society.
168
Money will never become freely or cheaply available in a society which nourishes a strong
moral prejudice against the taking of any interest at all – as distinct from objection to the
taking of extortionate interest.  If usury on any terms, however reasonable, is thought to be
a discreditable business, men will tend to shun it, and the few who practise it will demand
a high return for being generally regarded as moral lepers.
The continuing hostility against usury in early-modern Protestant England and Holland47
169 13 Elizabeth I, c. 8 (1571):  in Great Britain, Record Commission (T. E. Tomlins, J. Raithby, et
al.), eds., Statutes of the Realm, 6 vols. (London, 1810-22), vol. IV:1, p. 542.
170  Statute 37 Henrici VIII, c. 9 (1545) and Statute 5-6 Edwardi VI c. 20, in Statutes of the Realm,
vol. III, p.  996; vol.  IV:1, p. 155.
171  See  Roland Bainton, The Reformation of the Sixteenth Century (Boston, 1952), pp. 247-50,
noting few differences between Luther and Calvin on this issue.
172 Georgia Harkness, John Calvin: The Man and His Ethics (New York, 1958), pp. 201-10. 
173  Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. 365-67.
174  Parker, ‘Emergence of Modern Finance’, p. 538.
175  Cited in Tawney, Richard, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: A Historical Study  (London,
1926), p.  94; see also pp. 61-115.
176 Daniel Coquillette, ‘The Mystery of the New Fashioned Goldsmiths: From Usury to the Bank of
England (1622-1694)’, in in Vito Piergiovanni, ed.,  The Growth of the Bank as Institution and the
Development of Money-Business Law, Comparative Studies in Continental and Anglo-American Legal
History vol. 12 (Berlin, 1993), pp.  94-99, citing also a similar statement from John Blaxton, The English
Usurer (1634).
177  Thomas Wilson, A Discourse Upon Usury By Way of Dialogue and Orations [1572], with an
historical introduction by Richard H. Tawney (New York, 1925), pp. 106-34, esp. p. 117; Tawney, Religion
and the Rise of Capitalism, pp. 91-115, 132-39, 178-89.
We have been led to believe that, after Elizabeth I’s Parliament of 1571 had amended the usury laws
to permit interest up to 10 percent  -- so that henceforth usury came to mean any interest charges above that
limit  –  the public hostility to ‘normal’ interest had waned.  But such a view is far from the historic truth.
Even her statute used hostile language in stating (in an almost contradictory fashion) in its preamble:  that
‘forasmuch as all Usurie being forbydden by the lawe of God’. 
169 In fact, Elizabeth had merely restored her
father’s statute of 1545  (Henry VIII), which had then been repealed under the even more Protestant regime
of Edward VI, in 1552, ‘forasmuche as Usurie is by the worde of God utterly prohibited, as a vyce moste
odyous and detestable’.
170
Furthermore, Calvin and Luther, the two major initiators and leaders of the Protestant Reformation,
did not really have the more ‘liberal’ views commonly attributed to them on the usury issue.  Only grudgingly
did they accept interest payments, only on investment loans, and only to a maximum of five percent.
171
Calvin himself clearly voiced his disapproval in stating that ‘it is a very rare thing for a man to be honest and
at the same time a usurer’.
172  He had also contended that all habitual usurers should be expelled from the
Church;
173 and indeed in Holland, the Calvinist synod of 1581 had decreed that no banker should ever be
admitted to communion service.
174  Subsequently, in the seventeenth century, an English Puritan minister
observed that ‘Calvin deals with usurie as the apothecarie doth with poyson’; 
175 and early in that century the
renowned  Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626) had contended  that ‘Usury is the certainest Meanes of Gaine,
though one of the worst.
176  According to Richard Tawney, so well known for his Religion and the Rise of
Capitalism, the English Puritan clergy continued to preach against the  ‘soul-corrupting taint of usury’ to the
very eve of the English Civil War (1642-51).
177
It is similarly important, in the early-modern history of usury laws and the origins of England’s own48
178  R. D. Richards, The Early History of Banking in England (London, 1929; reissued 1958),  pp. 19-
20; and statute 17-18 Victoria c. 90 (1854).
179  See nn.  2, 4,  above, and  Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England, table 7, p. 80.  Note
that in 1711 and 1712, the English Exchequer had sold redeemable debentures with an interest rate of 6.0%.
But thereafter all annuities were issued at 5% or less; and what is known as Pelham’s Conversion
consolidated the national debt, as Consols, in, first, 3.5% annuities (1752-57), and then 3.0% annuities (from
1757), which, in 1888,  were converted into 2.75% annuities, and then into 2.5% annuities in 1903, the rate
that prevails to this day for Consols sold on the London Stock Exchange.  On 7 June 2007, the market price
of 2.5% Consols was £51.28, to provide a yield of 4.875% (i.e., 2.5/51.28).
‘financial revolution’, to note that, although Elizabeth I had set the maximum interest rate at 10 percent, in
1571, subsequent Parliaments lowered that legal maximum rate, evidently in accordance with the long-term
decline in real interest rates:  to 8 per cent in 1623, to 6 per cent in 1660, and finally to 5 per cent in 1713,
the rate that continued to prevail until Parliament finally abolished the usury laws in 1854.
178 Hence another
point of significance about England’s own ‘financial revolution’, in establishing its own permanent funded
national debt: that if was fully based on the sale of annuities, and not of loan instruments (bonds and
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Table 1.          Ghent's Civic Revenues and Expenditures:
Loans, Erfelijk Renten and Lijfrenten, in quinquennial means
1321-25 to 1386-90
in pounds groot Flemish: converted from ponden payement at £40 payement = £1 groot
= £ 12 parisis
Part A:  CIVIC INCOMES
Quinquen- Loan Erfelijk Renten Lijfrenten Total Debt Total Civic Debt Revenues Renten
nium Revenues Sales in Sales in Revenues Revenues in as Percent as Percent
ending in £ groot £ groot  £ groot  in £ groot £ groot Flem of Total of Total
15 Aug Flemish Flemish Flemish Flemish Revenues Revenues
1321-25 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1,323.250 0.00% 0.00%
1326-30 122.923 67.528 0.000 190.451 1,662.320 11.46% 4.06%
1331-35 0.000 70.475 0.000 70.475 2,065.094 3.41% 3.41%
1336-40 1,053.501 55.373 0.000 1,108.874 2,529.937 43.83% 2.19%
1341-45 320.689 28.226 0.000 348.915 2,457.024 14.20% 1.15%
1346-50 457.958 55.566 591.503 1,105.027 4,009.796 27.56% 16.14%
1351-55 0.000 75.893 0.000 75.893 1,551.240 4.89% 4.89%
1356-60 7.083 67.252 33.459 107.794 1,377.152 7.83% 7.31%
1361-65 7.079 89.435 0.000 96.514 3,025.826 3.19% 2.96%
1366-70 14.030 67.825 0.000 81.855 2,450.375 3.34% 2.77%
1371-75 12.692 73.128 0.000 85.820 2,094.843 4.10% 3.49%
1376-80 7.375 69.344 0.000 76.719 2,594.754 2.96% 2.67%
1381-85 109.794 13.500 0.000 123.294 2,249.442 5.48% 0.60%
1386-90 58.650 120.850 0.000 179.500 2,119.692 8.47% 5.70%62
Table 1 b. Ghent's Civic Revenues and Expenditures:                                                                                           
Loans, Erfelijk Renten and Lijfrenten:                                                                                                
in quinquennial means, 1321-25 to 1386-90                                  
in pounds groot Flemish: converted from ponden payement at £40 payement
= £ groot = £12 parisis
Part B:                  CIVIC EXPENDITURES                                                                                                                       
Quinquen- Total Civic Loan Erfelijk Lijfrenten Total debt Total Civic Deficit Debt 
nium: Revenues Payments Renten Payments Payments Expenditures or Surplus Payments
year end: in £ groot £ groot Payments in £ groot in in £ groot in £ goot as Per Cent
15 Aug Flemish Flemish in £ groot Flemish £ groot Flemish Flemish of Total
Flemish Flemish Expenditures
1321-25 1,323.250 495.745 0.000 0.000 495.745 1,332.629 -9.380 37.20%
1326-30 1,662.320 312.183 3.950 0.000 316.133 1,591.546 70.775 19.86%
1331-35 2,065.094 222.120 163.343 0.000 385.464 2,048.972 16.122 18.81%
1336-40 2,529.937 221.763 3.031 0.000 224.795 2,647.171 -117.235 8.49%
1341-45 2,457.024 262.717 0.000 0.000 262.717 2,277.962 179.062 11.53%
1346-50 4,009.796 437.484 106.900 0.000 544.384 4,079.552 -69.756 13.34%
1351-55 1,551.240 0.000 0.000 30.950 30.950 1,399.930 151.310 2.21%
1356-60 1,377.152 72.164 0.000 6.000 174.517 1,354.878 22.274 12.88%
1361-65 3,025.826 210.735 0.000 1,087.500 1,298.235 3,077.658 -51.832 42.18%
1366-70 2,450.375 1,095.574 0.000 0.000 1,095.574 2,472.405 -22.030 44.31%
1371-75 2,094.843 500.685 0.000 0.000 500.685 2,088.092 6.751 23.98%
1376-80 2,594.754 136.770 0.444 0.000 137.214 2,891.748 -296.994 4.75%
1381-85 2,249.442 132.500 0.000 0.000 132.500 3,022.917 -773.475 4.38%
1386-90 2,119.692 96.638 0.000 0.000 96.638 2,201.708 -82.017 4.39%
Sources:
Stadsarchief Gent, Stadsrekeningen, series 400: nos. 1 - 10.
Jules Vuylsteke, ed., Gentsche stads- en baljuwsrekeningen, 1280 - 1336/ Comptes de la ville de Gand, 1280 - 1336, in the series Oorkondenboek
der stad Gent, eerste afdeeling: Rekeningen [Cartulaire de la ville de Gand, première série: Comptes] (Gent: F. Meyer-Van Loo, 1900).63
Napoleon De Pauw, and Julius Vuylsteke, eds., De rekeningen der stad Gent: Tijdvak van Jacob Van Artevelde, 1336 - 1349, 3 vols. (Ghent: Ad
Hoste, 1874 -85); Vol. I: 1336 - 1339; Vol. II: 1340 - 1345; Vol. III: 1345 - 1349.
Alfons Van Werveke, ed., Gentse stads- en baljuwsrekeningen (1351 - 1364), Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone
Kunsten van België, Koninklijke Commissie voor Geschiedenis (Brussels, 1970), with an introduction by Hans Van Werveke.
David Nicholas, and Walter Prevenier, eds., Gentse stads- en baljuwsrekeningen (1365 - 1376), Koninklijke Academie van België, Koninklijke
Commissie voor Geschiedenis (Brussels, 1999).
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Table 2. Aalst's Civic Revenues and Expenditures:  the Roles of Erfelijk- and Lijfrenten                          
in quinquennial means:  1396-1400 to 1546-50                                                   
Values in livres parisis:  £12 ponden parisis (parijs) = £1 pond groot Flemish                         
  = 240d groot Flemish                                                                                                    
A. INCOME
Sales of Sales of Total Sales Percentage Percentage Total Civic Renten sales
Quin- Erfelijk renten  Lijfrenten of Renten of Sales of Sales  Revenues as percent
quennium in £ parisis in £ parisis in £ parisis in Erfelijk  in Lijf- in £ parisis of Total
Renten renten Revenues
1396-1400 57.271 1,029.550 1,086.821 5.27% 94.73% 6,451.544 16.85%
1401-05 59.858 1,753.688 1,813.546 3.30% 96.70% 7,989.056 22.70%
1406-10 62.163 2,135.467 2,197.629 2.83% 97.17% 9,454.124 23.25%
1411-15 62.263 1,695.425 1,757.688 3.54% 96.46% 9,896.420 17.76%
1416-20 62.263 1,020.300 1,082.563 5.75% 94.25% 8,374.606 12.93%
1421-25 62.663 1,369.125 1,431.788 4.38% 95.62% 9,868.297 14.51%
1426-30 63.163 1,738.000 1,801.163 3.51% 96.49% 9,439.929 19.08%
1431-35 65.224 2,369.664 2,434.888 2.68% 97.32% 9,524.328 25.56%
1436-40 63.606 2,082.500 2,146.106 2.96% 97.04% 8,857.402 24.23%
1441-45 62.750 507.000 569.750 11.01% 88.99% 9,544.042 5.97%
1446-50 61.742 0.000 61.742 100.00% 0.00% 8,852.196 0.70%
1451-55 60.807 681.930 742.737 8.19% 91.81% 7,906.593 9.39%
1456-60 60.812 151.200 212.012 28.68% 71.32% 8,555.021 2.48%
1461-65 60.192 578.220 638.412 9.43% 90.57% 10,263.073 6.22%
1466-70 61.172 154.800 215.972 28.32% 71.68% 10,079.193 2.14%
1471-75 65.092 1,825.174 1,890.266 3.44% 96.56% 12,641.842 14.95%
1476-80 39.055 2,501.100 2,540.155 1.54% 98.46% 12,983.309 19.56%
1481-85 0.000 2,722.000 2,722.000 0.00% 100.00% 12,335.733 22.07%
1486-90 65.442 3,504.000 3,569.442 1.83% 98.17% 15,359.642 23.24%
1491-95*
1496-1500 41.679 234.000 275.679 15.12% 84.88% 12,071.073 2.28%
1501-05 41.679 230.400 272.079 15.32% 84.68% 11,552.635 2.36%
1506-10 41.679 0.000 41.679 100.00% 0.00% 10,842.610 0.38%
1511-15 41.679 0.000 41.679 100.00% 0.00% 11,268.611 0.37%
1516-20 41.679 480.000 521.679 7.99% 92.01% 11,107.796 4.70%65
Sales of Sales of Total Sales Percentage Percentage Total Civic Renten sales
Quin- Erfelijk renten  Lijfrenten of Renten of Sales of Sales  Revenues as percent
quennium in £ parisis in £ parisis in £ parisis in Erfelijk  in Lijf- in £ parisis of Total
Renten renten Revenues
1521-25 41.679 2,172.600 2,214.279 1.88% 98.12% 11,927.638 18.56%
1526-30 41.429 920.400 961.829 4.31% 95.69% 13,466.349 7.14%
1531-35 41.429 849.600 891.029 4.65% 95.35% 12,361.563 7.21%
1536-40 41.429 570.400 611.829 6.77% 93.23% 13,019.779 4.70%
1541-45 41.429 2,274.200 2,315.629 1.79% 98.21% 16,068.092 14.41%
1546-50 41.429 2,104.800 2,146.229 1.93% 98.07% 18,460.720 11.63%
Totals 1,552.755 37,655.543 39,208.297 3.96% 96.04% 330523.214375 11.86%
* Aalst town accounts registers are missing for these years.
Source: Algemeen Rijksarchief België (Archives Générales du Royaume), Rekenkamer/Chambre de Comptes, reg.  nos.  31,412 - 31,532.66
Table 3. Aalst's Civic Revenues and Expenditures:  the Roles of Erfelijk- and Lijfrenten and Excise-Tax Farms          
in quinquennial means:  1396-1400 to 1546-50                                                           
Values in livres parisis:  £12 ponden parisis (parijs) = £1 pond groot Flemish = 240d groot Flemish              
Part B: EXPENDITURES                                                                                                                                                  
Years in: Erfelijk Lijfrenten Total Renten Erfelijk Renten Lijfrenten Total Civic Renten
Quin- Renten Payments Payments payments payments Expenditures Payments
quenniums Payments in in as percent of as percent of in as % of Total
in £ parisis £ parisis £ parisis total Renten  total Renten  £ parisis Civic 
payments payments Expenditures
1396-1400 21.450 3,437.600 3,459.050 0.62% 99.38% 6,435.398 53.75%
1401-05 7.443 5,107.475 5,114.918 0.15% 99.85% 8,249.803 62.00%
1406-10 14.961 5,070.233 5,085.194 0.29% 99.71% 10,036.296 50.67%
1411-15 23.621 5,147.650 5,171.271 0.46% 99.54% 9,999.580 51.71%
1416-20 29.985 5,313.775 5,343.760 0.56% 99.44% 8,480.138 63.02%
1421-25 29.544 5,254.613 5,284.156 0.56% 99.44% 9,984.741 52.92%
1426-30 27.750 5,424.400 5,452.150 0.51% 99.49% 9,307.833 58.58%
1431-35 27.873 5,631.645 5,659.518 0.49% 99.51% 9,505.509 59.54%
1436-40 26.046 6,690.200 6,716.246 0.39% 99.61% 8,976.923 74.82%
1441-45 24.342 5,316.800 5,341.142 0.46% 99.54% 9,946.515 53.70%
1446-50 24.342 5,041.310 5,065.652 0.48% 99.52% 8,659.860 58.50%
1451-55 24.342 4,248.685 4,273.027 0.57% 99.43% 8,106.093 52.71%
1456-60 24.342 3,749.397 3,773.738 0.65% 99.35% 8,519.534 44.30%
1461-65 24.342 3,246.120 3,270.462 0.74% 99.26% 10,368.026 31.54%
1466-70 24.342 2,896.930 2,921.272 0.83% 99.17% 10,436.382 27.99%
1471-75 24.342 3,669.985 3,694.327 0.66% 99.34% 13,539.956 27.28%
1476-80 24.342 4,365.120 4,389.462 0.55% 99.45% 13,399.528 32.76%
1481-85 24.342 3,889.760 3,914.102 0.62% 99.38% 14,593.865 26.82%
1486-90 24.342 3,761.375 3,785.717 0.64% 99.36% 19,596.654 19.32%
1491-95*
1496-1500 24.342 4,084.838 4,109.179 0.59% 99.41% 13,280.307 30.94%
1501-05 24.342 3,868.230 3,892.572 0.63% 99.37% 11,929.568 32.63%
1506-10 24.342 3,361.100 3,385.442 0.72% 99.28% 11,244.321 30.11%
1511-15 25.450 3,148.513 3,173.963 0.80% 99.20% 11,580.223 27.41%67
Years in: Erfelijk Lijfrenten Total Renten Erfelijk Renten Lijfrenten Total Civic Renten
Quin- Renten Payments Payments payments payments Expenditures Payments
quenniums Payments in in as percent of as percent of in as % of Total
in £ parisis £ parisis £ parisis total Renten  total Renten  £ parisis Civic 
payments payments Expenditures
1516-20 409.559 2,649.740 3,059.299 13.39% 86.61% 11,829.040 25.86%
1521-25 333.944 2,985.600 3,319.544 10.06% 89.94% 13,556.191 24.49%
1526-30 249.605 3,758.670 4,008.275 6.23% 93.77% 15,208.093 26.36%
1531-35 306.745 3,825.440 4,132.185 7.42% 92.58% 14,185.161 29.13%
1536-40 300.033 3,850.110 4,150.143 7.23% 92.77% 14,824.634 27.99%
1541-45 359.880 3,640.500 4,000.380 9.00% 91.00% 18,216.665 21.96%
1546-50 563.402 4,420.290 4,983.692 11.30% 88.70% 22,303.229 22.35%
* Aalst town accounts registers are missing for these years.
Source: Algemeen Rijksarchief België (Archives Générales du Royaume), Rekenkamer/Chambre de Comptes, reg.  nos.  31,412 - 31,532.68
Table 4.             Aalst's Civic Revenues and Expenditures:  the Roles of Erfelijk- and Lijfrenten and Excise-Tax Farms            
in quinquennial means:  1396-1400 to 1546-50                                                                        
                                                                      
 Values in livres parisis and pond groot:  £12 ponden parisis (parijs) = £1 pond groot Flemish = 240d groot Flemish       
Part C:            Annual Balance Sheets of Income and Expenditures
Years: Total Civic Total Civic Total Civic Total Civic Surplus or Surplus or
Quin-  Revenues  Revenues Expenditures Expenditures Deficit Deficit
quennium in £ parisis in £ groot in £ parisis in £ groot in £ parisis in £ groot
1396-1400 6,451.544 537.629 6,435.398 536.283 16.146 1.345
1401-05 7,989.056 665.755 8,249.803 687.484 -260.747 -21.729
1406-10 9,454.124 787.844 10,036.296 836.358 -582.172 -48.514
1411-15 9,896.420 824.702 9,999.580 833.298 -103.160 -8.597
1416-20 8,374.606 697.884 8,480.138 706.678 -105.531 -8.794
1421-25 9,868.297 822.358 9,984.741 832.062 -116.444 -9.704
1426-30 9,439.929 786.661 9,307.833 775.653 132.096 11.008
1431-35 9,524.328 793.694 9,505.509 792.126 18.819 1.568
1436-40 8,857.402 738.117 8,976.923 748.077 -119.521 -9.960
1441-45 9,544.042 795.337 9,946.515 828.876 -402.473 -33.539
1446-50 8,852.196 737.683 8,659.860 721.655 192.336 16.028
1451-55 7,906.593 658.883 8,106.093 675.508 -199.500 -16.625
1456-60 8,555.021 712.918 8,519.534 709.961 35.487 2.957
1461-65 10,263.073 855.256 10,368.026 864.002 -104.953 -8.746
1466-70 10,079.193 839.933 10,436.382 869.698 -357.188 -29.766
1471-75 12,641.842 1,053.487 13,539.956 1,128.330 -898.114 -74.843
1476-80 12,983.309 1,081.942 13,399.528 1,116.627 -416.219 -34.685
1481-85 12,335.733 1,027.978 14,593.865 1,216.155 -2,258.133 -188.178
1486-90 15,359.642 1,279.970 19,596.654 1,633.055 -4,237.013 -353.084
1491-95*
1496-1500 12,071.073 1,005.923 13,280.307 1,106.692 -1,209.234 -100.770
1501-05 11,552.635 962.720 11,929.568 994.131 -376.933 -31.41169
Years: Total Civic Total Civic Total Civic Total Civic Surplus or Surplus or
Quin-  Revenues  Revenues Expenditures Expenditures Deficit Deficit
quennium in £ parisis in £ groot in £ parisis in £ groot in £ parisis in £ groot
1506-10 10,842.610 903.551 11,244.321 937.027 -401.711 -33.476
1511-15 11,268.611 939.051 11,580.223 965.019 -311.611 -25.968
1516-20 11,107.796 925.650 11,829.040 985.753 -721.244 -60.104
1521-25 11,927.638 993.970 13,556.191 1,129.683 -1,628.553 -135.713
1526-30 13,466.349 1,122.196 15,208.093 1,267.341 -1,741.743 -145.145
1531-35 12,361.563 1,030.130 14,185.161 1,182.097 -1,823.598 -151.967
1536-40 13,019.779 1,084.982 14,824.634 1,235.386 -1,804.855 -150.405
1541-45 16,068.092 1,339.008 18,216.665 1,518.055 -2,148.573 -179.048
1546-50 18,460.720 1,538.393 22,303.229 1,858.602 -3,842.509 -320.209
* Aalst town accounts registers are missing for these years.
Source: Algemeen Rijksarchief België (Archives Générales du Royaume), Rekenkamer/Chambre de Comptes, reg.  nos.  31,412 - 31,532.70
Table 5. Aalst's Civic Revenues and Expenditures:  the Roles of Erfelijk- and Lijfrenten                                             
and Excise-Tax Farms, in quinquennial means:  1396-1400 to 1546-50                                                 
Values in livres parisis:  £12 parisis (parijs) = £1 pond groot (gros) Flemish                              
= 240d groot Flemish                                                                                         
Part D:
Total Excise          Total Renten Renten Payments Total Civic Renten
Quin- Tax Farm Revenues Payments as Percentage Expenditures Payments
quennium in £ parisis in £ of Excise-Tax  in £ parisis as percent of
parisis Revenues Total Civic
Expenditures
1396-1400 4,754.133 3,459.050 72.76% 6,435.398 53.75%
1401-05 5,852.596 5,114.918 87.40% 8,249.803 62.00%
1406-10 5,752.817 5,085.194 88.39% 10,036.296 50.67%
1411-15 6,805.663 5,171.271 75.98% 9,999.580 51.71%
1416-20 6,419.275 5,343.760 83.25% 8,480.138 63.02%
1421-25 6,427.100 5,284.156 82.22% 9,984.741 52.92%
1426-30 6,668.567 5,452.150 81.76% 9,307.833 58.58%
1431-35 6,484.288 5,659.518 87.28% 9,505.509 59.54%
1436-40 6,084.429 6,716.246 110.38% 8,976.923 74.82%
1441-45 7,878.556 5,341.142 67.79% 9,946.515 53.70%
1446-50 7,500.927 5,065.652 67.53% 8,659.860 58.50%
1451-55 5,894.123 4,273.027 72.50% 8,106.093 52.71%
1456-60 6,960.540 3,773.738 54.22% 8,519.534 44.30%
1461-65 8,185.102 3,270.462 39.96% 10,368.026 31.54%
1466-70 8,439.850 2,921.272 34.61% 10,436.382 27.99%
1471-75 9,157.350 3,694.327 40.34% 13,539.956 27.28%
1476-80 9,001.283 4,389.462 48.76% 13,399.528 32.76%
1481-85 8,179.250 3,914.102 47.85% 14,593.865 26.82%
1486-90 7,704.100 3,785.717 49.14% 19,596.654 19.32%
1491-95*
1496-1500 10,129.869 4,109.179 40.56% 13,280.307 30.94%
1501-05 9,449.630 3,892.572 41.19% 11,929.568 32.63%
1506-10 9,074.767 3,385.442 37.31% 11,244.321 30.11%71
Total Excise          Total Renten Renten Payments Total Civic Renten
Quin- Tax Farm Revenues Payments as Percentage Expenditures Payments
quennium in £ parisis in £ of Excise-Tax  in £ parisis as percent of
parisis Revenues Total Civic
Expenditures
1511-15 9,486.219 3,173.963 33.46% 11,580.223 27.41%
1516-20 9,109.030 3,059.299 33.59% 11,829.040 25.86%
1521-25 8,257.570 3,319.544 40.20% 13,556.191 24.49%
1526-30 11,389.250 4,008.275 35.19% 15,208.093 26.36%
1531-35 9,772.260 4,132.185 42.28% 14,185.161 29.13%
1536-40 9,980.120 4,150.143 41.58% 14,824.634 27.99%
1541-45 12,058.925 4,000.380 33.17% 18,216.665 21.96%
1546-50 13,477.319 4,983.692 36.98% 22,303.229 22.35%
* Aalst town accounts registers are missing for these years.
Source: Algemeen Rijksarchief België (Archives Générales du Royaume), Rekenkamer/Chambre de Comptes, reg.  nos.  31,412 - 31,532.72
Table 6. Receipts from the Annual Auctions of Excise-Tax Farms in Aalst:  on Wine, Beer,                                 
 and Other Consumer Products in £ parisis                                                                                                  
1396-1400 to 1546-1550 in quinquennial means                                                                                         
in quinquennial means: 1396-1400 to 1546-1550                                                                            
Wine Beer Beer Total  of  Cloth Grain Total Index:
Wine  Excise  Excise Excise  Wine & ExciseTax Excise Excise Tax  Mean of
Years Excise  Tax Farm Tax Farm Tax Farm Exise  Wine & Farm  Tax Farm 1451-75=
Tax Farm as %  in £ as %  Tax Beer % in £ Farms in Revenues  100
in £ parisis of total parisis of total Farms of total parisis £ parisis in £ parisis
1396-1400 1,067.400 22.45% 1,793.733 37.73% 2,861.133 60.18% 334.900 801.400 4,754.133 61.523
1401-05 1,103.925 18.86% 2,167.675 37.04% 3,271.600 55.90% 264.663 756.175 5,852.596 75.738
1406-10 792.317 13.77% 2,323.833 40.39% 3,116.150 54.17% 291.167 817.483 5,752.817 74.447
1411-15 1,034.425 15.20% 2,370.320 34.83% 3,404.745 50.03% 832.500 856.933 6,805.663 88.072
1416-20 982.200 15.30% 2,051.200 31.95% 3,033.400 47.25% 881.375 842.200 6,419.275 83.072
1421-25 982.725 15.29% 2,118.375 32.96% 3,101.100 48.25% 908.500 861.750 6,427.100 83.173
1426-30 771.700 11.57% 2,824.700 42.36% 3,596.400 53.93% 881.200 678.350 6,668.567 86.298
1431-35 885.430 13.66% 2,387.150 36.81% 3,272.580 50.47% 848.290 675.680 6,484.288 83.913
1436-40 601.500 9.89% 2,456.675 40.38% 3,058.175 50.26% 932.500 566.292 6,084.429 78.738
1441-45 702.475 8.92% 2,951.975 37.47% 3,654.450 46.38% 1,504.275 825.775 7,878.556 101.956
1446-50 804.110 10.72% 2,880.570 38.40% 3,684.680 49.12% 1,276.010 732.790 7,500.927 97.069
1451-55 717.180 12.17% 2,488.580 42.22% 3,205.760 54.39% 782.480 495.380 5,894.123 76.276
1456-60 624.330 8.97% 2,600.330 37.36% 3,224.660 46.33% 1,372.430 759.203 6,960.540 90.076
1461-65 649.825 7.94% 3,042.705 37.17% 3,692.530 45.11% 1,568.295 1,069.885 8,185.102 105.923
1466-70 693.870 8.22% 3,374.270 39.98% 4,068.140 48.20% 1,567.000 959.860 8,439.850 109.220
1471-75 789.660 8.62% 3,367.060 36.77% 4,156.720 45.39% 1,963.960 992.860 9,157.350 118.505
1476-80 886.880 9.85% 3,160.290 35.11% 4,047.170 44.96% 1,972.395 977.542 9,001.283 116.485
1481-85 900.170 11.01% 2,653.970 32.45% 3,554.140 43.45% 1,946.570 704.170 8,179.250 105.847
1486-90 718.000 9.32% 2,827.000 36.69% 3,545.000 46.01% 1,583.500 866.000 7,704.100 99.699
1491-95*
1496-1500 1,161.813 11.47% 4,664.813 46.05% 5,826.625 57.52% 1,012.950 931.563 10,129.869 131.090
1501-05 1,140.020 12.06% 4,345.920 45.99% 5,485.940 58.05% 654.320 974.620 9,449.630 122.287
1506-10 1,045.887 11.53% 4,367.083 48.12% 5,412.970 59.65% 514.400 985.233 9,074.767 117.436
1511-15 1,138.900 12.01% 4,994.625 52.65% 6,133.525 64.66% 351.475 992.575 9,486.219 122.761
1516-20 1,325.680 14.55% 4,108.080 45.10% 5,433.760 59.65% 326.670 1,011.980 9,109.030 117.88073
Wine Beer Beer Total  of  Cloth Grain Total Index:
Wine  Excise  Excise Excise  Wine & ExciseTax Excise Excise Tax  Mean of
Years Excise  Tax Farm Tax Farm Tax Farm Exise  Wine & Farm  Tax Farm 1451-75=
Tax Farm as %  in £ as %  Tax Beer % in £ Farms in Revenues  100
in £ parisis of total parisis of total Farms of total parisis £ parisis in £ parisis
1521-25 1,030.700 12.48% 4,188.500 50.72% 5,219.200 63.21% 316.100 669.420 8,257.570 106.861
1526-30 1,366.640 12.00% 5,497.400 48.27% 6,864.040 60.27% 342.040 1,058.240 11,389.250 147.388
1531-35 1,413.120 14.46% 4,837.320 49.50% 6,250.440 63.96% 295.920 755.320 9,772.260 126.463
1536-40 1,145.880 11.48% 5,512.280 55.23% 6,658.160 66.71% 252.580 727.080 9,980.120 129.152
1541-45 1,423.120 11.80% 6,329.000 52.48% 7,752.120 64.29% 230.880 1,382.310 12,058.925 156.054
1546-50 1,497.605 11.11% 7,660.016 56.84% 9,157.621 67.95% 184.320 1,479.720 13,477.319 174.410
Totals 29,397.486 11.93% 106,345.448 43.17% 135,742.934 55.11% 26,193.664 26,207.789 246,334.907
* Aalst town accounts registers are missing for these years.
Source: Algemeen Rijksarchief België (Archives Générales du Royaume), Rekenkamer/Chambre de Comptes, reg.  nos.  31,412 - 31,532.74
Table 7. Aalst:  Excise-Tax Farm Revenues and Total Civic Revenues                                                                       
Receipts from the Annual Auctions of Excise-Tax Farms on Wine, Beer, and Other Consumer Products                   
in £ parisis and £ groot Flemish:  £1.0 groot = £12.00 parisis                                                     
As percentages of total civic revenues (compared renten sales as percentages of total revenues                          
in quinquennial means: 1396-1400 to 1546-1550                                                                                        
Years      Total of  Total of  Wine & Total Total Total Total Excise Tax Renten
Wine and Wine and Beer as % Excise Tax Tax Farm Civic Civic Farms as Sales as
Beer exise Beer exise of total Farm Revenues Revenues Revenues percent percent
tax farms tax farms tax farm Revenues in £ groot in £ groot of total of total
in £ parisis in £ groot revenues in £ parisis Flemish in £ parisis Flemish Revenues Revenues
1396-1400 2,861.133 238.428 60.18% 4,754.133 396.178 6,451.544 537.629 73.69% 16.85%
1401-05 3,271.600 272.633 55.90% 5,852.596 487.716 7,989.056 665.755 73.26% 22.70%
1406-10 3,116.150 259.679 54.17% 5,752.817 479.401 9,454.124 787.844 60.85% 23.25%
1411-15 3,404.745 283.729 50.03% 6,805.663 567.139 9,896.420 824.702 68.77% 17.76%
1416-20 3,033.400 252.783 47.25% 6,419.275 534.940 8,374.606 697.884 76.65% 12.93%
1421-25 3,101.100 258.425 48.25% 6,427.100 535.592 9,868.297 822.358 65.13% 14.51%
1426-30 3,596.400 299.700 53.93% 6,668.567 555.714 9,439.929 786.661 70.64% 19.08%
1431-35 3,272.580 272.715 50.47% 6,484.288 540.357 9,524.328 793.694 68.08% 25.56%
1436-40 3,058.175 254.848 50.26% 6,084.429 507.036 8,857.402 738.117 68.69% 24.23%
1441-45 3,654.450 304.538 46.38% 7,878.556 656.546 9,544.042 795.337 82.55% 5.97%
1446-50 3,684.680 307.057 49.12% 7,500.927 625.077 8,852.196 737.683 84.74% 0.70%
1451-55 3,205.760 267.147 54.39% 5,894.123 491.177 7,906.593 658.883 74.55% 9.39%
1456-60 3,224.660 268.722 46.33% 6,960.540 580.045 8,555.021 712.918 81.36% 2.48%
1461-65 3,692.530 307.711 45.11% 8,185.102 682.092 10,263.073 855.256 79.75% 6.22%
1466-70 4,068.140 339.012 48.20% 8,439.850 703.321 10,079.193 839.933 83.74% 2.14%
1471-75 4,156.720 346.393 45.39% 9,157.350 763.113 12,641.842 1,053.487 72.44% 14.95%
1476-80 4,047.170 337.264 44.96% 9,001.283 750.107 12,983.309 1,081.942 69.33% 19.56%
1481-85 3,554.140 296.178 43.45% 8,179.250 681.604 12,335.733 1,027.978 66.31% 22.07%
1486-90 3,545.000 295.417 46.01% 7,704.100 642.008 15,359.642 1,279.970 50.16% 23.24%
1491-95 *
1496-1500 5,826.625 485.552 57.52% 10,129.869 844.156 12,071.073 1,005.923 83.92% 2.28%
1501-05 5,485.940 457.162 58.05% 9,449.630 787.469 11,552.635 962.720 81.80% 2.36%75
Years      Total of  Total of  Wine & Total Total Total Total Excise Tax Renten
Wine and Wine and Beer as % Excise Tax Tax Farm Civic Civic Farms as Sales as
Beer exise Beer exise of total Farm Revenues Revenues Revenues percent percent
tax farms tax farms tax farm Revenues in £ groot in £ groot of total of total
in £ parisis in £ groot revenues in £ parisis Flemish in £ parisis Flemish Revenues Revenues
1506-10 5,412.970 451.081 59.65% 9,074.767 756.231 10,842.610 903.551 83.70% 0.38%
1511-15 6,133.525 511.127 64.66% 9,486.219 790.518 11,268.611 939.051 84.18% 0.37%
1516-20 5,433.760 452.813 59.65% 9,109.030 759.086 11,107.796 925.650 82.01% 4.70%
1521-15 5,219.200 434.933 63.21% 8,257.570 688.131 11,927.638 993.970 69.23% 18.56%
1526-30 6,864.040 572.003 60.27% 11,389.250 949.104 13,466.349 1,122.196 84.58% 7.14%
1531-35 6,250.440 520.870 63.96% 9,772.260 814.355 12,361.563 1,030.130 79.05% 7.21%
1536-40 6,658.160 554.847 66.71% 9,980.120 831.677 13,019.779 1,084.982 76.65% 4.70%
1541-45 7,752.120 646.010 64.29% 12,058.925 1,004.910 16,068.092 1,339.008 75.05% 14.41%
1546-50 9,157.621 763.135 67.95% 13,477.319 1,123.110 18,460.720 1,538.393 73.01% 11.63%
Totals 135,742.934 11,311.911 55.11% 246,334.907 20,527.909 330,523.214 27,543.601 74.53% 11.86%
* Aalst town accounts registers are missing for these years.
Source: 
Algemeen Rijksarchief België (Archives Générales du Royaume), Rekenkamer/Chambre de Comptes, reg.  nos.  31,412 - 31,532.
For the sources for the consumer baskets, see sources for Table 11.76
Table 8:             Values of the Sales of Excise Tax Farms in Aalst: in pounds parisis and groot Flemish                                                 
and in the equivalent value of the Flemish Basket of Consumables, for the Flemish price index                                          
in quinquennial means, 1396-1400 to 1546-50                                                                                  
Years: Mean Value of Mean Value of Value of Flemish Flemish Price  Value of Total Index of Total
Quin- of Total of Total Basket of Index for the  Excise Tax  Excise Tax Farms
quenniums Excise Tax Farm Excise Tax Farm  Consumables Basket Farms in Flemish in Flemish Baskets
Revenues Revenues in d groot Flem Mean of  Baskets of of Consumables
in £ parisis in £ groot Flem Mean: 126.295d  1451-75=100 Consumables Mean of 
1451-75=100
1396-1400 4,754.133 396.178 115.304 91.298 865.368 69.040
1401-05 5,852.596 487.716 111.810 88.531 1,057.126 84.339
1406-10 5,752.817 479.401 132.939 105.261 961.134 76.681
1411-15 6,805.663 567.139 120.370 95.309 1,122.510 89.555
1416-20 6,419.275 534.940 135.616 107.381 900.551 71.847
1421-25 6,427.100 535.592 141.680 112.182 925.372 73.828
1426-30 6,668.567 555.714 148.741 117.773 896.667 71.537
1431-35 6,484.288 540.357 155.989 123.512 838.614 66.906
1436-40 6,084.429 507.036 177.022 140.166 752.781 60.058
1441-45 7,878.556 656.546 143.350 113.504 1,283.387 102.390
1446-50 7,500.927 625.077 138.904 109.984 1,092.793 87.185
1451-55 5,894.123 491.177 127.434 100.902 934.272 74.538
1456-60 6,960.540 580.045 148.845 117.855 944.964 75.391
1461-65 8,185.102 682.092 112.030 88.705 1,477.210 117.854
1466-70 8,439.850 703.321 121.900 96.520 1,387.199 110.673
1471-75 9,157.350 763.113 121.264 96.017 1,523.476 121.545
1476-80 9,001.283 750.107 148.034 117.213 1,256.804 100.270
1481-85 8,179.250 681.604 198.097 156.853 897.013 71.565
1486-90 7,704.100 642.008 188.911 149.580 815.631 65.072
1491-95* 183.104 144.981
1496-1500 10,129.869 844.156 126.617 100.255 1,593.471 127.129
1501-05 9,449.630 787.469 194.467 125.449 975.132 77.797
1506-10 9,074.767 756.231 177.960 114.801 1,028.189 82.030
1511-15 9,486.219 790.518 213.773 137.904 908.914 72.514
1516-20 9,109.030 759.086 232.933 150.264 782.595 62.43777
Years: Mean Value of Mean Value of Value of Flemish Flemish Price  Value of Total Index of Total
Quin- of Total of Total Basket of Index for the  Excise Tax  Excise Tax Farms
quenniums Excise Tax Farm Excise Tax Farm  Consumables Basket Farms in Flemish in Flemish Baskets
Revenues Revenues in d groot Flem Mean of  Baskets of of Consumables
in £ parisis in £ groot Flem Mean: 126.295d  1451-75=100 Consumables Mean of 
1451-75=100
1521-25 8,257.570 688.131 278.933 179.938 599.318 47.814
1526-30 11,389.250 949.104 276.733 178.519 824.594 65.787
1531-35 9,772.260 814.355 269.720 173.995 730.432 58.275
1536-40 9,980.120 831.677 287.773 185.641 696.081 55.534
1541-45 12,058.925 1,004.910 322.960 208.340 748.274 59.698
1546-50 13,477.319 1,123.110 309.133 199.420 882.569 70.413
* Aalst town accounts registers are missing for these years.
Sources: 
Algemeen Rijksarchief België (Archives Générales du Royaume), Rekenkamer/Chambre de Comptes, reg.  nos.  31,412 - 31,532.
For the sources for the consumer baskets, see sources for Table 11.78
Table  9:     Revenues from the Sale of Excise Tax Farms in £ groot Flemish and equivalent values                                  
of the number of days’ wages for master masons, in quinquennial means, 1396-1400 to 1546-50                    
Total of    Value of  Flemish Mean Daily  Value of Index:  Income (210 Real Wage
Excise Tax     Flemish Price  Wage of Excise  Value of  days) for Index in 
5- Year Farm      Basket of Index Master Farms in Excise Master Masons Commodity
means Revenues  Consumables 126.295d  Masons no. of Tax Farms In Baskets of  Baskets
in £ groot    in d groot Mean of in d. groot days wages in no. days Consumables:  Mean of
Flemish     Flemish 1451-75 Flemish for master wages for in harmonic 1451-75
masons masons means =  100
1396-1400 396.178 115.304 91.298 7.200 13,205.926 65.715 12.749 100.762
1401-05 487.716 111.810 88.531 7.500 15,606.922 77.663 14.086 111.333
1406-10 479.401 132.939 105.261 7.500 15,340.844 76.339 11.848 93.638
1411-15 567.139 120.370 95.309 7.500 18,148.433 90.310 13.085 103.415
1416-20 534.940 135.616 107.381 7.700 16,673.442 82.970 11.880 93.891
1421-25 535.592 141.680 112.182 7.800 16,479.744 82.007 11.532 91.143
1426-30 555.714 148.741 117.773 7.900 16,882.447 84.010 11.159 88.198
1431-35 540.357 155.989 123.512 8.000 16,210.721 80.668 10.770 85.122
1436-40 507.036 177.022 140.166 7.900 15,403.618 76.651 9.404 74.323
1441-45 656.546 143.350 113.504 7.800 20,201.426 100.526 11.446 90.467
1446-50 625.077 138.904 109.984 7.700 19,482.926 96.951 11.540 91.204
1451-55 491.177 127.434 100.902 7.000 16,840.352 83.801 11.294 89.265
1456-60 580.045 148.845 117.855 7.900 17,621.620 87.689 11.123 87.914
1461-65 682.092 112.030 88.705 8.200 19,963.663 99.343 15.320 121.085
1466-70 703.321 121.900 96.520 7.800 21,640.641 107.688 13.432 106.163
1471-75 763.113 121.264 96.017 7.500 24,419.600 121.517 12.984 102.622
1476-80 750.107 148.034 117.213 8.000 22,503.206 111.980 11.349 89.696
1481-85 681.604 198.097 156.853 7.500 21,811.333 108.538 7.996 63.196
1486-90 642.008 188.911 149.580 10.000 15,408.200 76.674 9.012 71.225
1491-95* 183.104 144.981 10.000 11.469 90.646
1496-1500 844.156 126.617 100.255 9.400 21,552.912 107.252 15.519 122.657
1501-05 787.469 194.467 125.449 9.000 20,999.178 104.496 9.719 76.814
1506-10 756.231 177.960 114.801 9.000 20,166.148 100.351 10.653 84.194
1511-15 790.518 213.773 137.904 8.900 21,317.346 106.079 8.748 69.14479
Total of    Value of  Flemish Mean Daily  Value of Index:  Income (210 Real Wage
Excise Tax     Flemish Price  Wage of Excise  Value of  days) for Index in 
5- Year Farm      Basket of Index Master Farms in Excise Master Masons Commodity
means Revenues  Consumables 126.295d  Masons no. of Tax Farms In Baskets of  Baskets
in £ groot    in d groot Mean of in d. groot days wages in no. days Consumables:  Mean of
Flemish     Flemish 1451-75 Flemish for master wages for in harmonic 1451-75
masons masons means =  100
1516-20 759.086 232.933 150.264 9.000 20,242.289 100.730 8.114 64.129
1521-25 688.131 278.933 179.938 9.000 18,350.156 91.314 6.776 53.553
1526-30 949.104 276.733 178.519 9.000 25,309.444 125.945 6.830 53.979
1531-35 814.355 269.720 173.995 8.200 23,834.780 118.607 6.390 50.507
1536-40 831.677 287.773 185.641 7.600 26,263.474 130.692 5.536 43.752
1541-45 1,004.910 322.960 208.340 8.200 29,412.012 146.360 5.337 42.181
1546-50 1,123.110 309.133 199.420 9.000 29,949.598 149.035 6.104 48.240
* Aalst town accounts registers are missing for these years.
Sources:
Algemeen Rijksarchief België (Archives Générales du Royaume), Rekenkamer/Chambre de Comptes, reg.  nos.  31,412 - 31,532.
For the sources for the consumer baskets, see sources for Table 11.80
Table 9b.  Revenues from the Sale of Excise Tax Farms in £ groot Flemish and equivalent values
of the number of days wages for master masons, in quinquennial means, 1396-1400 to 1546-50
Total of Flemish Mean Daily  Value of Per Capita Tax Burden
Years in Excise Tax  Price  Wage of Excise  Tax Burden for Employed
5 - year Farm Index Master Farms in for Presumed Adult Males
means Revenues 126.295d Masons no.  of Population [900]
in £ groot  Mean of in d. groot days wages of 3600 per person
Flemish 1451-75=100 Flemish for master in days'  in days' 
masons wages wages
1396-1400 396.178 91.298 7.200 13,205.926 3.668 14.673
1401-05 487.716 88.531 7.500 15,606.922 4.335 17.341
1406-10 479.401 105.261 7.500 15,340.844 4.261 17.045
1411-15 567.139 95.309 7.500 18,148.433 5.041 20.165
1416-20 534.940 107.381 7.700 16,673.442 4.632 18.526
1421-25 535.592 112.182 7.800 16,479.744 4.578 18.311
1426-30 555.714 117.773 7.900 16,882.447 4.690 18.758
1431-35 540.357 123.512 8.000 16,210.721 4.503 18.012
1436-40 507.036 140.166 7.900 15,403.618 4.279 17.115
1441-45 656.546 113.504 7.800 20,201.426 5.612 22.446
1446-50 625.077 109.984 7.700 19,482.926 5.412 21.648
1451-55 491.177 100.902 7.000 16,840.352 4.678 18.712
1456-60 580.045 117.855 7.900 17,621.620 4.895 19.580
1461-65 682.092 88.705 8.200 19,963.663 5.545 22.182
1466-70 703.321 96.520 7.800 21,640.641 6.011 24.045
1471-75 763.113 96.017 7.500 24,419.600 6.783 27.133
1476-80 750.107 117.213 8.000 22,503.206 6.251 25.004
1481-85 681.604 156.853 7.500 21,811.333 6.059 24.235
1486-90 642.008 149.580 10.000 15,408.200 4.280 17.120
1491-95 n.a. 144.981 10.000
1496-1500 844.156 100.255 9.400 21,552.912 5.987 23.948
1501-05 787.469 125.449 9.000 20,999.178 5.833 23.332
1506-10 756.231 114.801 9.000 20,166.148 5.602 22.407
1511-15 790.518 137.904 8.900 21,317.346 5.921 23.686
1516-20 759.086 150.264 9.000 20,242.289 5.623 22.49181
Total of Flemish Mean Daily  Value of Per Capita Tax Burden
Years in Excise Tax  Price  Wage of Excise  Tax Burden for Employed
5 - year Farm Index Master Farms in for Presumed Adult Males
means Revenues 126.295d Masons no.  of Population [900]
in £ groot  Mean of in d. groot days wages of 3600 per person
Flemish 1451-75=100 Flemish for master in days'  in days' 
masons wages wages
1521-25 688.131 179.938 9.000 18,350.156 5.097 20.389
1526-30 949.104 178.519 9.000 25,309.444 7.030 28.122
1531-35 814.355 173.995 8.200 23,834.780 6.621 26.483
1536-40 831.677 185.641 7.600 26,263.474 7.295 29.182
1541-45 1,004.910 208.340 8.200 29,412.012 8.170 32.680
1546-50 1,123.110 199.420 9.000 29,949.598 8.319 33.277
* Aalst town accounts registers are missing for these years.
Sources:
Algemeen Rijksarchief België (Archives Générales du Royaume), Rekenkamer/Chambre de Comptes, reg.  nos.  31,412 - 31,532.
For the sources for the consumer baskets, see sources for Table 11.82
       Table 10                                                      Population Decline and Poverty in the Duchy of Brabant, 1437 - 1496                           
The number of family hearths (households) and percentage of hearths without taxable income:               
(‘poor hearths’) in 1437, 1480, and 1496                                                           
 
Area of Census 1437          1437 1480 1480 1496 1496 Percentage
in the duchy of Brabant no. of per cent no. of per cent no. of per cent Change from
hearths poor hearths hearths poor hearths hearths poor hearths 1437 to 1496
Brussels 6,376 10.5 7,414 7.9 5,750 17.1 -9.82%
Antwerp 3,440 13.5 5,450 10.5 6,586 12.5 91.45%
Leuven 3,579 7.6 3,933 18.3 3,069 n.a. -14.25%
s'Hertogen-bosch 2,883 10.4 2,930 7.9 3,456 n.a. 19.88%
Sub-total Large Towns 16,278 10.5 19,727 14.8 18,861 n.a. 15.87%
Small Towns 14,159 9.2 12,216 28.1 10,600 n.a. -25.14%
Villages 62,301 29.7 54,540 31.6 45,882 n.a. -26.35%
Total Duchy 92,738 23.4 86,483 27.3 75,343 n.a. -18.76%
Source: 
Joseph Cuvlier, Les dénombrements de foyers en Brabant, XIV - XVI siècle, 2 vols.  (Brussels, 1912-13), vol.  I, 
pp. 432-3, 446-7, 462-77, 484-7; and also pp. cxxxv, clxxvii-viii, ccxxiii-xviii.83
Table 11a.                                                                Basket of Consumables:  Commodity Price Indexes for Brabant and Flanders               
            
mean of 1451-75 = 100                                                                                                       
Commodity BRABANT
Amount Unit Value Value Percent




Rye 126 litres 42.404 28.269 18.24%
Barley
Peas
Sub-total 126.000 litres 42.404 28.269 18.24%
Drink
barley (or malt) 162.000 litres  39.712 26.475 17.08%




Beef 23.500 kg 54.704 36.469 23.53%
Sub-total 54.704 36.469 23.53%
Fish:  Herrings 40.000 no. 9.988 6.659 4.30%
Sub-total 119.396 79.597 51.35%
Dairy84
Commodity BRABANT
Amount Unit Value Value Percent
in d  gr. in d  gr.
Brabant Flemish
Butter 4.800 kg 19.728 13.152 8.48%
Cheese 4.700 kg 5.968 3.979 2.57%
Sub-total 25.696 17.131 11.05%
Food and Drink 172.504 115.003 74.19%
Industrial: Fuel
Charcoal 162.000 litres 10.568 7.045 4.54%
Candles 1.333 kg 7.608 5.072 3.27%
Lamp Oil
Sub-total 18.176 12.117 7.82%
Industrial: Textiles
Canvas/Linen 1.800 metre 17.000 11.333 7.31%
Shirting
Coarse Woollens 1.125 metre 24.844 16.563 10.68%
Sub-total 41.844 27.896 18.00%
TOTAL 232.524 155.016 100.00%85
Table 11b.                                 Basket of Consumables Commodity Price Indexes for Brabant and Flanders
     mean of values for 1451-75 = 100                                                                                   
Commodity FLANDERS
Amount Unit Value in Percent
  in d  groot               of total
Flemish                
Farinaceous
Wheat 45.461 litres 13.279 10.51%
Rye 36.369 litres 7.062 5.59%
Barley 18.184 litres 2.867 2.27%
Peas 24.243 litres 7.341 5.81%
Sub-total 124.257 litres 30.549 24.19%
Drink
barley (or malt) 163.659 litres  25.805 20.43%






Fish:  Herrings no.
Sub-total86
Table 11b.                                 Basket of Consumables Commodity Price Indexes for Brabant and Flanders
     mean of values for 1451-75 = 100                                                                                   
Commodity FLANDERS
Amount Unit Value in Percent
  in d  groot               of total
Flemish                
Dairy
Butter 13.610 kg 36.087 28.57%
Cheese 13.610 kg 8.578 6.79%
Sub-total 27.220 44.665 35.37%









Coarse Woollens 1.225 metre 25.276 20.01%
Sub-total 25.276 20.01%
TOTAL 126.295 100.00%87
Table 11b.                                 Basket of Consumables Commodity Price Indexes for Brabant and Flanders
     mean of values for 1451-75 = 100                                                                                   
Commodity FLANDERS
Amount Unit Value in Percent
  in d  groot               of total
Flemish                
bu = bushels; lb. = pound avoirdupois (453.592 g); pt = pint; yd = yard; l. = litre; m. = metre
Sources:  
Herman Van der Wee, ‘Prijzen en lonen als ontwikkelingsvariabelen:  Een vergelijkend onderzoek tussen Engeland en de Zuidelijke Nederlanden,
1400-1700’, in Album aangeboden aan Charles Verlinden ter gelegenheid van zijn dertig jaar professoraat (Wetteren: Universum, 1975), pp. 413-47;
reissued in English translation (without the tables) as ‘Prices and Wages as Development Variables: A Comparison Between England and the Southern
Netherlands, 1400-1700’, Acta Historiae Neerlandicae, 10  (1978), 58-78; republished in Herman Van der Wee, The Low Countries in the Early
Modern World , trans. by Lizabeth Fackelman (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press and Variorum, 1993), pp. 223-41.     
Charles Verlinden and E. Scholliers, et al, eds., Documents pour l'histoire des prix et des salaires en Flandre et en Brabant/Dokumenten voor de
geschiedenis van prijzen en lonen in Vlaanderen en Brabant, 4 vols. Rijksuniversiteit te Gent: Werken Uitgegeven door de Faculteit van de Letteren
en Wijsbegeerte nos. 125 [vol. I], 136 [vol. II.i], 137 [Vol.II.ii](Bruges, 1959 - 65).
Stadsarchief Gent, Stadsrekeningen 1349/50-1499/1500, Reeks 400: nos. 7 - 35:  town accounts.65Figure 1:    
 
Sales of Renten (Erfelijk Renten and Lijfrenten) and Total Civic Revenues in Aalst 
1396-1400 to 1546-50, in quinquennial means 
 







Source: Algemeen Rijksarchief België (Archives Générales du Royaume), Rekenkamer/Chambre 
de Comptes, reg.  nos.  31,412 - 31,532. Figure 2: 
 
Expenditures on Renten (Erfelijk Renten and Lijfrenten) and Total Civic Expenditures in 
Aalst, 
 
1396-1400 to 1546-1550, in quinquennial means 
 








Source: Algemeen Rijksarchief België (Archives Générales du Royaume), Rekenkamer/Chambre 
de Comptes, reg.  nos.  31,412 - 31,532. Figure 3: 
 
Total Civic Revenues and  Civic Expenditures, in Aalst 
 
1396-1400 to 1546-1550 , in quinquennial means 
 







Source: Algemeen Rijksarchief België (Archives Générales du Royaume), Rekenkamer/Chambre 
de Comptes, reg.  nos.  31,412 - 31,532. Figure 4:  
 
Total Excise Tax Farm Revenues and Total Expenditures on Renten (Erfelijk Renten and 
Lijfrenten) in Aalst: 
 
1396-1400 to 1546-50, in quinquennial means 
 






Source: Algemeen Rijksarchief België (Archives Générales du Royaume), Rekenkamer/Chambre 
de Comptes, reg.  nos.  31,412 - 31,532. Figure 5: 
 
Revenues from the Sale of Excise Tax Farms in Aalst: on beer, wine, and total consumer 
products taxes, 1396-1400 to 1546-50, in quinquennial means 
 







Source: Algemeen Rijksarchief België (Archives Générales du Royaume), Rekenkamer/Chambre 
de Comptes, reg.  nos.  31,412 - 31,532. Figure 6: 
 
Total Excise Taxes on Alcohol, Total Excise Tax Farms, and Total Civic Revenues, in Aalst 
 
1396-1400 to 1546-50, in quinquennial means 
 






Source: Algemeen Rijksarchief België (Archives Générales du Royaume), Rekenkamer/Chambre 
de Comptes, reg.  nos.  31,412 - 31,532. Figure 7: 
 
Values of the Sale of Renten (Erfelijk and Lijfrenten), Total Values of the Tax Farms, and 
Total Civic Revenues in Aalst, 1396 – 1400 to 1546-1550 
 
1396-1400 to 1546-50, in quinquennial means 
 








Source: Algemeen Rijksarchief België (Archives Générales du Royaume), Rekenkamer/Chambre 
de Comptes, reg.  nos.  31,412 - 31,532. 
 
 Figure 8: 
 
Mean Values of Excise Tax Farms, expressed in Pounds Groot Flemish and in the Number 
of Consumer Baskets, with the Flemish Price Index (1451-75 = 100) and Indexes for the 
Excise Tax Farms as valued in Flemish Consumer Baskets, in Aalst 
 









 Algemeen Rijksarchief België (Archives Générales du Royaume), Rekenkamer/Chambre de 
Comptes, reg.  nos.  31,412 - 31,532;   
 
Herman Van der Wee, ‘Prijzen en lonen als ontwikkelingsvariabelen:  Een vergelijkend 
onderzoek tussen Engeland en de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, 1400-1700’, in Album aangeboden aan 
Charles Verlinden ter gelegenheid van zijn dertig jaar professoraat (Wetteren: Universum, 
1975), pp. 413-47; reissued in English translation (without the tables) as ‘Prices and Wages as 
Development Variables: A Comparison Between England and the Southern Netherlands, 1400-
1700’, Acta Historiae Neerlandicae, 10  (1978), 58-78; republished in Herman Van der Wee, The Low Countries in the Early Modern World , trans. by Lizabeth Fackelman (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press and Variorum, 1993), pp. 223-41;   
 
Charles Verlinden and E. Scholliers, et al, eds., Documents pour l'histoire des prix et des salaires 
en Flandre et en Brabant/Dokumenten voor de geschiedenis van prijzen en lonen in Vlaanderen 
en Brabant, 4 vols. Rijksuniversiteit te Gent: Werken Uitgegeven door de Faculteit van de 
Letteren en Wijsbegeerte nos. 125 [vol. I], 136 [vol. II.i], 137 [Vol.II.ii](Bruges, 1959 - 65). Figure 9: 
 
Excise Tax Farm Revenues and Masons’ Wages in Aalst: Nominal and Real Wages 
 
Excise Tax Farm Revenues expressed in pounds groot Flemish and in masons’  wage 
incomes 
 
The Excise Tax Burden Expressed as the equivalent number of years of masons’ wages in 
Aalst 
 
Aalst nominal and real wage indexes:  mean of 1451-75 = 100 
 
with annual wage incomes expressed as the equivalent number of baskets of consumable 
(purchasable by that wage income) 
 






Sources:   
 
Algemeen Rijksarchief België (Archives Générales du Royaume), Rekenkamer/Chambre de 
Comptes, reg.  nos.  31,412 - 31,532;    
Herman Van der Wee, ‘Prijzen en lonen als ontwikkelingsvariabelen:  Een vergelijkend 
onderzoek tussen Engeland en de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, 1400-1700’, in Album aangeboden aan 
Charles Verlinden ter gelegenheid van zijn dertig jaar professoraat (Wetteren: Universum, 
1975), pp. 413-47; reissued in English translation (without the tables) as ‘Prices and Wages as 
Development Variables: A Comparison Between England and the Southern Netherlands, 1400-
1700’, Acta Historiae Neerlandicae, 10  (1978), 58-78; republished in Herman Van der Wee, The 
Low Countries in the Early Modern World , trans. by Lizabeth Fackelman (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press and Variorum, 1993), pp. 223-41;   
 
Charles Verlinden and E. Scholliers, et al, eds., Documents pour l'histoire des prix et des salaires 
en Flandre et en Brabant/Dokumenten voor de geschiedenis van prijzen en lonen in Vlaanderen 
en Brabant, 4 vols. Rijksuniversiteit te Gent: Werken Uitgegeven door de Faculteit van de 
Letteren en Wijsbegeerte nos. 125 [vol. I], 136 [vol. II.i], 137 [Vol.II.ii](Bruges, 1959 - 65). 
 
 